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Abstract
Huge amounts of information today are stored digitally and a significant amount of
this information (e.g., health records) must be kept unaltered and confidential over
long periods of time (i.e., decades or centuries). Consequently, there is a high de-
mand for protection schemes that can ensure integrity and confidentiality over such
long time periods. The cryptographic schemes used today for protecting integrity
and confidentiality (e.g., RSA signatures and AES encryption), however, are not
designed to provide long-term protection as their security relies on computational
assumptions (e.g., that factoring large integers is infeasible) and trust assumptions
(e.g., that a secret key is not compromised) which cannot be guaranteed over such
long time periods. To achieve long-term integrity protection Bayer, Haber, and Stor-
netta proposed a method for prolonging the validity of digital signatures by using
cryptographic timestamping. The security of this method, however, is unclear as no
precise security analysis has been performed. To achieve long-term confidentiality
protection there exist information-theoretically secure schemes (e.g., Quantum Key
Distribution, One-Time-Pad Encryption, or Secret Sharing) whose security does
not depend on computational assumptions. However, so far it is unclear whether
information-theoretic confidentiality protection can be combined with prolongable
integrity protection.
This thesis answers both of these research questions. In the first part, we develop
the first formal security models and proofs for several long-term integrity protection
schemes that are derived from the ideas of Bayer, Haber, and Stornetta. We first
develop a novel computational model that captures long-lived adversaries whose
computational power increases over time. Then, using this model, we show that
signature-based long-term integrity protection can be constructed from short-term
unforgeable signature schemes and that hash-based long-term integrity protection
can be constructed from short-term preimage-aware hash functions. We also propose
a new cryptographic primitive called long-term commitment, which is crucial for the
second part of this thesis. In the second part we then present the first storage sys-
tem that combines information-theoretic confidentiality protection with prolongable
integrity protection. We also propose two extensions of this system, where the first
enables long-term access pattern hiding security (i.e., it remains secret which data
items are accessed by the user at which times) and the second improves the efficiency
when storing large complex datasets.
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1. Introduction
Today, huge amounts of information are generated, exchanged, and stored digitally.
A significant amount of this information is long-lived and sensitive (e.g., health
records, governmental documents, enterprise documents, land registries, tax decla-
rations) and requires protection of integrity and confidentiality for decades or even
centuries.
1.1. Background
Digitally stored information today is commonly protected using digital signature
schemes (e.g., RSA [RSA78]) to ensure integrity and authenticity, and encryption
schemes (e.g., AES [Nat01]) to ensure confidentiality (see also [Buc16]). The com-
monly used signature and encryption schemes rely on computational assumptions
to be secure. For example, many schemes rely on the assumption that finding the
prime factors of large integers requires an infeasible amount of computing power
using current computing technology or an infeasible amount of time. Such a compu-
tational assumption crucially depends on the exact meaning of large and infeasible.
In fact, as computing technology is continuously being improved, what appears com-
putationally infeasible today, may appear feasible at some point in the future. Such
developments have severe consequences for the security of cryptographic schemes
that rely on computational assumptions. Historically, we observe that, for the men-
tioned reasons, DES encryption [Nat77] was replaced by AES encryption [Nat01]
and SHA-1 hashing [Nat95] was replaced by SHA-2 hashing [Nat02]. Moreover, we
know that the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange Protocol [DH76] and the RSA Signature
Scheme [RSA78], which are allegedly the most widely used cryptographic schemes
today, are prone to attacks based on quantum computing [Sho99] and will need to be
replaced by quantum-secure alternatives before sufficiently powerful quantum com-
puters are available (cf. [Nat17]). In summary, we observe that the commonly used
computationally secure cryptographic schemes have a limited lifetime and appear
insufficient to provide long-term protection (over decades or centuries).
A number of schemes have been proposed that mitigate the risks described above.
In the early 1990s, Bayer, Haber, and Stornetta proposed a method for prolonging
the validity of a digital signature beyond the validity of the corresponding digital
signature scheme [BHS93]. Their method uses digital time-stamping and is the ba-
sis for several long-term integrity schemes that have been proposed afterwards (cf.
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[VBC+15]). While it appears possible to prolong integrity and authenticity pro-
tection, it seems impossible to prolong confidentiality protection in a similar way.
The reason is that once sensitive information is leaked to an adversarial entity, we
usually cannot make that entity forget the information afterwards. From an in-
formation theoretic point of view, ciphertexts generated using a computationally
secure encryption scheme (e.g., AES) contain almost as much sensitive informa-
tion as the plaintexts. In the short-term this information may not be decryptable
by a computationally limited adversary, but as soon as the encryption is break-
able, knowing the ciphertexts is almost as good as knowing the plaintexts. As a
consequence, computationally secure encryption algorithms, ultimately, appear un-
suitable for long-term confidentiality protection. Suitable candidates, instead, are
information-theoretically secure schemes, which do not require any computational
assumptions. Examples for information-theoretically secure schemes are quantum
key distribution and one-time pad encryption for confidentiality protection of data
in transit, and proactive secret sharing for confidentiality protection of data at rest
(cf. [BBMW14]).
1.2. Open challenges
As explained in section 1.1, the signature renewal method of [BHS93] is the basis
for a number of schemes that are designed to provide long-term integrity protection.
Even though an earlier version of this method described in [HS91] was found to be
insecure, neither the revised version of the method, nor the schemes based on it are
provided with a comprehensive security analysis. Without such an analysis, however,
it remains unclear what are precisely the computational assumptions required and
security guarantees provided by these schemes.
When taking a closer look at modeling computational security of long-lived sys-
tems it becomes evident that this task, in fact, requires a whole new computational
model. A cryptographic scheme is traditionally considered computationally secure if
any efficient strategy for breaking the scheme can be turned into an efficient strategy
for solving some computational problem. Then, if there is no feasible strategy for
solving the computational problem, it follows that there is no feasible strategy for
breaking the security of the scheme. As pointed out in section 1.1, what is com-
putationally infeasible today, might become feasible at some point in the future.
However, such long-term computational aspects are typically not reflected within
the computational models used for analyzing the security of cryptographic schemes.
Canetti et al. made a step into this direction by proposing a computational frame-
work that allows for expressing time-related computational constraints [CCK+08].
However, their framework neither allows for modeling computational entities with
increasing computational power, nor for expressing exact security levels, while both
aspects are crucial when analyzing the security of long-term protection schemes.
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Consequently, to understand what are the security guarantees provided by long-
term integrity schemes, a new computational model is needed and, based on this,
precise security definitions and proofs must be developed.
Besides the lack of a precise understanding of the security of long-term integrity
schemes, there is also no solution for combining long-term integrity with long-term
confidentiality protection. On the one hand, existing long-term integrity schemes
leak information to third-party timestamp services. On the other hand, existing
long-term confidentiality schemes do not provide renewable integrity protection. To
meet the protection requirements of sensitive long-lived data, new schemes must be
developed that support simultaneous long-term protection of integrity and confiden-
tiality.
1.3. Contributions
1.3.1. Security analysis of long-term protection schemes
The first contribution of this thesis is a rigorous security analysis of long-term in-
tegrity protection schemes (Part I).
As a basis, in chapter 3, we provide a novel computational model for long-lived
systems. The model features a notion of time and allows for expressing time-related
computational constraints. It captures adversaries who have a potentially unlimited
running time, increase their computation rate over time, and change their compu-
tational architecture (e.g., from classical computers to quantum computers).
In chapter 4, we then present a formal security analysis of the renewal method
described in [BHS93]. We first describe a long-term integrity scheme based on this
method which uses signature-based timestamps for protection renewal. Then we
analyze the security of the described scheme and show that it can be reduced to
the security of the employed signature schemes within their validity period. In
particular, we prove a lower bound on the security level of the long-term integrity
scheme, where the bound is a function of the number of the employed cryptographic
components and of their security level within their validity period. This lower bound
can be used as a tool for estimating the security level of a given instantiation of the
long-term integrity scheme at a given point in time.
Next, in chapter 5, we present a formal security analysis of long-term timestamp
schemes that use a trusted repository. We prove the security of these schemes in the
ideal primitive model using preimage-aware hash functions [DRS09]. In particular,
we prove a lower bound on the security level of such a scheme, where the lower bound
is a function of the number of repository queries, the number of data items allowed
per timestamp, and the security level of the used cryptographic hash functions within
their validity period.
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Then, in chapter 6, we propose a novel cryptographic primitive called long-term
commitment. While no commitment scheme can be unconditionally hiding and un-
conditionally binding at the same time, a long-term commitment is unconditional
hiding and long-term binding (i.e., the binding security can be prolonged). On
the negative side, we argue why it is unlikely that long-term commitments can be
constructed from standard cryptographic primitives (e.g., one-way functions) us-
ing only black-box techniques. On the positive side, we show how to construct
long-term commitments from unconditionally hiding and extractable-binding com-
mitments. We also show that extractable-binding commitments can be constructed
from extractable and collision-resistant hash functions [BCC+17].
1.3.2. Constructions of long-term secure storage systems
providing integrity and confidentiality protection
The second contribution of this thesis is the development of various long-term secure
storage systems that simultaneously provide integrity and confidentiality protection
(Part II).
In chapter 7 we present LINCOS, which is the first storage system that simultane-
ously provides renewable integrity protection and information-theoretic confidential-
ity protection. On the way, we construct a novel long-term integrity scheme based
on long-term commitments (cf. chapter 6) that does not leak any information about
the protected data. We then combine this scheme with statistically secure secret
sharing to obtain LINCOS. Afterwards, we present an experimental evaluation of
LINCOS where long-term secure channels are implemented using QKD technology
within the Tokyo QKD Network [SFI+11]. This is the first work that shows the
feasibility of combined long-term integrity, authenticity, confidentiality protection.
Next, in chapter 8 we present PROPYLA, which is an extension of LINCOS that
additionally provides long-term access-pattern-hiding security. This is relevant in
scenarios where the storage provider has additional information about the structure
of the stored data. Then, even if the storage provider cannot see the data content, it
may still learn sensitive information by observing which data items are accessed at
which point in times. Access-pattern-hiding security ensures that storage providers
cannot learn anything from analyzing the access patterns. This property in addition
to data integrity and confidentiality is achieved by using the components of LINCOS
in combination with statistically secure ORAM schemes [CLP14]. In a performance
analysis we show show that the communication, computation, and storage overhead
of PROPYLA compared to LINCOS is poly-logarithmic in the number of stored data
items.
Finally, in chapter 9 we present ELSA, which is an optimization of LINCOS for
large datasets that contain relatively small data items. Such datasets often occur in
practice (e.g, medical record databases) and ELSA drastically reduces the number
6
1.3. Contributions
of timestamps required for protecting them. The performance improvements are
achieved by using extractable-binding and statistically hiding vector commitment
schemes. We first construct an extractable-binding and statistically hiding vector
commitment scheme that is secure under selective decommitment. We then combine
this scheme with renewable timestamps and secret sharing to obtain the storage
architecture ELSA. We also experimentally evaluate the performance of ELSA in a
simulated scenario where a dataset consisting of 12 000 data items of size 10 kB is
stored, protected, and verified over a time span of 100 years. Our evaluation shows
that ELSA completes this scenario an order of magnitude faster than LINCOS.
7

2. Preliminaries
2.1. Notation
We denote the set of natural numbers by N and the set of real numbers by R.
For r1, r2 ∈ R, we define R[r1,r2] = {r ∈ R : r1 ≤ r ≤ r2}. For n ∈ N, by [n] we
denote the set {1, . . . , n}. For vector V = (v1, . . . , vn), n ∈ N, and set I ⊆ [n], define
VI := (vi)i∈I , and for i ∈ [n], we may also write Vi := vi. For a probabilistic algorithm
A and input x, we write A(x) →r y to denote that A on input x produces y using
random coins r. For a pair of random variables (A,B) over a finite outcome set X,
we define the statistical distance of A and B as ∆(A,B) := ∑x∈X |PrA(x)− PrB(x)|.
We use the following square bracket notation for denoting lists. By [] we denote an
empty list. For a list L = [x1, . . . , xn] and i ∈ [n], we denote by L[i :] the sublist
[xi, . . . , xn], by L[: −i] the sublist [x1, . . . , xn−i+1], and by L[−i] the element xn−i+1.
For a list L and an element x, we write L += x to denote that x is appended to L.
2.2. Computational security
A cryptographic primitive is computationally secure if for any probabilistic adversary
given a large amount of computational resources the probability to break the security
of the scheme is negligible. Such an adversary can be thought of as a program that
runs on some kind of computing machine, which is modeled, for example, by a Turing
Machine [Tur37] or a Quantum Turing Machine [Deu85]. The resources of such an
adversary are measured in terms of the number of unitary operations performed by
the machine. For p ∈ N, by a p-step adversary we mean a program that halts after
at most p operations when run on the considered computing machine model.
Definition 2.1. Let  : N→ R[0,1] be a function and P be a cryptographic primitive.
We say P is -secure, if any p-step adversary breaks P with probability at most (p).
We remark that in the traditional view of cryptography the step count of an
adversary is sometimes also referred to as the computation time of the adversary. In
particular, no distinction between real time and computation steps is usually made.
Furthermore, the class of computing machines considered is usually assumed to be
the class of Turing Machines. We will see in chapter 3 that for analyzing long-term
security of cryptographic schemes it is useful to distinguish between real time and
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computational steps and to consider that the computational technology used by an
adversary may change over time.
Security reductions
Complex cryptographic protocols (such as timestamp schemes) are often constructed
from cryptographic primitives (such as hash functions or digital signature schemes).
If P is a cryptographic protocol that uses a primitive Q as a building block, a
typical security proof goes as follows. Assuming the existence of a p-step adversary
A that breaks the protocol P with probability at least A(p), a p′-step adversary B
is constructed that uses A and breaks the primitive Q with success probability at
least B(p′), where p′ = f(p) for some function f . We then have a statement that
if Q is -secure, then P is ′-secure with ′(p) = (f(p)). The slower the growth of
′(p)
(p) , the tighter the reduction is, i.e., the less security loss it has.
2.3. Cryptographic primitives
We describe several cryptographic primitives that are relevant in the context of
long-term protection schemes.
2.3.1. Hash functions
A hash function H maps input strings of arbitrary length to output strings of fixed
length. The security properties that are required from a hash function depend on
the application [RS04]. For example, a hash function H may be required to be
collision resistant, which means that it must be infeasible to find a pair of strings
(x, x′) such that H(x) = H(x′) and x 6= x′. Depending on the security model and
use case, hash functions may also be keyed [BCK96]. In this case, the hash function
is associated with a key generation algorithm that generates a hashing key. Before
the hash algorithm is used, a key is generated and the hash algorithm then takes as
input the key and a message.
Preimage-aware hash functions
Informally, a hash function H is called preimage aware (PrA) if whenever somebody
first outputs as hash value y and later comes up with a preimage x, H(x) = y,
then it must have known x when outputting y. The notion of preimage aware hash
functions was formalized by Dodis et al. [DRS09] for hash functions HP that use an
ideal primitive P . The primitive is ideal in the sense that it can only be called via an
oracle P that records all calls made to P in an advice string adv. More formally, for
HP to be preimage aware, there must exist an efficient algorithm E (the so-called
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extractor) which when given y and the list adv of calls to the ideal primitive P ,
outputs x such that HP (x) = y, or ⊥ if the extraction failed. An adversary against
the preimage awareness property of a hash function H tries to find x and y so that
E(adv, y) 6= x and y = HP (x).
Definition 2.2 (Preimage-aware function). Let  : N3 → R[0,1] be a function. A
function HP is -secure preimage aware (PrA) if for every pE , pA, and q, there is a
pE-step extractor E, such that for every pA-step adversary A that makes at most q
calls to Ex,
AdvPrAP,H(A, E) = Pr
[
ExpPrAP,H(A, E) = 1
]
≤ (pE , pA, q) ,
where ExpPrAP,H is defined in Listing 2.1.
Listing 2.1: PrA Security Experiment, ExpPrAP,H(A, E)
x← AP,Ex;
y ← HP (x);
return 1 if y ∈ Q ∧ V[y] 6= x else 0;
oracle P(m):
z ← P (m);
adv += (m, z);
return z;
oracle Ex(y):
x← E(y, adv);
Q← Q ∪ {y};
V[y]← x;
return x;
Hash chains
By a hash chain c, we mean a sequence c[1], c[2], . . . , c[m] of 2n-bit strings and an
m-bit string ι that is called the shape of c. The bits of ι are denoted by ι[1], . . . , ι[m].
Every c[k] consists of two n-bit halfs denoted by c[k]0 and c[k]1. By x c r we mean
that:
• H(c[1]) = r
• H(c[k + 1]) = c[k]ι[k], for every k ∈ {1, . . . ,m− 1}
• H(x) = c[m]ι[m]
For example, a hash chain can be seen as a path through a hash tree [Mer90] from
a leaf to the root (Figure 2.1).
11
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r
c[1]0
c[2]0
...
...
c[2]1
c[3]0 c[3]1
c[1]1
...
...
Figure 2.1.: A hash tree with hash chain c = [c[1]0‖c[1]1, c[2]0‖c[2]1, c[3]0‖c[3]1] of
shape ι = [0, 1, 0], where for any x with H(x) = c[3]0, x c r.
2.3.2. Digital signature schemes
A digital signature scheme SIG is defined by a tuple (M, Setup, Sign,Verify), where
M is the message space, and Setup, Sign, Verify are algorithms with the following
properties.
Setup()→ (sk, pk): This algorithm generates a secret signing key sk and a public
verification key pk.
Sign(sk,m)→ s: This algorithm gets as input a secret key sk and a message m ∈
M. It outputs a signature s.
Verify(pk,m, s)→ b: This algorithm gets as input a public key pk, a message m,
and a signature s. It outputs b = 1, if the signature is valid, and 0, if it is
invalid.
A signature scheme is considered -secure if for any t-bounded algorithm A,
Pr
Setup→(sk,pk)
[ AO(pk)→ (m, s) :
Verify(pk,m, s) = 1 ∧m 6∈ Q
]
≤ (t),
where O(m) = {Q += m; Sign(sk,m)→ s; return s; } [GMR88].
2.3.3. Timestamp schemes
A timestamp scheme involves a client and a timestamp service. The timestamp
service initializes itself using algorithm Setup. The client uses protocol Stamp to
request a timestamp from the timestamp service. Furthermore, there exists an
12
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algorithm Verify that allows anybody to verify the validity of a message-timestamp-
tuple.
Timestamp schemes can be realized in different ways (e.g., using a widely visible
medium or trusted timestamp services [HS91]). For the most part, we consider
timestamp schemes based on timestamp services and digital signatures. These work
as follows. On initialization, a timestamp service chooses a signature scheme SIG
and runs the setup algorithm SIG.Setup → (sk, pk). It publishes the public key
pk. A client obtains a timestamp for a message m, as follows. First, it sends the
message to the timestamp service. Then, the timestamp service reads the current
time t and creates a signature on m and t by running SIG.Sign(sk, [m, t]) → s. It
then sends the signature s and the time t back to the client. Anybody can verify the
validity of a timestamp (t, s) for a message m by checking SIG.Verify(pk, [m, t], s) =
1. In addition, the authenticity of the public key is checked using a trust anchor
that contains root certificates and revocation lists (cf. [BKW13]). The security of
signature-based timestamp schemes is based on the security of the used signature
schemes.
2.3.4. Commitment schemes
A commitment scheme can be thought of as a cryptographic version of a sealed
envelope. It allows one party to fix a chosen message m without revealing it to
other parties. At a later point, the party can decide to reveal the message m in a
way that everybody is convinced that m is indeed the message that was previously
fixed. More formally, a commitment scheme is defined as follows.
Definition 2.3 (Commitment scheme). A (non-internactive) commitment scheme
COM is defined by a tuple (M, Setup,Commit,Verify), whereM is the message space,
and Setup, Commit, Verify are algorithms with the following properties.
Setup()→ pk: This algorithm generates a public commitment key pk.
Commit(pk,m)→ (c, d): This algorithm gets as input a public key pk and a message
m ∈M. It outputs a commitment c and a decommitment d.
Verify(pk,m, c, d)→ b: This algorithm gets as input a public key pk, a message m, a
commitment c, and a decommitment d. It outputs b = 1, if the decommitment
is valid, and 0, if it is invalid.
For a commitment scheme to be secure, it must satisfy hiding and binding security.
These are commonly defined as follows. For a commitment scheme to be hiding
secure, it is required that the commitment receiver does not learn the message
during the commitment phase. If this property holds for commitment receivers
with unlimited computational resources, then we say the scheme is unconditionally
hiding.
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Definition 2.4 (Statistically Hiding). Let CS = (M, Setup,Commit,Verify) be a
commitment scheme. For any public key k ∈ Setup and message m ∈ M, de-
fine Ck(m) as the random variable that has the distribution of c when sampling
Commit(k,m) → (c, d). A commitment scheme is -statistically-hiding if for any
k ∈ Setup, and any pair (m1,m2) ∈M2, we have that ∆(Ck(m1), Ck(m2)) ≤ .
A commitment scheme is considered binding secure if a committer cannot change
his mind about the committed message. Here, we consider committers with limited
computational resources.
Definition 2.5 (Classical binding). Let  : N → R[0,1]. A commitment scheme CS
is -classical-binding if for every integer p, for every p-step adversary A:
AdvBindCS (A) = Pr
[
ExpBindCS (A) = 1
]
≤ (p) .
Listing 2.2: The binding experiment ExpBindCS (A).
ck ← CS.Setup;
(c,m,w,m′, w′)← A(ck);
if CS.Verify(ck,m, c, w) = CS.Verify(ck,m′, c, w′) = 1 and m 6= m′ then
return 1;
else
return 0;
end
2.3.5. Secret sharing schemes
A secret sharing scheme allows a data owner to share a secret data object among a
set of shareholders such that only specified subsets of the shareholders can recon-
struct the secret, while all the other subsets of the shareholders have no information
about the secret. Here, we consider threshold secret sharing schemes [Sha79], for
which there exists a threshold parameter t (chosen by the data owner) such that
any set of t shareholders can reconstruct the secret, but any set of less than t share-
holders has no information about the secret. A secret sharing scheme has a protocol
Setup for generating the sharing parameters, a protocol Share for sharing a data
object, and a protocol Reconstruct for reconstructing a data object from a given set
of shares. In addition to standard secret sharing schemes, proactive secret sharing
schemes additionally provide a protocol Reshare for protection against so called mo-
bile adversaries [HJKY95]. The protocol Reshare is an interactive protocol between
the shareholders after which all the stored shares are refreshed so that they no longer
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can be combined with the old shares for reconstruction. This protects against adver-
saries who gradually corrupt an increasing number of shareholders over the course
of time.
2.3.6. Oblivious RAM
An oblivious random access machine (ORAM) [Gol87, GO96] allows a client to
access a remotely stored database such that the storage server does not learn which
data items are of current interest to the client. Here we assume that the client’s data
consists of N blocks of equal size and each block is associated with a unique identifier
id ∈ {1, . . . , N}. The server holds a database of size M > N blocks and each block in
the server database is identified by a location i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}. A (stash-free) ORAM
is defined by algorithms Setup, GenAP, and GetId with the following properties.
Setup(N): This algorithm takes as input the client database size N and generates
a client local state s and a server database size M .
GenAP(s, id): This algorithm gets as input a client state s and a client block identifier
id ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and outputs an access pattern P ∈ {1, . . . , N}2×n, which is a
sequence of server block location pairs, and a new client local state s′.
GetId(s, i): This algorithm gets as input a client state s and a server block location
i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, and outputs the corresponding client block identifier id ∈
{1, . . . , N}.
An ORAM is used as follows to store and access a database of size N . First,
the client runs algorithm Setup(N) → (s,M) and initializes the server database
with M data blocks. To access (i.e., read or write) block id ∈ {1, . . . , N} at the
server, the client first computes GenAP(s, id) → (P, s′) and updates its local state
s ← s′. Then it accesses the server database according to the access pattern P =
[(i1, j1), . . . , (in, jn)], as follows. For every block location pair (i, j) ∈ P , it first
retrieves block i. Then, it checks if GetId(s, i) = id and if this is the case, processes
the data. Afterwards, it stores the block at the new location j.
An ORAM is secure if the access patterns generated by GenAP are indindistin-
guishable from each other. In the security experiment (Listing 2.3), an adversary
can instruct the client to access blocks of its choice and then sees the induced access
patterns. In order to break the security, the adversary has to distinguish the access
patterns of two access instructions of its choice.
Definition 2.6 (ORAM Security). An ORAM scheme ORAM is information theoret-
ically secure if for any N ∈ N and probabilistic algorithm A,
Pr[ExpAPHORAM,N(A) = 1] =
1
2 .
15
2. Preliminaries
Listing 2.3: The ORAM access pattern hiding experiment ExpAPHORAM,N(A).
(s,M)← ORAM.Setup(N);
(id1, id2)← AClient(M);
b←$ {1, 2};
P ← Client(idb);
b′ ← AClient(P );
if b=b’ then
return 1;
else
return 0;
end
oracle Client(id):
(s, P )← ORAM.GenAP(s, id);
return P ;
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3. A Computational Model for
Long-Lived Systems
When analyzing the security of long-term protection schemes, attackers must be con-
sidered whose lifetime is as long as the lifetime of the protected data, i.e., decades
or even centuries. During such long time periods computational assumptions, which
cryptographic schemes rely on, are often invalidated and the corresponding schemes
must be replaced by new schemes based on stronger computational assumptions. We
observe the following two developments with respect to computational technology.
Firstly, new algorithms are developed that break computationally secure schemes
more efficiently. Secondly, new computational technologies are developed that al-
low for computing algorithms faster. The computational model typically used in
cryptography, however, does not reflect such technological advancements. In order
to analyze the security of long-lived systems, a new computational model must be
developed that captures these developments.
Contribution. In this chapter we first discuss existing computational models and
their shortcomings when used for analyzing the security of long-lived systems. We
then present a novel computational model that is adequate for analyzing the security
of long-lived cryptographic systems. In particular, our model allows for capturing
that new algorithms are found and new computational technologies become avail-
able.
Publications. This chapter is based on publications [G1], [G4], and [G3].
3.1. Discussion of existing computational models
The most widely used computational model in cryptography is the Turing Machine
Model [Tur37]. This model was proposed in 1936 by Alan Turing and it is widely
accepted as an adequate model to express what is computable by the computing
technology that we use today. In addition, it allows for measuring the efficiency
of an algorithm [Coo71]. Moreover, it has been shown that several other impor-
tant computation models (e.g., the Random Access Machine Model [CR72]) can be
efficiently simulated in the Turing Machine Model.
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The Turing Machine Model has been validated as an adequate model for com-
putation on classical information using boolean operations. However, in the 1980s
the concept of quantum computing was proposed [Ben80, Fey82, Deu85], which is
computation on quantum information using quantum operations. Quantum com-
putation is captured, for example, by the Quantum Turing Machine Model [Deu85]
and the Quantum Random Access Machine Model [Kni96]. While it is still unclear
whether quantum computers are inherently more powerful than classical computers,
current results suggest that they are [Sho99]. In the future, even more advanced
computational technology may be developed. Thus, our goal is to consider the most
general class of computing machines possible and we want to be able to express
that computational technology and, in particular, the computational technology is
improving over time. Time-related computational constraints, however, are rarely
considered in cryptographic security models, with the following exceptions:
In [CCK+08], Canetti et al. propose a framework for modeling computational
security in long-lived systems. They first observe that in virtually all existing cryp-
tographic security models the adversaries are assumed to be polynomially bounded
while long-lived systems may be running for exponential time. To resolve this imbal-
ance, they propose a computational model for long-lived systems where computation
time and real time are distinguished. This allows them to model adversaries that
are computationally bounded per unit of time while their overall running time is
unlimited. As an example use of their framework, they study the security of a long-
term integrity scheme. We also used their framework to analyze the security of a
different long-term integrity scheme [G8]. However, while their framework allows
for modeling long-lived computationally bounded adversaries, it does not consider
that computational technology is advancing. Also, it does not allow for analyzing
concrete security levels of cryptographic schemes which is crucial when analyzing
the security of long-term integrity schemes, as we will see in chapter 4, chapter 5,
and chapter 6.
In [Sch14], Schwenk proposes a formalism for modeling time in cryptographic sys-
tems and uses it for analyzing the security of authenticated key exchange protocols.
The basic idea is to augment the security experiment with a global clock that is
incremented whenever a special oracle call is made. However, while Schwenk uses
the power of this time formalism to capture certain aspects of the functionality
of the analyzed key exchange protocols, he does not use it to express time-related
computational bounds for adversaries.
3.2. The computational model used in this thesis
We now present the computational model that we will use in this thesis for analyzing
the security of long-lived systems. It is based on the notion of a computing machine,
which is a general model of computation that captures classical computers as well
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as quantum computers, and potentially other computational technologies that may
be developed in the future. We then augment this model with a notion of real-time
and describe a formalism for modeling computing machines whose computational
power increases over time.
Computing machines with time-related computational bounds
A computing machine M describes a probabilistic input-output relation. For an
input x and an output y, we write Pr[M(x) = y] to denote the probability that
on input x machine M outputs y. The process of producing an output is called a
computation of the machine. A computing machine has an internal state which is
transformed consequently over the course of a computation by applying a certain
set of unitary operations. The number of operations performed is also referred to
by the step count of the machine.
We assume that at every point in time t, there is a certain class of computing
machines Mt available. Furthermore, we assume that the class Mt of computing
machines available at time t widens when t increases, i.e., Mt ⊆ Mt′ for t < t′.
This captures that more powerful computing architectures are developed over the
course of time, e.g., M1 may represent classical computers and M2 may represent
quantum computers. We remark that quantum communication is not considered in
this model.
Model of time. We model real time using a global clock time formalism similar
to [Sch14]. That is, we augment our security experiments with a global clock Clock
which is associated with a discrete state time ∈ N that globally determines what is
the current time in the experiment. The adversary is given the power to advance
time by calling Clock(t), which sets time = t if t > time.
Long-lived adversaries. We model long-lived adversaries with increasing computa-
tional power over time as follows. A long-lived adversary A is a sequence of machines
(A(0),A(1),A(2), . . .), where A(t) ∈ Mt, and is associated with a global clock Clock.
When AClock is started, then actually the component AClock(0) is run. Whenever a
component AClock(t) calls the clock oracle to set a new time t′, then component AClock(t)
is stopped and the component AClock(t′) is run with input the internal state of AClock(t) .
For functions ρ : N → N and q : N → N, we say A is ρ-bounded if for every time t,
the aggregated step count of the machine components of A until time t is at most
ρ(t). We say A is q-call-bounded if for every time t, it has done at most q(t) oracle
calls until time t.
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Notation. Let P be a cryptographic primitive andM be a machine class. We say
P is -secure for adversaries ofM if any p-step adversary of classM breaks P with
probability at most (p).
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Integrity Protection
In the early 1990s, Haber and Stornetta proposed a method for prolonging the valid-
ity of digital signatures [HS91]. While obvious flaws in their first proposal had been
fixed later [BHS93], their method was not formally proven secure and the precise
security guarantees remained unclear. Nevertheless, many schemes and standards
for long-term integrity protection have been proposed based on this method over the
last decades (see [VBC+15] for an overview), but comprehensive security models and
proofs are still missing.
Contribution. In this chapter we provide the first formal security analysis of long-
term integrity schemes. In particular, we formally define long-term integrity schemes
and their security using the computational model described in chapter 3. We then
describe a long-term integrity scheme based on the signature renewal method de-
scribed in [BHS93] and analyze its security. The result of our security analysis is
a lower bound on the security level of the described scheme, where the bound is a
function of the short-term security levels of the used cryptographic components.
Publications. This chapter is based on publication [G1].
4.1. Discussion of long-term integrity schemes
This section informally discusses the functionality and security requirements of long-
term integrity protection schemes that are derived from the ideas of Bayer, Haber,
and Stornetta [BHS93].
4.1.1. Functionality
Suppose a user has a signed data object D = (d, s), where d is the data object and
s is the signature. Integrity and authenticity protection of d is guaranteed by the
digital signature s. However, a digital signature has a limited lifetime whose length
depends on the choice of the signature scheme and the choice of the signature scheme
parameters [Len04]. It is also influenced by the possibility that the private signing
key can leak to an attacker, which would enable the attacker to forge signatures. In
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the following, we describe a protection method based on the ideas of [BHS93] for
protecting integrity and authenticity of d over long time periods.
Initiating protection
At first, the user initiates the long-term integrity and authenticity protection of
d by sending D = (d, s) to a certified time-stamping authority (TSA) [ACPZ01].
The TSA creates a signature-based timestamp by reading the current time t and
computing a signature s0 on D‖t0. The TSA then sends the timestamp (t0, s0)
back to the user. The idea is that the timestamp can later prove that the signature
was generated at a point in time when the corresponding signature scheme was still
considered secure.
Prolonging protection
The security of the initial integrity protection relies on the security of the digital
signature scheme used by the TSA, which is also limited. To prolong the validity
of an initial integrity proof (t0, s0) for a data object D beyond the lifetime of the
signature s0, a new timestamp (t1, s1) is retrieved for (D, t0, s0) from a TSA that uses
a stronger signature scheme. The tuple (t0, s0, t1, s1) then constitutes an integrity
proof for D with an extended lifetime. In particular, it allows for proving that
the signatures s1, s0, and s have been generated when the corresponding signature
scheme instances were considered secure.
The validity of an integrity proof can be prolonged repeatedly. This is done by
time-stamping the current integrity proof as described above. Whenever the validity
of an integrity proof is prolonged, a new timestamp signature is added. Hence, the
integrity proof can be described by a sequence of timestamp signatures, denoted as
t0, s0, . . . , tn, sn. We visualize the procedure in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1.: Generation of a long-term integrity proof. The colored bars visualize
the security of the signature schemes.
Verification
To verify the integrity and datedness of a data object D = (d, s) with respect to time
t0 using integrity proof t0, s0, . . . , tn, sn, it needs to be checked that each signature
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si is valid for D‖t0‖s0‖ . . . ‖ti−1‖si−1‖ti at time ti+1. To verify the authenticity of d,
it needs to be checked that the signature s is valid for d at time t0.
4.1.2. Requirements for security
In the following we discuss the requirements for the security of long-term integrity
schemes. Intuitively, a long-term integrity scheme is secure if it is infeasible to
produce a valid integrity proof p for a data object d and time t if d did not exist at
time t. In the following we list the trust assumptions, cryptographic assumptions,
and computational assumptions that are commonly considered when using long-term
integrity schemes.
Trust assumptions. TSAs need to be trusted that they read and sign the correct
time when generating timestamps.
Cryptographic assumptions. The proposed long-term integrity schemes rely on
computationally secure cryptographic primitives, such as digital signature schemes
and hash functions. A computationally secure cryptographic primitive is usually as-
sociated with a validity period that depends on the chosen scheme and the scheme
parameters. It is essential that the used cryptographic scheme instances are se-
cure within their validity period, e.g., that a signature scheme is unforgeable (cf.
subsection 2.3.2) or a hash function is collision-resistant (cf. subsection 2.3.1).
Computational assumptions. Adversaries are long-lived and may increase their
computational power over time (cf. chapter 3).
4.1.3. Related approaches
A variety of schemes for long-term integrity protection have been proposed that
rely on the method proposed in [BHS93] and described in subsection 4.1.1. In the
following we give a brief overview of the different approaches. A more detailed
overview can be found, for example, in [VBC+15].
The method described in subsection 4.1.1 uses a sequence of timestamps to pre-
serve the validity of a digital signature. Several schemes have been proposed that use
a similar approach, e.g., Advanced Electronic Signatures [ETS10b, ETS10a], Con-
tent Integrity Service [Hab06], and the Evidence Record Syntax [GBP07, BSG11].
They mostly differ in how the sequence of timestamps to a document is generated
and verified. Evidence Record Syntax, for instance, is a format which uses Merkle
Trees [Mer90] and allows to protect a set of documents with a single timestamp.
For our description of the long-term protection method in subsection 4.1.1 we
have considered signature-based time-stamping. An alternative method for time-
25
4. Signature-based Long-Term Integrity Protection
stamping is time-stamping based on public repositories (PR, also known as widely-
visible medium, WVM). The idea behind PR-based time-stamping is to publish
a hash of the data on a widely visible medium that has a time reference (e.g., a
newspaper). Due to the public release of the hash value and the security properties
of the used hash function, the data cannot be altered afterwards. This approach
assumes that the PR will be available in the future. Furthermore, this approach
asks for the existence of witnesses, i.e., people that saw the original data and can
testify that the data has not been changed since. We analyze PR-based long-term
integrity protection in chapter 5.
Another approach to long-term integrity protection uses highly trusted notaries.
Such notaries can certify the validity of digital signatures and thereby enable schemes
where old attestations can be removed once their validity has been certified within
a new attestation. Thus, with notary-based schemes an integrity proof only con-
tains a single digital signature. Notary-based long-term protection schemes are, for
example, Cumulative Notarization [LG04] and Attested Certificates [VCBH13]. We
remark that notary-based schemes require highly trustworthy notaries which the
verifier trusts to properly verify and certify attestations. This is necessary because
the verifier cannot later check whether this process has been carried out correctly
because old attestations are deleted and only the most recent one is kept. While
the trust assumptions for notary-based schemes are stronger than for TSA-based
schemes, from a cryptographic viewpoint the constructions are similar (i.e., secu-
rity is prolonged by signature renewal). While our analysis focuses on TSA-based
schemes, it appears likely that our techniques can also be applied for analyzing
notary-based schemes.
4.2. Formalization of long-term integrity schemes
In this section, we provide a formal security analysis of long-term integrity schemes.
Our security analysis is based on the computational model described in chapter 3
and the observations made in section 4.1.
We start by defining the syntax of long-term integrity schemes and describe the
construction of a long-term integrity scheme, referred to by TS-LTIS, within that
syntax. The construction is based on the description given in subsection 4.1.1 and
lies at the core of many proposed long-term integrity schemes (e.g., [GBP07, BSG11,
Hab06]). Afterwards, we define what is the correct functionality of long-term in-
tegrity schemes and show that TS-LTIS functions correctly. Next, we define a secu-
rity model for long-term integrity schemes via a game in which an adversary is asked
to forge an integrity proof for a document that was not known by the adversary at
the claimed point in time. Finally, we prove the security of TS-LTIS based on the
proposed model.
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4.2.1. Scheme definition and construction
A long-term integrity scheme consists of three algorithms, one for generating an
initial integrity proof, one for prolonging the validity of an integrity proof, and one
for verifying an integrity proof. The following definition captures this more formally.
Definition 4.1 (Long-term integrity scheme). A long-term integrity scheme is a
tuple of algorithms (Protect, Prolong, Verify) with the following properties.
• Protect(d) → (P, t): On input of data object d, this algorithm generates an
integrity proof P and additionally outputs the time t that P refers to.
• Prolong(d, P ) → P ′: On input of data object d and integrity proof P , this
algorithm generates a new integrity proof P ′.
• Verify(TA, tver; d, t, P ) → b: On input of trust anchor TA, current verification
time tver, data object d, time t, and integrity proof P , this algorithm outputs
b = 1 if P is a valid integrity proof for data object d and time t under trust
anchor TA and given that the current time is tver. If P is not valid under these
constraints, it outputs b = 0.
Next, we describe the construction of a long-term integrity scheme based on the
description given in subsection 4.1.1. We refer to subsection 2.3.3 for a more detailed
description of the functionality of signature-based TSAs.
Construction 4.1 (TS-LTIS). The long-term integrity scheme TS-LTIS consists of
the algorithms (Protect, Prolong, Verify) as defined below.
• Protect(d): Select a TSA and request a timestamp τ on d from the TSA. Output
the timestamp τ , which is the initial integrity proof, and the time τ.t,which is
provided by the TSA with the timestamp τ .
• Prolong(d, P ): When the signature scheme used to generate the latest time-
stamp included in P is about to become insecure, do the following: Select a
TSA and request a timestamp τ on (d, P ) from the TSA. Output the pair
(P, τ), which is the new integrity proof.
• Verify(TA, tver; d, t, P ): Let P = (τ1, . . . , τn) and tn+1 = tver, and for i ∈
{1, . . . , n}, let ti be the time associated with τi. For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, check
that the timestamp τi was valid for data d‖τ1‖ . . . ‖τi−1 and time ti at time ti+1
by using the trust anchor TA. Then check that t0 = t. If all checks go through
output b = 1, otherwise output b = 0.
(We remark that the trust anchor TA must contain the data that is needed for
verifying timestamp signatures, e.g., public key certificates and revocation lists.
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Public key certificates come with expiry dates which also determine the validity
of the used cryptographic algorithms. If the cryptography scheme described in
the certificate is broken before the expiration date, then the certificate must be
revoked. We refer to [BKW13] for more details on public key certificates.)
4.2.2. Correctness
A long-term integrity scheme must fulfill the following correctness requirements.
They define what is the intended functionality of a long-term integrity scheme when
no adversary is considered and all cryptographic services are assumed to be secure.
Afterwards we show that TS-LTIS satisfies this correctness definition.
Definition 4.2 (Correctness). Let (Protect,Prolong,Verify) be a long-term integrity
scheme and n be an integer. A proof of integrity Pn for a data object d is generated
as follows.
At time t0, the algorithm Protect is executed with input d. Let integrity proof P0
and reference time t be the output of that execution. Then, for i = 1, . . . , n, at time
ti > ti−1, the algorithm Prolong is executed with input data object d and integrity
proof Pi−1 at a point in time when the cryptographic primitives used to generate Pi−1
are still valid. Let integrity proof Pi be the output of that execution. Finally, at some
point in time tver, the verification algorithm Verify is executed. Let TA denote the
trust anchor provided by the environment at that time.
For a long-term integrity scheme (Protect,Prolong,Verify) to be correct we require
that for any data object d if proof Pn is generated as described above, then the
equation Verify(TA, tver; d, t0, Pn) = 1 must hold.
The next theorem states that our construction TS-LTIS presented in subsec-
tion 4.2.1 functions correctly.
Theorem 4.1 (Correctness of TS-LTIS). The long-term integrity scheme TS-LTIS
is correct.
Proof. Let d be a data object and assume that Pn is an integrity proof generated
as follows. First, algorithm Protect is executed on input data object d and outputs
an integrity proof P0 and a time t0. Then, for i = 1, . . . , n, algorithm Prolong is
executed with Pi−1 as input returning a new proof Pi. For correctness it is required
that if the used TSAs are secure within their usage period, then it must hold that
Verify(TA, tver; d, t0, Pn) = 1, where TA is the trust anchor at time tver.
Indeed, proof Pn generated as described above verifies for d and t0, which can
be seen as follows. We observe that the certificate validity checks in Verify succeed
because we assume that the cryptographic services were chosen correctly. Further-
more, we observe that the signature checks during verification also succeed because
Pn is constructed by executing algorithm Protect followed by multiple executions
of algorithm Prolong, and thus, the data structure of the proof has the correct for-
mat.
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4.2.3. Security
Next, we define a security model for long-term integrity schemes. Our security
definition is based on a probabilistic experiment in which an adversary can interact
with cryptographic components in its environment and is then asked to output a
forged integrity proof. We first describe the adversary model. Then we state the
security definition. Finally, we show that our construction TS-LTIS satisfies that
definition.
Adversary model
We consider adversaries with potentially unlimited running time that are computa-
tionally bounded per unit of time as described in chapter 3. An adversary may also
interact with its environment, for example, by requesting timestamps from trusted
time-stamping authorities. In the following, we first describe which queries an ad-
versary can make to interact with its environment.
Set time. As described in chapter 3, we consider in our long-term security experi-
ments a global clock that determines the global time in the experiment (for example,
used by TSAs). The adversary is given the power to advance the time shown on the
clock. Formally, this is modeled as follows. The environment has a global variable
tcur ∈ N0. At initialization, the time is set to zero, i.e., tcur := 0. The adversary may
advance time via the following query.
• SetTime(t): If time t is larger than the current time tcur (i.e., t > tcur), tcur is
set to t (i.e., tcur := t).
We remark that because the computational power of the adversary is bounded with
respect to time, the adversary is eventually forced to advance time via a SetTime
query in order to continue its operation (cf. chapter 3).
Request timestamps. In the environment of the adversary TSAs are active. Each
TSA is associated with a signature scheme S and a validity period, that is, a time
interval [t1, t2]. At the beginning of the validity period, at time t1, the TSA generates
a key pair, S.KeyGen()→ (sk, pk) and the public key and the validity times are given
to the adversary.
An adversary can request timestamps from TSAs in its environment. In addition,
after the validity period of a TSA has passed, it can compromise the TSA. In this
case, the adversary obtains the private signing key. This is modeled by allowing the
adversary to make the following queries.
• Timestamp(i, x): The adversary makes a timestamp query Timestamp with
input the identifier of a TSA i and a data object x. If the current time tcur lies
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within the validity period of TSA i, then a signature σ on the current time
tcur and the data object x is generated, i.e., Sign(tcur‖x)→ σ. Afterwards, the
tuple (tcur, σ) is returned to the adversary.
• CompromiseTSA(i): When the adversary makes a query CompromiseTSA with
input the identifier of a TSA i, it is checked whether the validity period of
TSA i is over, and if this is the case, the private signing key of TSA i is given
to the adversary.
We remark that our model of time-stamping is based purely on signatures. In
other approaches, e.g., [ACPZ01], the data is first hashed and then signed. We
analyze hash-based time-stamping in chapter 5.
Security definition
We now define unforgeability security of long-term integrity schemes.
Definition 4.3 (Unforgeability security). Let LTIS = (Protect,Prolong,Verify) be a
long-term integrity scheme, A be an adversary as defined in chapter 3, and Env be
an environment as described in section 4.2.3.
The forgery game is defined as follows. The adversary A interacts with its envi-
ronment Env and, at some point in time tver, outputs (d, t, P ). Let TA denote the
trust anchor (i.e., public keys of TSAs and scheme validity times) provided by the
environment at time tver. The adversary wins the game if Verify(TA, tver; d, t, P ) = 1
and no timestamp service was queried with d at time t. That is, the adversary is
able to output a valid integrity proof for data object d and time t, without knowing d
at time t. We denote the winning probability of A in this game by AdvintegrityLTIS,A,Env,tver.
We say a long-term integrity scheme LTIS is -secure for environment Env and
computing machine model M if for any ρ-bounded adversary A ∈M, for any point
in time tver,
AdvintegrityLTIS,A,Env,tver ≤ (ρ, tver) .
The following theorem states that the security level of the long-term integrity
scheme TS-LTIS can be reduced to the security levels of the used cryptographic
components within their validity period.
Theorem 4.2. Let Env be an environment with timestamp services T = {TSi}i and
for all i, let [TSi.t1,TSi.t2] be the validity period of TSi. If for all i, TSi is TSi-
secure against adversaries of MTSi.t2, then the long-term integrity scheme TS-LTIS
is -secure for Env and M with
(ρ, tver) =
∑
TSi∈Ttver
TSi(ρ(TSi.t2)) ,
where Ttver is the set of timestamp services available until time tver.
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Proof. Let A ∈M be a ρ-bounded adversary and tver be a point in time. For every
timestamp service TSi, we construct from A an adversary Bi against the signature
scheme corresponding to TSi, and show that if A breaks the security of TS-LTIS,
then at least one of the Bi breaks the security of TSi within its valitidy period (i.e.,
before time TSi.t2).
We describe the adversary Bi against the timestamp service TSi. The adversary Bi
runsA until time TSi.t2 and simulates the environment ofA as described in the game
above with the following exceptions. When A asks for the signature verification key
of authority i, Bi provides the public verification key of its forgery game, and when
A asks for a timestamp of that authority, then Bi creates that timestamp using
its signing oracle. Algorithm Bi constantly scans the communication of A with its
environment for a pair (x, τ), where x is some data object and τ is a timestamp
corresponding to TSi for which A has not requested a timestamp yet. If Bi finds
such a tuple, it outputs that tuple as the (x‖τ.t, τ.σ), where τ.t is the timestamp
time and τ.σ is the timestamp signature, as a forgery for its signature forgery game.
We observe that we can bound the probability that A outputs a data object d
with a valid integrity proof P = (τ1, . . . , τn) for time t by the sum of the probability
that one of the timestamps in P was forged by A while the corresponding timestamp
service was valid. This can be seen, as follows. Suppose a timestamp for some data
object x′ and time t′ is not forged. Then a timestamp service was queried with x′ at
time t′. We observe that the verification procedure of TS-LTIS guarantees that τi is a
valid timestamp for data d, τ1, . . . , τi and time ti at time ti+1. It also guarantees that
the timestamp service corresponding to τi is valid at the time of the next timestamp
ti+1. It follows that for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the timestamp service TSτi.TS was queried
with (d, τ1, . . . , τi−1) at time τi.t. Thus, whenever A outputs (d, t, P ) such that P
is valid for d and time t but no timestamp service was queried with d at time t,
then one of the adversaries Bi finds a forged timestamp signature while scanning
the queries of A before the corresponding timestamp service becomes invalid.
In summary, we can bound the probability that A forges a long-term integrity
proof by the sum over the probability that the security of at least one of the time-
stamp services is broken within its validity period, i.e.,
AdvintegrityLTIS,A,Env,tver ≤
∑
TSi∈Ttver
TSi(ρ(TSi.t2)) .
We remark that this reduction-based security proof is substantially different from
typical reduction-based security proofs in the sense that the reduction algorithm is
required to be successful within the validity period of the respective cryptographic
component, which is in most cases before the long-term adversary has finished its
computation.
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Table 4.1.: Security of long-term integrity protection as a function of the security
of cryptographic services.
n Lcomp Lint
216
2−80 2−64
2−128 2−112
2−192 2−174
Table 4.2.: Security of long-term integrity protection as a function of the length
parameter.
Lcomp n Lint
2−128
28 2−120
216 2−112
232 2−96
4.3. Evaluation of security level
Given the security analysis in section 4.2 and the result of Theorem 4.2, we evaluate
the security level Lint of the long-term integrity scheme TS-LTIS. Here, by security
level we mean the probability that an adversary of the considered type breaks the
scheme.
We observe that we can analyze the security level based on two parameters. The
first parameter Lcomp is a common upper bound on the failure probability of each of
the used cryptographic components (i.e., signature schemes). For example, Lcomp =
2−80 means that any component has at least 80 bit security (i.e., a failure probability
of at most 2−80) within its validity period against the considered class of adversaries.
The second parameter n corresponds to the total number of components available.
According to Theorem 4.2, it is Lint ≤ n · Lcomp.
In Table 4.1 we show the security level Lint of TS-LTIS for n = 216 and different
values of Lcomp. We observe that there is a constant factor of security loss between
the common security level of the cryptographic components Lcomp and the security
level of the long-term integrity scheme Lint.
In Table 4.2 we show the security level Lint of TS-LTIS for Lcomp = 2−128 and dif-
ferent values of n. We observe that the security loss increases when n increases. The
magnitude of the security loss depends on the number of involved cryptographic com-
ponents (i.e., signature schemes) and seems unavoidable, as discussed in [BJLS16].
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Time-Stamping from
Preimage-Aware Hashing
Hash-based time-stamping is a viable alternative to signature-based time-stamping
(cf. chapter 4) whose security within short-lived systems has been studied extensively
[BS04, BLSW05, BL07, BN08, BN10, BL13]. However, the security of hash-based
time-stamping in long-lived systems, and, in particular, when used in combination
with the renewal method of [BHS93], has not been studied thus far.
Contribution. In this chapter we prove the security of hash-based long-term time-
stamping in the ideal primitive model by using preimage-aware hash functions. In
order to achieve this, we first establish the notion of extractable security for short-
term timestamp schemes and show that hash-based time-stamping is extractable
secure if preimage-aware hash functions are used. Afterwards, we introduce the
notion of extractable security to long-term time-stamping and show that long-term
time-stamping is extractable secure if extractable secure short-term time-stamping
is used. In particular, we provide formulas for estimating concrete security levels.
We also apply our results and show what is the security level achieved by hash-based
long-term time-stamping for different parameters and protection periods.
Publications. This chapter is based on publication [G4].
5.1. Background
5.1.1. Hash-based time-stamping
Digital time-stamping was first proposed by Haber and Stornetta [HS91]. It is used
to prove that a given data object existed at a certain point in time. In the following
we describe a hash-based timestamp scheme based on their ideas [HS91, BHS93]
and survey various security models that have been proposed for such a scheme.
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Scheme description
The following hash-based timestamp scheme is associated with a hash function H
and a set of allowed hash chain shapes S. It uses a trusted repository Rep that
accepts hash value queries. If Rep receives a hash value query r, it publishes r so
that everybody can verify that r existed at this point in time t.
The time-stamping procedure is divided into rounds. During each round, a time-
stamp server receives a set of bitstrings {x1, . . . , xn} from clients. At the end of
each round it runs algorithm Stamp to generate timestamps for these bitstrings and
returns the timestamps to the clients. Algorithm Verify is used to verify timestamps.
Stamp: On input of bitstrings x1, . . . , xn (n ≤ |S|), a hash tree [Mer90] is computed
from leaves x1, . . . , xn. Let r be the root of that hash tree and ci be the hash
chain corresponding to the path from leaf xi to the root r (cf. Figure 2.1).
The timestamp server publishes the root hash r at the repository Rep and for
i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, sends ci as the response to request xi. Hash chain ci is also
called a timestamp for bitstring xi.
Verify: On input x, hash chain c, and a hash value r published at the repository, it
is checked that c has allowed shape, shape(c) ∈ S, and c is a hash chain from
x to r, x c r. The algorithm outputs 1 if these conditions hold, otherwise the
algorithm outputs 0.
Security model
Intuitively, security of a timestamp scheme means that an adversary cannot back-
date any x, i.e., generate an x and a hash chain c such that Verify(x, c, r) = 1 for an
r published at Rep before the generation of x. Such a condition is formalized, for
example, in [BS04, BL06], where a two-stage adversary A = (A1,A2) is considered.
At the first phase of the attack, A1 stores hashes into the repository Rep in an
arbitrary way. At the second stage, A2 presents an unpredictable x, a hash chain c,
and selects an r published at Rep so that Verify(x, c, r) = 1. The unpredictability
of x is essential as otherwise x could have been pre-computed by A1 before r is
published and hence x could in fact be older than r.
The security definitions of [BS04, BL06] model the future as a computationally
efficient stochastic process which may not be the case in the real world. There are
no arguments against the future documents having arbitrary distributions. Addi-
tionally, the success of A is defined as the average over such a distribution and it
might still be easy to backdate fixed documents. Having such arguments in mind,
extraction-based security definitions for time-stamping have been explored in [BL07].
Intuitively, such conditions say that whenever A1 publishes a hash r to Rep and later
A2 outputs a document x and a hash chain c with Verify(x, c, r) = 1, then x must
have been “known” by A1 when r was stored in Rep. Formally, this is expressed
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by assuming the existence of an extraction algorithm E that depends on A1 and
outputs a set of bitstrings X such that if A2 outputs (x, c) with Verify(x, c, r) = 1
for some r ∈ Rep, then x ∈ X with overwhelming probability.
In section 5.2 and section 5.3 we propose extraction-based security definitions
for timestamp schemes and long-term timestamp schemes in the ideal primitive
model. We then analyze the security of the hash-based long-term timestamp scheme
described in subsection 5.1.2 based on these definitions.
5.1.2. Hash-based long-term time-stamping
Next, we describe a hash-based long-term timestamp scheme based on the idea
of Bayer et al. for extending the lifetime of a digital signature [BHS93]. Such a
scheme has the property that the validity of existing timestamps can be prolonged
by obtaining additional timestamps. In the following we assume that the short-term
timestamp schemes available are described by the set T S = {TSi}i. Each timestamp
scheme TSi ∈ T S is associated with a start time tsi and a breakage time tbi . The
start time defines when the scheme becomes available and the breakage time defines
after which time the timestamps created using this scheme are not considered valid
anymore. Additionally, we assume the existence of a repository Rep that is used
for publishing root hash values. The long-term timestamp scheme is defined by
algorithm Stamp for creating an initial timestamp, algorithm Renew for renewing a
timestamp, and algorithm Verify for verifying a timestamp.
Stamp: This algorithm gets as input a timestamp scheme identifier i and a sequence
of bitstrings x1, . . . , xn. It creates timestamps for the bitstrings using scheme
TSi by computing (r, c1, . . . , cn) ← TSi.Stamp(x1, . . . , xn). Then, the root
hash r is published together with identifier i at the repository Rep. Let t be
the time when r was published. For j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the algorithm responds to
request xj with timestamp Tj = [(i, cj, r, t)].
Renew: This algorithm gets as input a timestamp scheme identifier i′ and a sequence
of bitstrings and timestamps (x1, T1), . . . , (xn, Tn). The algorithm renews the
timestamps using scheme TSi′ as follows. First, it computes new timestamps
(r, c1, . . . , cn) ← TSi′ .Stamp(x1‖T1, . . . , xn‖Tn). Then, it publishes the root
hash r together with the timestamp scheme identifier i′ at the repository Rep.
Let t be the time when r is published. For j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, the algorithm sends
(i′, cj, r, t) as the response to request (xj, Tj). The client receiving (i′, cj, r, t)
updates its timestamp by appending (i′, cj, r, t) to Tj.
Verify: This algorithm takes as input a bitstring x, a long-term timestamp T =
(C1‖ . . . ‖Cn), where Cj = (ij, cj, rj, tj), a time t, a reference R to the trusted
repository Rep, and a set of admissible timestamp schemes T S = {TSi}i.
For j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, it is verified that TSij .Verify((x‖C1‖ . . . ‖Cj−1), cj, rj) = 1,
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(ij, rj) ∈ R[tj], and tbij > tj+1. The algorithm outputs 1 if these conditions
hold, otherwise it outputs 0.
5.2. Extractable time-stamping
In this section we define extractable time-stamping for (short-term) timestamp
schemes (cf. subsection 5.1.1). Informally, extractability of a timestamp scheme TS
means that if a root hash r is published at the repository at time t and later some-
one comes up with a bitstring x and a hash chain c such that TS.Verify(x, c, r) = 1,
then x must have been known at time t. Our notion of extractable time-stamping
is reminiscent of PrA hash functions [DRS09] and knowledge-binding commitments
[BL07]. After giving the definition of an extractable timestamp scheme, we ana-
lyze the security of the timestamp scheme construction described in subsection 5.1.1
when instantiated with a PrA hash function.
5.2.1. Security definition
More formally, extractability of a timestamp scheme TSP with an ideal primitive P is
defined using an experiment ExpExTs (Listing 5.1). In this experiment an adversary
A publishes root hashes at the repository. The adversary also uses the ideal primitive
P and queries to P are recorded in an advice string adv. The definition of extractable
time-stamping requires the existence of an extractor E with the following properties.
Whenever A publishes a root hash r, the extractor E extracts from r and the advice
adv, a set of supposedly timestamped bitstrings X. At the end, A outputs a bitstring
x, a timestamp c, and a root hash r. It wins if c is valid for x and r, r was published,
and x was not extracted.
Definition 5.1 (Extractable time-stamping). Let  : N3 → R[0,1]. A timestamp
scheme TSP using ideal primitive P is -secure extractable (ExTs) if for all integers
pE , pA, and qE , there is a pE-step extractor E, such that for every pA-step adversary
A that makes at most q calls to Rep,
AdvExTsP,TS(A, E) = Pr
[
ExpExTsP,TS(A, E) = 1
]
≤ (pE , pA, q) .
5.2.2. Security analysis
We analyze the security of the hash-based timestamp scheme from subsection 5.1.1.
We first recall various properties of hash chain shapes [BL13] which are useful for
analyzing the security of hash-based timestamp schemes.
Definition 5.2. We say that a timestamp scheme associated with allowed shapes S
is N-bounded if |S| ≤ N .
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Listing 5.1: The extractable time-stamping experiment ExpExTsP,TS(A, E).
(x, c, r)← AP,Rep;
return 1 if TS.Verify(x, c, r) = 1 ∧ r ∈ R ∧ x 6∈ L[r] else 0;
oracle P(m):
z ← P (m);
adv += (m, z);
return z;
oracle Rep(r):
X ← E(adv, r);
R← R ∪ {r};
L[r]← X;
return X;
Definition 5.3. An N-bounded timestamp scheme is said to be shape-compact, if
the length of allowed hash chains does not exceed 2 log2N .
Next we proof a bound on the security of the hash-based timestamp scheme from
subsection 5.1.1 if instantiated as N -bounded and shape compact.
Theorem 5.1. The timestamp scheme from subsection 5.1.1 instantiated as N-
bounded and shape compact and with an -secure PrA hash function HP is ′-secure
extractable with
′(pE , pA, q) = 
(
α · pE
2N log2N
, β · (pA + 2qN log2N), 2qN log2N
)
,
for some small constants α and β.
Proof. Let S be the set of allowed shapes associated with an N -bounded shape
compact timestamp scheme TS and let E be an extractor for HP that extracts
a preimage given a hash value and the ideal primitive calls. Such an extractor
exists if HP is PrA-secure. Using E as a black box, we construct a list extractor
L (Listing 5.2), which extracts timestamped bitstrings from published root hash
values. Having as input a P -query string adv and a bitstring r (a hash value), the
list extractor L extracts for every allowed hash-chain shape ι ∈ S, the corresponding
hash chain in a top-down way, starting from r. Due to the shape-compactness, the
step count of L is bounded by α · pE · N ·maxι∈S length(ι) ≤ 2 · α · pE · N log2(N),
for some small constant α and if pE is a bound on the step count of E .
Let AP,Rep be an adversary that participates in the ExTs-experiment denoted by
ExpExTsP,TS(A,L). We construct an adversary BP,Ex (Listing 5.3) that participates in
the PrA-experiment ExpPrAP,H(B, E) as follows. The adversary BP,Ex runs algorithm
AP,Rep, where calls to the repository Rep are simulated using algorithm REx (List-
ing 5.4).
Note that whenever A succeeds in the ExTs-experiment, it finds (x, c, r) such that
x
c r, x ∈ R, and x 6∈ L[r]. This means there must be k such that HP (c[k + 1]) =
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Listing 5.2: List extractor L(adv, r).
for ι ∈ S do
x← E(adv, r), c← [], k ← 0;
while x 6= ⊥ and k < length(ι) do
k ← k + 1;
x← E(adv, xι[k]) (where x = x0‖x1);
end
L[r]← L[r] ∪ {x};
end
return L;
Listing 5.3: PrA adversary BP,Ex.
(x, c, r)← AP,REx ;
ι← shape(c);
if ∃k : R[c[k]ι[k]] = 1, V[c[k]ι[k]] 6= c[k + 1] then
return c[k + 1];
else
return x;
end
Listing 5.4: Rep simulator REx(r).
for ι ∈ S do
x← Ex(r), k ← 0;
while x 6= ⊥ and k < length(ι) do
k ← k + 1;
x← Ex(xι[k]);
end
L[r]← L[r] ∪ {x};
end
return L[r];
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c[k]ι[k] (where ι is the shape of c), but the extractor E failed to extract c[k+ 1] from
c[k]ι[k]. Therefore, after simulating A, the adversary B obtains the hash chain c and
finds the smallest k, such that R[c[k]ι[k]] = 1 and V[c[k]ι[k]] 6= c[k + 1], and outputs
c[k + 1], or, if no such k exists, outputs x. We observe that B succeeds in the PrA
experiment whenever A succeeds in the ExTs experiment,
AdvExTsP,TS(A,L) ≤ AdvPrAP,H(B, E) .
The step count of BP,Ex is O(pA + 2qRN log2N), where pA is the step count of A
and qR is the number of calls to Rep. It follows that
AdvExTsP,TS(A,L) ≤ AdvPrAP,H(B, E) ≤ (pE , α · (pA + 2qRN log2N), 2qRN log2N) ,
for some small constant α and where pE is a bound on the step count of E . The
step count of L is pL = O(2pEN log2N). We obtain that the timestamp scheme
constructed from HP is ′-secure extractable with
′(pL, pA, qR) = 
(
β · pL
2N log2N
,α · (pA + 2qRN log2N), 2qRN log2N
)
,
for some small constant β.
The log2N term can be eliminated if a more efficient tree-extractor is used.
Theorem 5.2. The timestamp scheme from subsection 5.1.1 instantiated as N-
bounded and shape compact and with an -secure PrA hash function HP is ′-secure
extractable with
′(pE , pA, q) = 
(
α · pE
2N , β · (pA + 2Nq), 2Nq
)
,
for some small constants α and β.
Sketch. The list extractor used in the proof of Theorem 5.1, extracts a separate hash
chain for each leaf of the hash tree. This means that each of the inner nodes of the
tree are extracted many times. The efficiency of the extraction can be improved by
avoiding redundant extraction of hash chains that partially overlap. This is what
the tree extractor does and it leads to the improved security bound.
5.3. Extractable long-term time-stamping
In this section we propose a security model for the hash-based long-term timestamp
scheme described in subsection 5.1.2. First, we define what it means for a long-
term timestamp scheme to be extractable secure. Then, we prove a lower bound
on the security level of the long-term timestamp scheme construction described
in subsection 5.1.2 based on the security level of the timestamp schemes used for
timestamp renewal.
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5.3.1. Security definition
We define extractable security of hash-based long-term timestamp schemes via ex-
periment ExpExLTs (Listing 5.5). Similar to the definitions of PrA hash functions
and extractable time-stamping without renewal, our definition of extractable long-
term time-stamping uses an ideal primitive P which can only be called via an oracle
P that records all calls to P in an advice string adv. The experiment also involves
a global clock Clock as described in chapter 3.
The experiment involves an adversary A and an extractor E . The adversary A
may publish root hash values r at the repository Rep at any time by calling Rep(r).
When Rep is called with root hash r at time t, it records r associated with t in a
global table R (i.e., R[t] ← R[t] ∪ {r}, where initially R[t] = {}). Additionally, the
extractor E on input adv and r extracts a set of bitstrings X that is stored associated
with time t in a table L (i.e., L[t]← L[t] ∪X, where initially L[t] = {}). The goal of
the adversary A is to produce (x, T, t) such that T is a valid long-term timestamp
for bitstring x and time t, and x was not extracted at time t (i.e., Verify(x, c, t, R) = 1
and x 6∈ L[t]).
Definition 5.4 (Extractable long-term time-stamping). Let M describe the avail-
able machines classes and T S describe the available timestamp schemes. Let  :
N4 → R[0,1]. A long-term timestamp scheme LTSP , which uses an ideal primitive P ,
is -secure extractable (forM and T S) if for all bounds ρE , ρA, and q, there is a ρE-
bounded extractor E ∈ M, such that for every ρA-step-bounded and q-call-bounded
adversary A ∈M, and for every time t:
AdvExLTsP,LTS,T S(A, E , t) = Pr
[
ExpExLTsP,LTS,T S(A, E , t) = 1
]
≤ (ρE , ρA, q, t) .
Listing 5.5: Extractable long-term time-stamping, ExpExLTsP,LTS,T S(A, E , t∗).
(x, T, t)← AClock,P,Rep;
return 1 if LTS.Verify(x, T, t, R, T S) = 1 ∧ x 6∈ L[t] ∧ time ≤ t∗ else 0;
oracle Clock(t):
if t > time then
time← t;
end
oracle P(m):
z ← P (m);
adv← adv||(m, z);
return z;
oracle Rep(r):
X ← E(adv, r);
t← time;
R[t]← R[t]‖r;
L[t]← L[t]‖X;
return X;
5.3.2. Security analysis
Before we analyze the security of the long-term timestamp scheme described in
subsection 5.1.2, we adapt the notion of extractable time-stamping from section 5.2
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to the long-term setting where the class of computing machines available changes
over time.
Definition 5.5 (Extractable time-stamping (refined)). Let ME and MA be classes
of machines and  : N3 → R[0,1]. We say a non-renewable timestamp scheme TS is
-secure extractable for adversaries of MA and extractors of ME if for all integers
pE , pA, and qE , there exists a pE-step extractor E ∈ ME , such that for every pA-step
adversary A ∈MA that makes at most q calls to Rep:
AdvExTsP,TS(A, E) ≤ (pE , pA, q) .
We now prove a bound on the security level of the long-term timestamp scheme
described in subsection 5.1.2 in terms of the security level of the available timestamp
schemes.
Theorem 5.3. Let M describe the available computing machine classes and T S =
{TSPi }i describe the available timestamp schemes, which use an ideal primitive P .
If for every i, TSPi is i-secure extractable for adversaries of Mtbi and extractors ofMtsi , then the long-term timestamp scheme described in subsection 5.1.2 is -secure
extractable with
(ρE , ρA, q, t) =
∑
i∈{i:tbi≤t}
i
(
α · ρE(tbi), β ·
(
ρA(tbi) + q(tbi)ρE(tbi)
)
, q(tbi)
)
,
for some small constants α and β.
Proof. Let Li ∈ Mtsi be the list extractor for TSi that exists because TSi is i-
secure extractable for adversaries of Mtbi and extractors of Mtsi . Using the Li’s as
black boxes, we construct a long-term list extractor L ∈ M in the following way
(Listing 5.6). Having as input an ideal primitive advice string adv and a bitstring r,
the list extractor L decomposes r into a timestamp scheme identifier i and a hash
value r′, checks if scheme i can be used at the current time, and if so, extracts a set
of bitstrings X from r′ using list extractor Li. The step count of L in this run is at
most the step count of Li (plus a small simulation overhead).
Listing 5.6: Long-term extractor L(adv, r)
r = (i, r′);
if tsi ≤ time < tbi then
return Li(adv, r′);
else
return ⊥;
end
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Let A be any adversary that participates in the ExLTs experiment. For every i, we
construct an adversary B(i) (Listing 5.7) that participates in the ExTs experiment as
follows.1 The adversary BP,Rep(i) simluates a run of AClock,P,R where the clock Clock is
simulated using Listing 5.9 and the repository R is simulated using Listing 5.8. The
simulation is performed only while time does not exceed the breakage time tbi . The
adversary B(i) tries to find a moment t′′ < tbi when A submits (j, r′′) to the repository
to renew a tuple (x′, i, c′, r′, t′) valid with scheme TSi and A submitted (i, r′) to the
repository, but x′ has not been extracted. This violates the ExLTs-condition for
TSi.
Listing 5.7: ExLTs adversary BP,Rep(i) .
(x, c, t)← AClock,P,R while time < tbi
until ∃j, x′, c′, r′, t′, r′′, t′′ such that
• (j, r′′) ∈ R[t′′] and tsj < t′′ < tbi , tbj,
• (x′, i, c′, r′, t′) ∈ L[t′′],
• Si.Verify(x′, c′, r′) = 1,
• (i, r′) ∈ R[t′] and tsi < t′ < tbi ,
• x′ 6∈ L[t′];
if ∃ such (j, x′, c′, r′, t′, r′′, t′′) then
return x′;
else
return ⊥;
end
Define It = {i : tbi ≤ t}. We observe that whenever A is successful until time t,
one of {Bi : tbi ≤ t} is successful,
AdvExLTsP,LTS (A,L, t) ≤
∑
i∈It
AdvExTsP,TSi(B(i),Li) .
1We use the notation B(i) to distinguish between B(i) and the time-components B = (B0,B1, . . .)
of an adversary.
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Listing 5.8: Repository simulator R(r).
r = (j, r′);
t← time;
if tsj ≤ t < tbj then
if j=i then
X ← Rep(r′);
else
X ← Lj(adv, r′);
end
else
X ← ⊥;
end
R[t]← R[t]‖r;
L[t]← L[t]‖X;
return X;
Listing 5.9: Clock simulator Clock(t).
if t > time then
time← t;
end
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Assume A is ρA-step-bounded and q-call-bounded, and assume L is ρL-bounded.
Then, for each i, the step count of B(i) is O(ρB(tbi) + q(tbi)ρL(tbi)). We obtain that
for every t,
AdvExLTsP,LTS (A,L, t) ≤
∑
i∈It
AdvExTsP,TSi(B(i),Li)
≤∑
i∈It
i
(
α · ρL(tbi), β · (ρB(tbi) + q(tbi)ρL(tbi)), q(tbi)
)
,
for some small constants α and β.
5.4. Evaluation
We evaluate which protection level the long-term timestamp scheme described in
subsection 5.1.2 provides in a practical scenario. For our evaluation we consider a
scenario where data is protected over a time period of Y years. The security level
of the long-term timestamp scheme is evaluated in terms of the security level of the
hash functions that are used to instantiate the available timestamp schemes. Here,
we assume that all used hash functions have the same security level during their
validity period, where by security level we mean a bound on the success probability
of an adversary.
5.4.1. Scenario
We assume that a set T S = {TSPi }i of available hash-based timestamp schemes,
where for each i, HPi is the hash function used by TSPi . We assume that the PrA-
security of a hash function derives from the ratio of the adversary power pA and the
extractor power pE , and is influenced by the number of repository calls q and a base
security level δ. Concretely, we assume that each hash function Hi is -secure PrA
until its breakage time tbi with (pE , pA, q) = pApE qδ. Furthermore, we assume that
each timestamp scheme TSi is N -bounded and shape compact, which means that
each timestamp round up to N timestamps are generated. For our practical security
analysis we neglect the constants α and β derived in Theorem 5.2 and Theorem 5.3
as they are in most cases close to 1.
By Theorem 5.2 we obtain that each timestamp scheme TSi is ′-secure extractable
until time tbi with
′(pE , pA, q) ≤ 
(
pE
2N , pA + 2Nq, 2Nq
)
= pA + 2Nq
pE
(2N)2qδ .
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Furthermore, by Theorem 5.3 we obtain that the long-term timestamp scheme is
′′-secure long-term extractable with
′′(ρE , ρA, q, t) ≤
∑
i∈It
′
(
ρE(tbi), ρA(tbi) + q(tbi)ρE(tbi), q(tbi)
)
≤∑
i∈It
ρA(tbi) + q(tbi)ρE(tbi) + 2Nq(tbi)
ρE(tbi)
(2N)2q(tbi)δ
≤∑
i∈It
(
ρA(tbi)
ρE(tbi)
+
(
2N
ρE(tbi)
+ 1
)
q(tbi)
)
(2N)2q(tbi)δ .
We assume that the adversary and the extractor have the same computation
power, i.e., ρA(t)
ρE(t) = 1, and we observe that any reasonable extractor E extracts at
least 2N bitstrings before the breakage time of a scheme, i.e., ρE(tbi) ≥ 2N . Let time
be denoted in years and assume that each year at most L new timestamp schemes
become available, and at most R root hashes are published at the repository, i.e.,
|It| = |{i : tbi ≤ t}| ≤ tL and q(t) ≤ tR. We obtain the following bound on the
security level of the long-term timestamp scheme:
′′(ρE , ρB, q, t) ≤ 12t3(NR)2Lδ .
5.4.2. Results
In Figure 5.1 we show the security level of the long-term timestamp scheme for
different time spans Y and parameters N , L, R, and δ. The default parameters are
Y = 100, L = 10, N = 232, R = 365, and δ = 2−192.
By the upper left graph of Figure 5.1, we observe a cubic security loss over time
for the case that the security level of the used hash function remains constant. Using
a base security level of δ = 2−192 for the hash function, the security level of the long-
term timestamp scheme after 1 year is 2−104, after 10 years it drops to 2−94, and after
100 years it drops to 2−84. There is a linear loss in security for increasing the number
L of short-term timestamp schemes used per year, as depicted in the upper right
graph. Allowing a larger number R of hash values to be published at the repository
results in a quadratic security loss, as can be seen in the middle left graph. The
number N of timestamps that can be issued per root hash is an important factor
because in practice it may be large. The security level decreases quadratically when
N is increased, as can be seen in the middle right graph. Using N = 216 results
in security level 2−116 after 100 years, while using N = 248 results in security level
2−52. Finally, the bottom graph shows how the security of the long-term timestamp
scheme depends linear on the base security level δ of the used hash functions.
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Figure 5.1.: Evaluation of the security level ′′ of long-term time-stamping when
run for Y years, and with parameters L, R, N , and δ. Here, L is the
number of new short-term timestamp schemes per year, R is the number
of published root hashes per short-term scheme, N is the number of
documents covered by one root hash, and δ is the base security level of
the hash functions.
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6. Long-Term Commitments via
Extractable-Binding Commitments
Cryptographic commitments are either unconditionally hiding or unconditionally
binding, but cannot be both. As a consequence, the security of commonly used
commitment schemes is threatened in the long-term, when adversaries become com-
putationally much more powerful.
Contribution. We improve over this situation by putting forward a new notion
of commitment schemes, so called long-term commitment schemes. These schemes
allow for adjusting the protection level after the initial commitment. On the way
to constructing long-term commitment schemes, we find that such a construction
seems impossible solely based on classically binding commitments. We thus propose
the notion of extractable-binding commitments, which requires that the committer
“knows” the committed message at the time of the commitment. We then present
a construction of an extractable-binding long-term commitment scheme based on
extractable-binding (short-term) commitments. Finally, we prove the security of
our construction using the computational model described in chapter 3.
Publications. This chapter is based on publication [G3].
6.1. On the (im)possibility of constructing long-term
secure commitments
Commitment schemes are important building blocks in many cryptographic pro-
tocols and also important mechanisms in secure electronic archival storage (see
Part II). They enable a party to commit to (potentially) secret data, so that the
commitment process reveals no information (the hiding property) and the commit-
ting party cannot afterwards deny or modify the data (the binding property).
The classical binding definition provided in subsection 2.3.4 is widely used, but it
also appears unsuitable in certain scenarios. For example, it cannot be achieved in
the standard Universal Composability Framework [CF01] and it seems insufficient
for commitments in the presence of quantum computers [Unr16]. In the following, we
will discuss why it also appears insufficient for constructing long-term commitments.
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It is a well-known fact that no commitment scheme can be simultaneously hiding
and binding against an adversary with unlimited computational resources [May97,
BCMS97]. A different approach to enabling long-term security (in contrast to uncon-
ditional security) is to employ a renewal technique such as the one by Bayer, Haber,
and Stornetta for prolonging the validity of a digital signature [HS91, BHS93]. We
adapt their idea to commitments as follows. A document X and its commitment
c = C(X) are renewed (at time t) by creating a new commitment c∗ = C∗(X, c). If
later (say, at t′ > t) the cryptographic mechanisms of C are broken but those of C∗
are still secure, and it is believed that the mechanisms in C were secure at t, then
after opening the renewed commitment (c, c∗) (and seeing X), it is still reasonable
to believe that X was indeed the committed message.
In order to prove the security of such a construction, our goal is to reduce its
long-term security to the short-term security of the individual commitments. If we
rely on the classical binding property, however, such a reduction seems impossible
to obtain (at least using black-box techniques). Indeed, we would have to show that
if there exists an efficient adversary A that creates an ambiguous opening of (c, c∗)
at time t′, then there exists an efficient adversary A′ that successfully creates an
ambiguous opening of C at time t < t′. But such an adversary cannot exist because
C is still binding secure at time t and A does provide not produce any useful outputs
before time t′ > t.
We solve this problem by using an extraction-based binding property, which re-
quires that for every efficient committer A1, there exists an efficient extractor E ,
such that E , on input the random coins of A1, predicts the message decommitted by
any efficient A2. This allows us to extract information from the long-term adversary
before it finishes its computation.
6.2. Extractable-binding commitments
For extractable-binding commitments we require that the committer, who produces
a commitment and later opens the commitment to some message, must already
know the message at the time of the commitment. As we will see in section 6.4,
extractable-binding commitments are sufficient to construct long-term commitment
schemes.
6.2.1. Definition
Extractable-binding is defined in experiment ExpExtBind with a two staged adversary
(A1,A2) and an extractor E . Here, A1 is the committing algorithm who outputs
a commitment c and an advice string s that contains information how to open c.
The extractor E gets as input the random coins ω of A1 and the advice string s. It
outputs a message m∗ which is the extracted message. Afterwards, the second stage
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adversary A2 is run on input of advice string s and outputs a commitment opening
(m,w). A commitment scheme is extractable-binding if there exists an extractor
such that for any commitment opening, the extracted message equals the opened
message.
Definition 6.1 (Extractable binding). Let  : N3 → R[0,1]. A (non-interactive)
commitment scheme CS is -extractable-binding, if for every integers p1 and p2, for
every p1-step adversary A1, there exists a pE-step extractor E, such that for every
p2-step adversary A2:
AdvExtBindCS (A1, E ,A2) = Pr
[
ExpExtBindCS (A1, E ,A2) = 1
]
≤ (p1, pE , p2) .
Listing 6.1: ExpExtBindCS (A1, E ,A2) (Extractable-Binding Experiment)
ck ← CS.Setup;
(s, c) ω←− A1(ck);
m∗ ← E(ck, ω);
(m,w)← A2(s);
return 1 if CS.Verify(ck,m, c, w) = 1 ∧m 6= m∗ else 0;
6.2.2. Relation to other cryptographic notions
In the following we discuss the relation of extractable-binding commitments to other
cryptographic notions.
Classical-binding commitments
The following theorem shows that every extractable binding commitment scheme is
classical-binding.
Theorem 6.1 (EB⇒CB). If CS is -extractable binding, then CS is ′-classical-
binding, where ′(p) = inf{2 · (p, pE) : pE ∈ N}.
Proof. Let A be a p-step Bind-adversary and let E be any extractor guaranteed
by the assumption. We construct an ExtBind adversary (A1,A2) as follows. The
first stage A1(ck) runs A(ck) (with random string ω) to obtain (c,m,w,m′, w′) and
returns (s, c), where s = (ck, ω,m,w,m′, w′). The second stage A2(s) parses s to
obtain (ck, ω,m,w,m′, w′), tosses a coin b ← {0, 1}, and outputs (m,w) if b = 0,
and otherwise outputs (m′, w′). If A is successful in ExpBindCS , then (A1,A2) is
successful in ExpExtBindCS with probability 12 independent of the extractor E . As the
running time of (A1,A2) is about p (A2 just parses and tosses a coin), we have
AdvExtBindCS (A1, E ,A2) ≥ 12AdvBindCS (A) and hence,
AdvBindCS (A) ≤ 2 ·AdvExtBindCS (A1, E ,A2) ≤ 2 · (p, pE) ,
where pE is the step count of E .
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Knowledge-binding commitments
Knowledge-binding commitments were proposed by Buldas and Laur [BL07] as a new
security notion for time-stamping. In comparison to extractable-binding, knowledge-
binding is defined for multi-message commitments (e.g., list commitments or set
commitments) and the extractor depends on the second stage adversary A2, but A2
gets an additional advice string which is not available to the extractor. Theorem 6.2
implies that the single-message variant of knowledge-binding (Definition 6.2) implies
extractable-binding up to a small security loss due to the reduction.
Definition 6.2 (Knowledge binding (single-message)). Let  : N2 → R[0,1]. A
commitment scheme CS is -knowledge-binding, if for all integers p and pE , for
every p-step adversary A = (A1,A2), there exists a pE-step extractor E, such that
for every advice string a ∈ {0, 1}p:
AdvKBindCS (A, E , a) = Pr
[
ExpKBindCS (A, E , a) = 1
]
≤ (p, pE) ,
where ExpKBindCS is defined in Listing 6.2.
Listing 6.2: Knowledge-binding experiment ExpKBindCS (A, E , a).
ck ← CS.Setup;
(s, c) ω1←− A1(ck);
m′ ← E(ck, ω1);
(m,w)← A2(a, s);
if CS.Verify(ck,m, c, w) = 1 ∧m 6= m′ then
return 1;
else
return 0;
end
Theorem 6.2 (KB⇒EB). If CS is -knowledge-binding, then CS is ′-extractable-
binding with ′(p1, pE , p2) = (p1 + α · p2 log p2, pE), for some constant α.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary p1-step adversary A1 that acts in terms of the ex-
tractable binding experiment. We define A′2(a, s) as an universal probabilistic Tur-
ing machine that uses the first argument a as a program for an arbitrary p2-step
machine A2(s). According to [AB09], A′2 runs in O(p2 log p2) steps, i.e., α · p2 log p2
for some constant α. Consider the KBind-adversary A = (A1,A′2) that runs in
(p1 + α · p2 log p2) steps and let E be a pE -step KBind-extractor. Note that E can
also be considered as an ExtBind-extractor. We observe that A succeeds in the
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KBind-experiment if and only if (A1,A2) succeeds in the ExtBind-experiment and
hence,
AdvExtBindCS (A1, E ,A2) = AdvKBindCS (A, E , a) ≤ (p1 + α · p2 log p2, pE) .
Extractable collision-resistant hash functions
In [BCC+17], Bitansky et al. propose the notion of an extractable and collision-
resistant hash function (ECRH). They show how to construct an ECRH from several
different knowledge assumptions (i.e., Knowledge of Exponent and Knowledge of
Knapsack). In the following we show that if there exists an ECRH, then there exists
an extractable-binding (and statistically hiding) commitment scheme. In particular,
we show that the commitment scheme by Halevi and Micali [HM96], from here on
referred to by HM96, instantiated with an ECRH is extractable-binding.
In the following, we first provide the relevant definitions, then prove that ex-
tractable collision-resistant hash functions are extractable-binding, and finally prove
that HM96 instantiated with an extractable-binding hash function is extractable-
binding.
Definition 6.3 (Collision-resistance). We say a keyed function (K,F ) is -collision
resistant if for all t ∈ N, for all t-bounded algorithms A:
Adv(K,F)CR (A) = Pr
[
k ← K, (x, x′)← A(k) :
F (k, x) = F (k, x′)
]
≤ (t) .
Definition 6.4 (Extractability). We say a keyed function (K,F ) is -extractable
if for all tA, tE ∈ N, for all tA-bounded algorithms A, there exists a tE-bounded
algorithm E, such that:
Adv(K,F)EX (A, E) = Pr
[
k ← K, y r←− A(k), x← E(k, r) :
y ∈ Image(F (k, ·)) ∧ F (k, x) 6= y
]
≤ (tA, tE) .
Definition 6.5 (Extractable-binding hash function). A keyed hash function (K,H)
is -extractable-binding if for all t1, t2, tE ∈ N, it holds that for every t1-bounded
algorithm A1, there exists a tE-bounded algorithm E, such that for all t2-bounded
algorithms A2:
Adv(K,H)EB (A1,A2, E) = Pr
 k ← K, (y, s)
r←− A1(k),
x← A2(s), x′ ← E(k, r) :
H(k, x) = y ∧ x 6=x′
 ≤ (t1, t2, tE) .
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Theorem 6.3 (ECRH⇒EBHF). Let (K,H) be a keyed hash function that is EX-
extractable and CR-collision-resistant. There exist constants α and β such that
(K,H) is EB-extractable-binding for
EB(t1, t2, tE) = EX(α · t1, tE) + CR(β · (t1 + t2 + tE))
Proof. Let (K,H) be a keyed hash function that is CR-collision-resistant and EX-
extractable. Fix any constants t1, t2, and tE , t1-bounded algorithm A1, and t2-
bounded algorithm A2.
Let B1 be an algorithm that on input k, runs A1(k) → (y, s) and outputs y.
Define tB1 as the maximum over the computational resources required to evaluate
B1 on input k for k ∈ K.
For any t, let EB1,t be a t-bounded algorithm such that Adv(K,H)EX (B1, EB1,t) ≤
EX(tB1 , t). Such an algorithm exists because (K,H) is EX-extractable.
Let t′ be the maximum constant such that EB1,t′ is tE -bounded for all inputs (k, r),
where k ∈ K and r is a random string produced by A1(k). Define EA1 = EB1,t′ .
Let B2 be an algorithm that on input k, runs A1(k) r−→ (y, s), A2(s) → x, and
EA1(k, r)→ x′, and outputs (x, x′).
We now derive an upper bound on the probability that A2 outputs a preimage
and EA1 fails to extract a preimage or outputs a different preimage. We observe that
Adv(K,H)EB (A1,A2, EA1) = Pr
 k ← K, (y, s)
r←− A1(k),
x← A2(s), x′ ← EA1(k, r) :
H(k, x) = y ∧ x 6=x′

= Pr
 k ← K, (y, s)
r←− A1(k),
x← A2(s), x′ ← EA1(k, r) :
H(k, x) = y ∧ x 6=x′ ∧H(x′) = y

+ Pr
 k ← K, (y, s)
r←− A1(k),
x← A2(s), x′ ← EA1(k, r) :
H(k, x) = y ∧ x 6=x′ ∧H(x′) 6= y
 .
Furthermore, we observe that
Pr
 k ← K, (y, s)
r←− A1(k),
x← A2(s), x′ ← EA1(k, r) :
H(k, x) = y ∧ x 6=x′ ∧H(x′) = y
 = Pr [ k ← K, (x, x′)← B2(k) :
H(k, x) = H(k, x′) ∧ x 6=x′
]
= Adv(K,H)CR (B2) ,
and
Pr
 k ← K, (y, s)
r←− A1(k),
x← A2(s), x′ ← EA1(k, r) :
H(k, x) = y ∧ x 6=x′ ∧H(x′) 6= y
 ≤ Pr [k ← K, y r←− B1(k), x′ ← EA1(k, r) :
y ∈ Image(H(k, ·)) ∧H(x′) 6= y
]
= Adv(K,H)EX (B1, EA1) .
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It follows that
Adv(K,H)EB (A1,A2, EA1)
≤ Adv(K,H)EX (B1, EA1) + Adv(K,H)CR (B2)
≤ EX(tB1 , tE) + CR(tB2) .
We conclude that there exist constants α and β such that (K,H) is EB-extractable-
binding with
EB(t1, t2, tE) = EX(α · t1, tE) + CR(β · (t1 + t2 + tE)) .
We briefly state the commitment scheme described in [HM96] with a keyed hash
function.
Construction 6.1 (HM96). Let M,N ∈ N, (K,H) be a keyed hash function with
domain {0, 1}∗ and codomain {0, 1}N , and UHF be a universal hash function with
domain {0, 1}M and codomain {0, 1}N . The commitment scheme HM96 proposed in
[HM96] associated with a keyed hash function (K,H) is constituted by algorithms
Setup, Commit, and Verify defined as follows.
Setup()→ k: Sample K → k and output k.
Commit(k,m)→ (c, d): Sample {0, 1}M → d. Compute H(k,m)→ s and H(k, d) =
y. Sample UHF→ h with h(d) = s. Set c = (y, h).
Verify(k,m, c, d)→ b: Let c = (y, h). If H(k,m) = h(d) and H(k, d) = y, set b = 1.
Otherwise set b = 0.
The next theorem states that HM96 is extractable-binding if the used hash func-
tion (K,H) is extractable-binding.
Theorem 6.4 (EBHF⇒EBCOM). Let (K,H) be an H-extractable-binding hash
function. There exist constants α and β such that the commitment scheme HM96
instantiated with (K,H) is C-extractable-binding for
C(t1, t2, tE) = 2 · H(α · (t1 + tE), α · t2, β · tE) .
Proof. Let (K,H) be an H-extractable-binding hash function. Fix any constants
t1, t2, and tE , t1-bounded algorithm A1, and t2-bounded algorithm A2.
Let B1 be an algorithm that on input k, runs A1(k) → ((y, h), s) and outputs
(y, s). Define tB1 as the maximum over the computational resources required to
evaluate B1 on input k for k ∈ K.
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For any t and t′, let EB1,t,t′ be a t′-bounded algorithm such that for all for t-
bounded algorithms B2, Adv(K,H)EB (B1,B2, EB1,t,t′) ≤ H(tB1 , t, t′). Such an algorithm
exists because (K,H) is H-extractable-binding.
Let B2 be an algorithm that on input s, computes A2(s)→ (m,x) and outputs x.
Define tB2 as the maximum over the computational resources required to evaluate
B2 on input s for k ∈ K and ((y, h), s) ∈ A1(k).
For any t and t′, let C1,t,t′ be an algorithm that on input k, computes A1(k) r−→
((y, h), s), EB1,t,t′(r, k) → x′, h(x′) → z′, and outputs (z′, s). Define tC1,t,t′ as the
maximum over the computational resources required to evaluate C1,t,t′ on input k
for k ∈ K.
Let C2 be an algorithm that on input s, computes A2(s)→ (m,x) and outputs m.
Define tC2 as the maximum over the computational resources required to evaluate
C2 on input s for k ∈ K and ((y, h), s) ∈ A1(k).
For any t3, t4, t5, t6, let EC1,(t3,t4),(t5,t6) be a t5-bounded algorithm such that for all t6-
bounded algorithms C2, it is Adv(K,H)EB (C1,(t3,t4), C2, EC1,(t3,t4),(t5,t6)) ≤ H(tC1,t3,t4 , t6, t5).
Such an algorithm exists because (K,H) is H-extractable-binding.
For any t3, t4, t5, t6, let EA1,(t3,t4,t5,t6) be an algorithm that on input (k, r), computes
EB1,t3,t4(k, r) r
′−→ x′, EC1,(t3,t4),(t5,t6)(k, r‖r′)→ m′, and outputs m′.
Let t′ be the maximum constant such that EA1,t′,t4,t′,t6 is tE -bounded for all inputs
(k, r), where k ∈ K and ((h, y), s) r←− A1(k). Define EA1 = EA1,t′,tB2 ,t′,tC2 , EB1 =EB1,t′,tB2 , and EC1 = EC1,(t′,tB2 ),(t′,tC2 ).
We now prove an upper bound on the probability that for a commitment produced
by A1, algorithm A2 finds an opening for a message different from the one extracted
by EA1 . We observe that
AdvHM96EB (A1,A2, EA1)
= Pr
k ← HM96.K, ((h, y), s)
r←− A1(k), (m,x)← A2(s),
m′ ← EA1(k, r) :
HM96.V (k,m, c, d) ∧m6=m′

= Pr

k ← K, ((h, y), s) r←− A1(k), (m,x)← A2(s),
x′ r
′←− EB1(k, r),m′ ← EC1(k, r‖r′) :
H(k, x) = y ∧H(k,m) = h(x) ∧m6=m′

= Pr

k ← K, ((h, y), s) r←− A1(k), (m,x)← A2(s),
x′ r
′←− EB1(k, r),m′ ← EC1(k, r‖r′) :
H(k, x) = y ∧H(k,m) = h(x) ∧m6=m′ ∧ x 6= x′

+ Pr

k ← K, ((h, y), s) r←− A1(k), (m,x)← A2(s),
x′ r
′←− EB1(k, r),m′ ← EC1(k, r‖r′) :
H(k, x) = y ∧H(k,m) = h(x) ∧m 6=m′ ∧ x = x′

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by the definitions of HM96 and EA1 and the law of total probability. Next, we observe
that
Pr

k ← K, ((h, y), s) r←− A1(k), (m,x)← A2(s),
x′ r
′←− EB1(k, r),m′ ← EC1(k, r‖r′) :
H(k, x) = y ∧H(k,m) = h(x) ∧m 6=m′ ∧ x 6= x′

= Pr

k ← K, (y, s) r←− B1(k), x← B2(s),
x′ r
′←− EB1(k, r),m′ ← EC1(k, r‖r′) :
H(k, x) = y ∧H(k,m) = h(x) ∧m 6=m′ ∧ x 6= x′

≤ Pr
k ← K, (y, s)
r←− B1(k), x← B2(s),
x′ ← EB1(k, r) :
H(k, x) = y ∧ x 6= x′

= Adv(K,F)EB (B1,B2, EB1)
and
Pr

k ← K, ((h, y), s) r←− A1(k), (m,x)← A2(s),
x′ r
′←− EB1(k, r),m′ ← EC1(k, r‖r′) :
H(k, x) = y ∧H(k,m) = h(x) ∧m 6=m′ ∧ x 6= x′

≤ Pr

k ← K, ((h, y), s) r←− A1(k), (m,x)← A2(s),
x′ r
′←− EB1(k, r),m′ ← EC1(k, r‖r′) :
H(k,m) = h(x) ∧m 6=m′

= Pr
k ← K, (z, s)
r←− C1(k), x← C2(s),
m′ ← EC1(k, r) :
H(k,m) = z ∧m6=m′

= Adv(K,F)EB (C1, C2, EC1)
by the definitions of B1, B2, C1, and C2. In combination, we obtain
AdvHM96EB (A1,A2, EA1)
≤ Adv(K,H)EB (B1,B2, EB1) + Adv(K,H)EB (C1, C2, EC1)
≤ H(tB1 , tB2 , tEB1 ) + H(tC1 , tC2 , tEC1 ) .
We conclude that there exist constants α and β, such that the commitment
scheme HM96 instantiated with an H-extractable-binding hash function (K,H) is
C-extractable-binding for
C(t1, t2, tE) = 2 · H(α · (t1 + tE), α · t2, β · tE) .
Statistical hiding security of HM96 is proven in [HM96]. It follows that if there
exists an extractable-binding hash function, then there exists a statistically hiding
and extractable-binding commitment scheme.
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6.3. Long-term commitment schemes
6.3.1. Scheme definition
A long-term secure commitment scheme allows to generate commitments that re-
main binding for long periods of time, e.g., decades or even centuries. Such a
commitment is generated in an initial commitment generation procedure and needs
to be updated periodically in order to remain valid. For initial commitment and
also for updating a commitment, a short-term secure commitment scheme is chosen
whose security must be provided until the next update.
The following definition captures long-term commitment schemes more formally.
Here, by a a reference to a commitment function we mean a pointer to the com-
mitment algorithm of a chosen commitment scheme. A commitment function Com
gets as input a message m and outputs a commitment c. By a trusted commitment
verification function we mean a function that allows to verify commitments that
have been generated in the past. A commitment verification function Ver gets as
input a message m, a commitment c, a witness w, and a time t. It outputs 1 if
(m,w) is a valid opening for commitment c at time t and it outputs 0 in any other
case.
Definition 6.6 (Long-term commitment scheme). A long-term commitment scheme
is a triple of algorithms Commit, Recommit, Verify, where:
• Commit gets as input a reference to a commitment function Com, and a mes-
sage m. It outputs a state S, a witness W , and a commitment c.
• Recommit gets as input a state S and a reference to a commitment function
Com. It outputs a state S ′, a renewed witness W , and a commitment c.
• Verify gets as input a reference to a trusted commitment verification function
Ver, a message m, a list of commitments C, and a witness W . It outputs a
boolean b, where b = 1 if C is a valid long-term commitment for m and b = 0
if C is invalid.
A long-term commitment scheme (Commit,Recommit,Verify) is used by a com-
mitter A for committing to a message m in the presence of a verifier B, as follows.
In the protocol, the verifier B maintains a list of commitment values C.
Initial commitment. The committer A chooses a secure commitment scheme CS,
generates the initial commitment (S,W, c) ← Commit(CS.Com,m) and sends
the commitment c to the verifier B. When B receives c, it reads the current
time t and sets C ← [(t, c)].
Recommitment. A chooses a new commitment scheme CS, generates a new com-
mitment by running (S,W, c) ← Recommit(CS.Com, S), and sends c to B.
When B receives c, it reads the current time t and appends (t, c) to C.
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Verification. A sends the witness W to B. When B receives W , it uses a trusted
commitment verification function Ver and runs b← Verify(Ver,m,C,W ). The
verifier B accepts the commitment if b = 1, otherwise B rejects.
6.3.2. Security definition
In the following, we present definitions of binding and hiding for long-term commit-
ment schemes.
Commitment scheme instances. In the following security definitions we define
experiments that involve a set of commitment scheme instances C = {CS1,CS2, . . .}.
Each instance CSi is associated with a start time tsi and an end time tbi . At the start
time, public commitment parameters are generated and after the end time, com-
mitments generated using this instance are considered invalid (e.g. not considered
secure anymore).
The following long-term experiments use the clock oracle described by Listing 6.3.
This oracle, in addition to defining the time, also checks whether new commitment
instances have become available and generates and outputs the public commitment
parameters accordingly.
Listing 6.3: The clock oracle Clock(t).
CK ← [];
if t > time then
time← t;
forall i ∈ {j : tsj = t} do
ck ← CSi.Setup;
CK[i]← ck;
CK ← CK‖(i, ck);
end
end
return CK ;
Hiding. The unconditionally hiding experiment ExpLtHide for long-term commit-
ment schemes (Listing 6.4) is defined similar to the unconditionally hiding exper-
iment ExpHide for (short-term) commitment schemes. It considers an unbounded
adversary A which is given access to oracle Clock. The adversary A generates two
messages (m0,m1) and an advice string s. Then, a coin is flipped b ←$ {0, 1} and
the adversary may call oracles Com and ReCom. If the Com oracle is called, an initial
long-term commitment to mb is generated and returned to the adversary. When the
ReCom oracle is called, a chosen long-term commitment is renewed and the adversary
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gets the renewed commitment value. At some point in time, the adversary A guesses
which message has been committed to by outputting a bit b′ and wins if it guesses
correctly, i.e. if b′ = b. Unconditional hiding for long-term commitment schemes is
defined as follows.
Definition 6.7 (Long-term hiding). A long-term commitment scheme LCS is un-
conditionally hiding if for any set C of unconditionally hiding commitment schemes,
for any adversary A:
AdvLtHideLCS,C (A) = Pr
[
ExpLtHideLCS,C (A) = 1
]
= 12 .
Listing 6.4: The long-term hiding experiment ExpLtHideLCS,C (A).
(m0,m1, s)← AClock;
b←$ {0, 1};
b′ ← AClock,Com,Recom(s);
if b′ = b then
return 1;
else
return 0;
end
oracle Com(i, j):
(Si,Wi, c)← LCS.Commit(Comj,mb);
return c;
oracle Recom(i, j):
(Si,Wi, c)← LCS.Recommit(Si,Comj);
return c;
Binding. The binding experiment ExpLtExtBind for long-term commitment schemes
(Listing 6.5) considers a two-staged long-term adversary (A1,A2), which is given
access to an oracle Clock, and an extractor E . The first-stage adversary A1 outputs
an initial commitment c and an advice string s using random coins ω. The extractor
E then gets the public commitment parameters CK and random coins ω and outputs
an extracted message m′. The initial commitment c is recorded by running Rec(c).
Afterwards, the second-stage adversary A2 gets the advice string s, runs the long-
term commitment protocol (during which he may call Rec several times), and finally
outputs a message m and a long-term witness W . The adversary wins if it is finished
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early enough (time ≤ τ), (m,W ) is a valid opening for the commitment sequence
C, and m differs from the extracted message m′.
Definition 6.8 (Long-term binding). Let M describe the available machine classes
and C describe the available commitment scheme instances. Let  : N5 → R[0,1]. A
long-term commitment scheme LCS is -binding (for M and C) if for any bounds
ρ1, ρE , ρ2, and q, for any ρ1-bounded deterministic adversary A1 ∈M, there exists
a ρE-bounded extractor E ∈ M, such that for any ρ2-bounded A2 ∈M that is q-call-
bounded, and any time t:
AdvLtExtBindLCS,C (A1,E ,A2,t)=Pr
[
ExpLtExtBindLCS,C (A1, E ,A2, t)=1
]
≤(ρ1,ρE ,ρ2,q,t) .
Listing 6.5: Long-term extractable binding, ExpLtExtBindLCS,C (A1, E ,A2, t).
(s, c) ω←− AClock1 ;
m′ ← E(CK, ω);
Rec(c);
(m,W )← AClock,Rec2 (s);
if time ≤ t and m 6= m′ and
LCS.Verify(Ver,m, C,W ) = 1 then
return 1;
else
return 0;
end
oracle Rec(c):
t← time;
C← C‖(t, c);
function Ver(m, c, w, t):
c = (i, c′);
if tsi ≤ time and t < tbi then
b← CSi.Verify(CK[i],m, c, w);
return b;
else
return 0;
end
6.4. Construction and security analysis
In the following we describe a long-term commitment scheme construction and prove
its security. The construction is based on the ideas of Bayer, Haber, and Stornetta
[HS91, BHS93] for renewing timestamps. The main idea is that in order to renew
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a commitment, a new commitment is given to the message and the opening value
of the previous commitment. In the following, we refer to this construction by
LtCom. We remark that we here consider commitment schemes that allow messages
of arbitrary length, i.e., with message space {0, 1}∗ (e.g., [HM96]).
Construction 6.2. The algorithms Commit, Recommit, and Verify of the long-term
commitment scheme LtCom are defined as follows:
• Commit(Com,m): Run (c, w) ← Com(m). Set W = [w] and S = (m,W ).
Output S, W , and c.
• Recommit(S,Com): Run (c, w) ← Com(S). Let S = (m, [w1, . . . , wn]). Set
W = [w1, . . . , wn, w] and S ′ = (m,W ). Output S ′, W , and c.
• Verify(Ver,m,C,W ): Let C = [(c1, t1), . . . , (cn, tn)] and W = [w1, . . . , wn].
Compute b ← ∧ni=1 Ver((m, [w1, . . . , wi−1]), ci, wi, ti+1), where tn+1 is the cur-
rent time. Output b.
Now we analyze the security of LtCom. First, we note that LtCom is uncondi-
tionally hiding, if unconditionally hiding commitment schemes are used. This is
because then the individual commitments are independent of each other and of the
committed messages and decommitments. Next, we prove that LtCom is long-term
binding, given that the accumulated security level of the used short-term commit-
ment schemes is sufficiently small. For the long-term binding security analysis we
first refine the extractable-binding definition for short-term commitment schemes to
make it meaningful in the long-term security model. More specifically, we refine the
definition such that the computational models of the adversary and the extractor
may be restricted to a certain machine classes.
Definition 6.9 (Extractable-binding (refined)). LetMA andME be machine classes
and  : N3 → R[0,1]. We say a commitment scheme CS is -extractable-binding for
adversaries of MA and extractors of ME if for every integers p1 and p2, for every
p1-step adversary A1 ∈MA, there exists a pE-step extractor E ∈ ME , such that for
every p2-step adversary A2 ∈MA:
AdvExtBindCS (A1, E ,A2) ≤ (p1, pE , p2) .
The following theorem establishes a bound on the binding security of the long-
term commitment scheme LtCom in terms of the binding security of each of the
chosen short-term commitment schemes.
Theorem 6.5. Let M describe the available machine classes and C = {CSi}i de-
scribe the available commitment scheme instances. For every i, assume that the
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commitment scheme CSi is i-extractable-binding for adversaries ofMtbi and extrac-
tors of Mtsi . Then, LtCom is -binding with
(ρ1, ρE , ρ2, q, t) =
∑
i∈{i:tbi≤t}
i
(
ρA(tbi), ρE(tbi), α
)
and ρA(t) = ρ1(t) + ρ2(t) + q(t) ∗ ρE(t), for a constant α.
Proof. To prove the theorem, we first describe the extractor algorithm that ex-
tracts the committed message from the first commitment of a long-term adversary
in ExpLtExtBind. Then we describe a reduction from the security of the long-term
commitment scheme to the aggregated security of the commitment schemes C.
We start by describing the long-term extractor E (Listing 6.6) that we construct
using the first-stage adversary A1 and the short-term extractors {Ei}i correspond-
ing to commitment schemes {CSi}i. When the long-term extractor is called with
input (CK, ω), it runs A1 using commitment parameters CK and random coins ω for
obtaining the commitment c. The extractor then decomposes c into a commitment
scheme identifier i and a commitment value c′. Afterwards, it checks if scheme i is
currently usable and if this is the case, it runs the extractor Ei, corresponding to
scheme i, with input the corresponding key CK[i] and random coins ω. The long-term
extractor outputs the message m returned by the short-term extractor Ei.
Listing 6.6: Long-term extractor E(CK, ω)
Simulate A1 using commitment parameters CK and random coins ω to
obtain commitment c;
c = (i, c′);
if tsi ≤ time < tbi then
m← Ei(CK[i], ω);
else
m←⊥;
end
return m;
Next, we describe the reduction from a successful long-term adversary to a set of
short-term commitment adversaries, of which at least one is successful. Let (A1,A2)
be an adversary pair that participates in ExpLtExtBind. For each commitment scheme
CSi ∈ C, we construct a corresponding short-term adversary pair (Bi,1,Bi,2) that
participates in ExpExtBind. The adversary Bi,1 (Listing 6.7) simulates the experiment
ExpLtExtBind with (A1,A2) until it successfully obtains two different message-witness
pairs which are valid for the same commitment with respect to commitment scheme
CSi, or the lifetime of the commitment scheme CSi is over. It passes the two different
message-witness pairs (m0, w0,m1, w1) to Bi,2 and commits c. The adversary Bi,2
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(Listing 6.8) gets as input the message-witness pairs, flips a coin b ←$ {0, 1}, and
outputs (mb, wb).
For every time t, define It = {i : tbi ≤ t} as the set of indices of the schemes
whose lifetime expires until time t. We observe that for every successful run of the
long-term adversary (A1,A2), there is i ∈ It such that the run of the short-term
adversary (Bi,1,Bi,2) is successful. It follows that
AdvLtExtBindLtCom,C (A1, E ,A2, t) ≤
∑
i∈It
AdvExtBindCSi (Bi,1, Ei,Bi,2) .
Assume A1 is ρ1-bounded, A2 is ρ2-bounded, and E is ρE -bounded. Additionally
assume that A2 makes at most q(t) receiver oracle calls until time t. Define ρB(t) :=
ρ1(t) + ρ2(t) + q(t) ∗ ρE(t). The step count of Bi,1 is bounded by ρB(tbi). It follows
that for every t,
AdvLtExtBindLtCom,C (A1, E ,A2, t) ≤
∑
i∈It
AdvExtBindCSi (Bi,1, Ei,Bi,2)
≤∑
i∈It
i
(
ρB(tbi), ρE(tbi), 1
)
.
6.5. Evaluation
We evaluate the security loss over time for the long-term commitment scheme de-
scribed in section 6.3. For our evaluation we consider a scenario where a commitment
should last for a time period t. The security level of the long-term commitment
scheme is evaluated in terms of the security level of the short-term commitment
schemes that are used. For convenience, we assume that all used commitment
schemes have the same security level before they become insecure. Here, by the
security level we mean a bound on the success probability of the adversary. Con-
cretely, consider a long-term commitment scheme that uses short-term commitment
schemes C = {CSi}i. We assume that the extractable-binding security of a com-
mitment scheme derives from the ratio of the adversary power pA and the extractor
power pE , multiplied by a base security level δ. Hence, we assume each CSi is -
secure extractable-binding before its breakage time tbi with (p1, pE , p2) = p1+p2pE δ.
By Theorem 6.5, we obtain that the long-term commitment scheme is ′-secure
extractable-binding with
′(ρ1, ρE , ρ2, q, t) = δ ∗
∑
i∈{i:tbi≤t}
ρ1(tbi) + ρ2(tbi) + q(tbi) ∗ ρE(tbi) + α
ρE(tbi)
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Listing 6.7: ExtBind adversary Bi,1(ck) constructed from long-term ad-
versary (A1,A2) and long-term extractor E .
run
(s∗, c∗) ω
∗←− AClock1 ;
C← C ∪ {c∗};
m∗ ← E(CK, ω∗);
M← M ∪ {m∗};
(m∗∗,W ∗∗)← AClock,Rec2 (s∗);
M← M ∪ {m∗∗};
W← W ∪W ∗∗;
until (time ≥ tbi) or
(∃m,m′ ∈ M, w, w′ ∈ W, (i, c) ∈ C :
CSi.Verify(CK[i],m, c, w) = CSi.Verify(CK[i],m′, c, w′) = 1);
return ((m,w,m′, w′), c);
simulator Clock(t):
CK ← [];
if t > time then
forall i ∈ {j : time < tsj ≤ t} do
if i = i then
ck ← ck;
else
ck ← CSi.Setup;
end
CK[i]← ck;
CK ← CK‖(i, ck);
end
time← t;
end
return CK ;
simulator Rec(c):
C← C ∪ {c};
c = (i, c′);
if tsi ≤ time then
Let ω be the random
coins consumed by A1
and A2 until this point;
m← Ei(CK[i], ω, c′);
m = (m′, w′);
M← M ∪ {m′};
W← W ∪ {w′};
end
Listing 6.8: ExtBind adversary Bi,2(s).
s = (m0, w0,m1, w1);
b←$ {0, 1};
return (mb, wb);
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Figure 6.1.: Evaluation of the security level ′ of the long-term commitment scheme
LtCom in terms of time t and short-term commitment security level δ.
Here, we assume R = 1, L = 5, and we choose δ = 2−192 for evaluating
over time t and we choose t = 100 for evaluating over δ.
for some constant α. Let the unit of time be years and assume that the number of
commitment schemes that become available during each year is at most L and the
number of renewals that are done per year is at mostR, i.e., |It| = |{i : tbi ≤ t}| ≤ t∗L
and q(t) ≤ t ∗ R. We suggest that it is reasonable that the computational power of
the adversary is comparable to the computational power of the extractor. Hence,
we assume that ρ1(t)
ρE
= ρ2(t)
ρE
= 1. We also observe that the step count α of the
very simple second-stage adversary described in Listing 6.8 should be smaller than
ρE , hence, we assume αρE(t) ≤ 1. We obtain the following bound on the long-term
security level:
′(ρ1, ρE , ρ2, q, t) ≤ 3 ∗ t2 ∗ LRδ .
In Figure 6.1, we show how the long-term security level develops over time and for
different choices of the base security level δ. We observe that after 100 years the
security level drops from 2−182 to 2−175 (for R = 1, L = 5, and δ = 2−192). We also
observe that there is a constant difference of roughly 218 between the base security
level δ and the long-term security level ′ if the time period is kept fixed.
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7. LINCOS: A Long-Term Secure
Storage System providing
Integrity and Confidentiality
Previous long-term protection schemes only supported protection of either integrity
or confidentiality. However, much long-lived digitally stored information requires
protection of both properties simultaneously (e.g., governmental documents, elec-
tronic health records).
Contribution. We present the long-term secure storage system LINCOS, which is
the first system that provides simultaneous long-term protection of integrity and
confidentiality. We first construct a long-term integrity scheme that does not leak
any information about the protected data by using information-theoretically hiding
commitments and computationally secure timestamps. We then combine the ob-
tained long-term integrity scheme with proactive secret sharing in order to construct
LINCOS and we provide a security analysis for this construction. We also present
an implementation and experimental evaluation of LINCOS that uses quantum key
distribution for establishing information-theoretically secure communication chan-
nels between the data owner and the shareholders. Our experiments are carried
out within the Tokyo QKD Network, which is one of the most advanced QKD net-
works. Our experimental evaluation establishes the feasibility of LINCOS and shows
that it is a promising solution for long-term secure data storage with integrity and
confidentiality protection.
Publications. This chapter is based on publication [G2].
7.1. COPRIS: Confidentiality-preserving long-term
integrity scheme
In this section we present the scheme COPRIS which ensures long-term integrity
protection and is long-term confidentiality preserving, i.e., it does not leak any in-
formation about the protected data. Recall that by long-term protection we mean
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protection for an indefinite time period. The scheme also provides long-term authen-
ticity if the protected data is signed and the integrity of the signature is protected
together with the signed data.
7.1.1. Scheme
COPRIS works as follows. A document owner stores a document d at some time t.
He keeps d secret and uses COPRIS to construct a proof of integrity PI for d. Later
he may choose to reveal d to another party. This party then uses PI to verify that
d existed at time t. To preserve the confidentiality of d, the proof of integrity PI
is constructed in such a way that no information about d is revealed to any third
party. Outsourced storage of the confidential data is later dealt with in section 7.2.
We now explain the construction of the proof of integrity and its verification and
we show that this construction has the desired security properties. The integrity
proof is a pair (E,R), where E is an evidence record and R is a list of decommitment
values. The evidence record is constructed interactively between the document
owner and an evidence service which, in turn, interacts with a timestamp service.
The list of decommitment values is constructed and kept secret by the document
owner. The document owner may decide to reveal the decommitment values together
with the document to a third party verifier.
In the following we describe COPRIS in detail. Figure 7.1 illustrates the function-
ality of COPRIS. Figure 7.2 lists the algorithms used in COPRIS.
Initial protection. The initial integrity proof is constructed as follows. The doc-
ument owner runs algorithm Protect. Input is the document d and the (initially
empty) list of decommitment values R. He selects a commitment scheme CS and
computes a commitment (c, r) ← CS.Commit(d). He sets R = (r) and sends the
commitment value c to the evidence service. When the evidence service receives c,
it runs algorithm AddEv. Input is c and the (initially empty) evidence record E. It
requests a timestamp T on c from a timestamp service TS using protocol TS.Stamp
at time t. The evidence record is initialized as E = (c, T, t).
Timestamp renewal. Before the last timestamp becomes insecure it must be re-
newed. In this case, the evidence service executes algorithm RenewTs, where the
input is the current evidence record E. It selects a new timestamp scheme TS and
obtains a timestamp T on E at time t using protocol TS.Stamp. Then, it appends
(⊥, T, t) to E, where ⊥ indicates that there is no commitment generated at time-
stamp renewal.
Commitment renewal. Before the last commitment created by the document
owner becomes insecure, it must be renewed. The document owner runs the al-
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gorithm RenewCom. Input is the document d and the decommitment value list
R. The document owner selects a new commitment scheme CS and computes
(c, r) ← CS.Commit(d,R). He add r to the list R at position |E| and sends c
to the evidence service. When the evidence service receives c, it runs algorithm
AddEv. Input is c and the evidence record E.
Verification. When the document owner reveals d to the verifier, he also transmits
the asserted existence time t and the integrity proof (E,R). Using this information,
the verifier can validate the existence of d at time t as follows. Let R = (r0, . . . , rn)
and E = (c0, T0, t0, . . . , cn, Tn, tn).
We describe the verification procedure. We define tn+1 to be the time of verifica-
tion and for i ∈ {0, . . . , n} we set Ei = (c0, T0, t0, . . . , ci, Ti, ti) and Ri = (r0, . . . , ri).
Furthermore, for i ∈ {0, . . . , n} let TSi the timestamp scheme associated with Ti
and if ci 6= ⊥, let CSi denote the commitment scheme associated with ci. Also, let
tNRC(i) denote the time of the next recommitment after ci, i.e., the minimum ti′ with
i′ > i and ci′ 6= ⊥ or tn+1 if i = n. The verifier uses his trust anchor TA, which
must contain the necessary certificates for the public parameters of the signatures
and commitments, and for i ∈ {0, . . . , n} verifies that
if ci 6= ⊥:
CSi.Verify(TA, (d,Ri−1), ci, ri; tNRC(i)) = 1
TSi.Verify(TA, (Ei−1, ci), Ti, ti; ti+1) = 1
else:
TSi.Verify(TA, Ei−1, Ti, ti; ti+1) = 1.
7.1.2. Security
In the following, we provide a security analysis of COPRIS. We show that COPRIS
provides long-term integrity and authenticity protection and that no confidential
data is leaked to the evidence and timestamp service.
We consider adversaries that may be active for an unbounded period of time while
being computationally bounded per unit of time. We refer to chapter 3 for more
details regarding this computational model. It reflects the indefinite lifetime of long-
lived systems and of the data processed by them. The fact that adversaries have
limited capabilities per unit of real time allows for the usage of computationally
secure cryptographic primitives in long-lived systems.
Our security analysis is based on the results of Part I, where it is shown that (under
certain computational assumptions) extractable commitments and timestamps can
be used to argue about the knowledge at an earlier point in time based on the
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Figure 7.1.: Functionality of COPRIS.
current knowledge and the interaction with the considered cryptographic system.
In our security analysis we will use the following notation. For a data object d and
a time t, we write d ∈ K[t] to denote that d was known at time t. We remark that
knowledge is not forgotten, that is, for any data object d and any two points in
time t and t′, it holds that if d ∈ K[t] and t′ > t, then also d ∈ K[t′]. We also use
the convention that for verification of timestamps and commitments a trust anchor
TA is provided by a PKI that certifies the verification keys of the used timestamp
and commitment scheme instances and specifies the corresponding instance validity
periods.
We first state two arguments which are derived from the results of chapter 4,
chapter 5, and chapter 6 about extractable timestamps and commitments. We will
then use these arguments for showing that integrity proofs of COPRIS are long-term
unforgeable. The first argument states that if somebody knows a timestamp (T, t)
and a data object d at a time t′, and (T, t) is valid for d at t′, then has already
been known d at time t (with high probability). The second argument states that if
somebody knows a commitment value c at a time t, a message d and a decommitment
r are known at time t′ > t, and r is a valid decommitment from c to d at time t′,
thenthe message d has already been known at the commitment time t (with high
probability).
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Protect(d,R):
1. Select commitment scheme CS
2. (c, r)← CS.Commit(d)
3. Send c to evidence service, set R = (r)
AddEv(c, E):
1. Select timestamp scheme TS
2. (T, t)← TS.Stamp(E, c)
3. Append (c, T, t) to E
RenewTs(E):
1. Select timestamp scheme TS
2. (T, t)← TS.Stamp(E)
3. Append (⊥, T, t) to E
RenewCom(d,R):
1. Select commitment scheme CS
2. (c, r)← CS.Commit(d,R)
3. Send c to evidence service, append r to R
Verify(TA, d, t, R,E):
1. Let R = (r0, . . . , rn) and E = (c0, T0, t0, . . . , cn, Tn, tn) such that ri corresponds
to ci. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, let Ei = (c0, T0, t0, . . . , ci, Ti, ti) and Ri = (r0, . . . , ri),
let TSi be the timestamp scheme associated with Ti, and if ci 6= ⊥, let CSi be
the commitment scheme associated with ci. Furthermore let t0 = t and tn+1
be the current time.
2. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n}, if ci = ⊥, verify that TSi.Verify(TA, Ei−1, Ti, ti; ti+1) =
1, and if ci 6= ⊥, verify that CSi.Verify(TA, (d,Ri−1), ci, ri; tNRC(i)) = 1 and
TSi.Verify(TA, (Ei−1, ci), Ti, ti; ti+1) = 1.
Figure 7.2.: Algorithms used in COPRIS for initial protection, adding evidence,
timestamp renewal, commitment renewal, and verification.
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Argument 7.1. For any data object d, timestamp (T, t), and time t′:
(d, (T, t)) ∈ K[t′] ∧ VerifyTsTA(d, T, t; t′) = 1 =⇒ d ∈ K[t] .
Argument 7.2. For any commitment value c, time t, data object d, decommitment
value r, and time t′ > t:
c ∈ K[t] ∧ (d, r) ∈ K[t′] ∧ VerComTA(d, c, r; t′) = 1 =⇒ d ∈ K[t] .
By long-term unforgeability of COPRIS we mean that it is computationally in-
feasible to construct a valid integrity proof for a document d and a time t if d was
unknown at time t.
It is essential for the security of COPRIS that the following assumptions hold.
I1. The commitment schemes used in the proof of integrity are computationally
binding in their usage period.
I2. The timestamp schemes used in the proof of integrity are computationally
unforgeable in their usage period.
I3. The verifier has a valid trust anchor.
Here, by usage period of the cryptographic schemes we mean the time interval
that begins when the cryptographic scheme is chosen and ends when it is replaced
by a new scheme. Also, by a valid trust anchor we mean a trust anchor that allows
for the verification of all timestamps and commitments.
Argument 7.3. Under assumptions I1, I2, and I3, COPRIS is long-term unforge-
able.
Proof sketch. Assume an adversary outputs (d, t, E,R) such that (E,R) is a valid
integrity proof for d and time t. We show that in this case d was known at time t
(with high probability).
We write R = (r0, . . . , rn) and E = (c0, T0, t0, . . . , cn, Tn, tn). For i ∈ {0, . . . , n} let
Ei = (c0, T0, t0, . . . , ci, Ti, ti) and Ri = (r0, . . . , ri). Furthermore, we denote by CSi
the commitment scheme corresponding to ci, for ci 6= ⊥, and by TSi the timestamp
scheme corresponding to Ti. Also, denote by tn+1 the time at which the adversary
outputs (d, t, E,R). Finally, let tNRC(i) denote the time of the next recommitment
after ci or tn+1 if i = n.
We show that for i ∈ {n, . . . , 0} the following holds:
• (ci, Ti, ti) was known at time ti+1.
• If ci 6= ⊥, then (d,Ei, Ri) was known at time tNRC(i).
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We prove the first two statements recursively. We observe that for i = n both
statements are obviously true as (d, t, E,R) is presented at time tn+1 = tNRC(n) and
E = En contains (cn, Tn, tn) and R = Rn. Next, we prove that if the statements are
true for i, then they must also be true for i − 1. We observe that if ci = ⊥, then
by the validity of the integrity proof we have TSi.Verify(TA, Ei−1, Ti, ti; ti+1) = 1
and by assumptions I2 and I3 and Argument 7.1 we have that Ei−1 was known at
time ti, which implies that (ci−1, Ti−1, ti−1) was also known at time ti. Furthermore,
we observe that if ci 6= ⊥, then we have CSi.Verify(TA, (d,Ri−1), ci, ri; tNRC(i)) = 1
and TSi.Verify(TA, (Ei−1, ci), Ti, ti; ti+1) = 1. By assumptions I2 and I3 and Ar-
gument 7.1 it follows that (Ei−1, ci) was known at time ti, which implies that
(ci−1, Ti−1, ti−1) was also known at time ti, and by assumptions I1 and I3 and Ar-
gument 7.2 it follows that (d,Ri−1) was known at time ti = tNRC(i−1). We observe
that, in particular for i = 0, this means that d was known at time t1 = t (with high
probability).
We remark that the concrete security level of the protection degrades slowly over
time based on the chosen schemes and parameters. For more details, we refer to
chapter 4, chapter 5, and chapter 6.
Next, we show that COPRIS is confidentiality preserving in the long-term, i.e.,
no information is leaked to the evidence and timestamp service (in an information-
theoretic sense). This fact relies on the following assumption.
C1. The commitment schemes are information-theoretically hiding.
Argument 7.4. Under assumption C1, COPRIS is information-theoretic confiden-
tiality preserving.
Proof sketch. The only data that is sent by the document owner to the evidence
service and from there to the timestamp service are information-theoretically hiding
commitments. By assumption C1, these commitments do not leak any information
about the committed data.
7.2. LINCOS: System for long-term integrity,
authenticity, and confidentiality
In this section we describe our new long-term storage system LINCOS which allows
for information-theoretic confidentiality and long-term integrity and authenticity
protection. The situation is similar as in COPRIS. A document owner stores a
document d at time t. He uses an integrity system, which is based on COPRIS, to
construct an integrity proof PI. Additionally, he uses a confidentiality system for
information-theoretic confidential storage of the secret document. The confidential-
ity system is also used for confidential storage of the secret decommitment values,
which are generated during integrity proof construction.
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Figure 7.3.: Overview of the long-term secure storage system LINCOS.
7.2.1. System specification
An overview of LINCOS is shown in Figure 7.3. The involved parties are the docu-
ment owner, the evidence service, a timestamp service, a set of shareholders, and a
verifier. These parties are connected by private or authenticated channels as shown
in Figure 7.3. While LINCOS is running, the respective channels are instantiated
securely whenever a connection needs to be established. When referring to the ev-
idence service, we use the same notation as in the description of COPRIS. That is,
the document owner maintains a list of decommitment values R and the evidence
service maintains an evidence record E. Both are initially empty.
Initial document protection. For initial protection of a document d, the document
owner runs COPRIS.Protect. Input is a document d and the (initially empty) list of
decommitment values R. The document owner chooses a confidentiality system in-
volving several shareholders. The document owner uses protocol Share to distribute
(d,R) among the shareholders.
Renewal of timestamps. In COPRIS, timestamps are renewed on a regular basis.
For this, the evidence service uses COPRIS.RenewTs.
Renewal of commitments. In COPRIS also the commitments are renewed regu-
larly. For this, the document owner does the following. First, he retrieves d and the
sequence of decommitment values R from the confidentiality system by running pro-
tocol Retrieve. Then, he runs the algorithm COPRIS.RenewCom, thereby updating
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the list of decommitment values R and the evidence record E. Finally, the docu-
ment owner selects a potentially new confidentiality system and runs protocol Share
to distribute the document d and the updated sequence of decommitment values R
among the shareholders in the confidentiality system.
Renewal of secret shares. The shares stored by the shareholders are renewed on a
regular basis. This prevents a mobile adversary to take advantage of shares he may
have been able to obtain in the past. In this process, the current set of shareholders
of the confidentiality system may also be replaced by a new set of shareholders
operated by the same confidentiality system. This resharing is done by running
protocol Reshare.
Verification. When the document owner decides to reveal the document d to a
verifier and prove that it existed at time t, he executes the following steps. He
requests the current evidence record E from the evidence service. He also retrieves
the document d and the list of decommitment values R from the confidentiality
system by running the protocol Retrieve. He sends the document d, time t, evidence
record E, and the list of decommitment values R to the verifier through a private
channel. The verifier uses the data that he received and his trust anchor TA and
checks that COPRIS.Verify(TA, d, t, E,R) = 1. This proves that d existed at time t
and has not been changed.
7.2.2. Security
We show that under appropriate assumptions, LINCOS provides integrity protection
for an indefinite period of time and information-theoretic confidentiality protection.
Adversaries are assumed to have the capabilities described in subsection 7.1.2.
They run forever but are computationally bounded per unit of time. In addition,
to analyze confidentiality, adversaries are assumed to be active and mobile. This
means that adversaries may eavesdrop on channels or corrupt shareholders. A more
detailed discussion of this model can be found in [OY91, CH94, HJKY95].
Integrity. Argument 7.3 states that in this adversary model, LINCOS provides
long-term integrity and authenticity protection if assumptions I1, I2, and I3 from
subsection 7.1.2 are satisfied.
Confidentiality. We say that LINCOS provides information-theoretic confidential-
ity protection if an adversary with capabilities as described above cannot recover
any information about the stored document in an information-theoretic sense.
For information-theoretic confidentiality we require assumption C1 from subsec-
tion 7.1.2 and the following assumptions to hold.
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C2. The private channels used in LINCOS provide information-theoretic confiden-
tiality and computational authenticity at the time of data transmission.
C3. The proactive secret sharing schemes used in LINCOS provide information-
theoretic confidentiality.
C4. During their usage periods, the secret sharing services used in LINCOS prevent
mobile adversaries from learning k or more shares.
Argument 7.5. Under assumptions C1, C2, C3, and C4 the system LINCOS pro-
vides information-theoretic confidentiality protection.
Proof sketch. LINCOS is based on COPRIS, which is information-theoretic confi-
dentiality preserving under assumption C1. Hence, an adversary cannot obtain any
information about the confidential document by eavesdropping on the authenticated
channel from the document owner to the evidence service or from the evidence ser-
vice to the timestamp service.
Information-theoretic confidentiality of data sent through the private channels
from the document owner to the shareholders or between the shareholders is guar-
anteed by assumption C2. Information-theoretic confidentiality of data stored at
the shareholders is guaranteed by assumptions C3 and C4.
7.3. Implementation
In this section we describe our implementation of the storage system LINCOS, which
we presented in section 7.2.
LINCOS uses COPRIS for its integrity system and proactive secret sharing com-
bined with appropriate private channels for its confidentiality system. We describe
the implementation of these two systems. One important feature of our implemen-
tation is the possibility of replacing cryptographic components. This is required
because of assumptions I1 and I2. Another feature is the realization of private
channels using the Tokyo QKD Network [SFI+11].
7.3.1. Implementation of COPRIS
The parties involved in COPRIS are the document owner, the evidence service, and
a timestamp service. As cryptographic componentes they use commitment and
timestamp schemes. We implemented COPRIS in Java following the specification
given in section 7.1. Here we describe the implementation of the components.
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Commitment scheme. As the commitment scheme, which is used by the docu-
ment owner to generate commitments to documents, we use the scheme proposed
by Pedersen [Ped92]. It is computationally binding and information-theoretically
hiding (assumptions I1 and C1) and is parametrized by two prime numbers p and q.
The size of q determines the size of the data that can be committed to. The scheme
is binding if it is infeasible to compute discrete logarithms in the unique q-order
subgroup of Zp.
To allow committing to data of arbitrary length, data are first hashed, using a
cryptographic hash function, and then committed to. Our implementation supports
the SHA-2 hash function family which contains the hash functions SHA-224, SHA-
256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. They have increasing security levels.
The hash function and the parameters of the commitment scheme are chosen such
that binding security is achieved during the intended usage period as required by
assumption I1. In practice, these choices can be made on the basis of trustworthy
recommendations. For an overview of recommendations see [Gir18].
Timestamp scheme. The timestamp service used by the evidence service is imple-
mented in accordance with standard RFC 3161 [ACPZ01]. Implementing it requires
choosing a hash function and a digital signature scheme. We use the SHA-2 hash
function family and the RSA digital signature scheme. The security of the used
RSA instance depends on the bitlength of the RSA-modulus. Hash function and
RSA-modulus are chosen such that they remain secure during their usage period as
required by assumption I2. Again, see [Gir18] for an overview of recommendations
on how to choose hash functions and security parameters in practice.
Authenticated channels. Authenticated channels are realized using TLS [DR08].
This protocol is state of the art and provides mutual authentication in a computa-
tional sense. Authenticated channels are important for the robustness of our system.
They guarantee that the document owner connects with the intended evidence ser-
vice. However, our security analysis does not require security properties of these
channels. Therefore, we do not discuss the schemes and parameters chosen for TLS.
7.3.2. Secret sharing and private channels
In the following we describe the implementation of the confidentiality system in
LINCOS which uses private channels and proactive secret sharing.
Private channels. LINCOS uses private channels to connect the document owner
with the shareholders. By assumption C2, these channels are required to provide
information-theoretic confidentiality and computational authenticity. For establish-
ing such private channels we use the Tokyo QKD Network [SFI+11], which is shown
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Figure 7.4.: The secret sharing scheme supported by the Tokyo QKD Network.
in Figure 7.4. A combination of Wegman-Carter authentication, QKD, and OTP
encryption is used to achieve information-theoretic private and authenticated chan-
nels [LC99, May01, SBPC+09]. The network consists of three layers; the quantum
layer, the key management layer, and the application layer. Secret sharing is run
on the application layer. Parties on the application layer request and receive key
material from the key management layer. The key management layer establishes an
interface to the quantum layer where the raw key material is generated using QKD
technology. To improve the capabilities of the network, keys are relayed on the key
management layer by key management agents. In order to allow for assumption C2
to hold, further technical protection measures are in place as explained below. In
the following, we explain the functionality of the network in more detail.
Wegman-Carter authentication [WC81] is used to guarantee authenticity of the
channels. The initial authentication is done using a preshared key. Further key
material for this authentication is generated using QKD.
We explain the key exchange mechanism. On the quantum layer, nodes that are
directly connected via a QKD link can generate raw key material. QKD transmitters
and receivers are assumed to be located in the trusted nodes. The exact configura-
tions of the QKD links and protocols in use are shown in Table 7.1 with achieved
key generation rates.
Once keys have been generated in the quantum layer, they are pushed up to
the key management layer and then stored and managed by the key management
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Name Protocol Length Key rate
km kb/s
NEC-0 BB84 50 200
NEC-1 BB84 22 200
Toshiba BB84 45 300
NTT-NICT DPS-QKD 90 10
Gakushuin CV-QKD 2 100
SeQureNet CV-QKD 2 10
Table 7.1.: Specifications of the QKD links.
agents (KMAs). All the KMAs are placed in the trusted nodes. The KMAs are
connected by authenticated channels, and execute key relays by key encapsulation
in a hop-by-hop fashion. Thus a key pair can be shared between two terminal nodes
even if they are not directly connected by a QKD link. A reliable key management
server (KMS) is also located at one of the trusted nodes, gathers link information
(bit error rates, key rates, amounts of accumulated keys, etc.) from the KMAs,
organizes a routing table, and provisions secure paths to the KMAs. Secure key
transfer is made on request from the KMA to the document owner/shareholder via
a protected classical channel, e.g., a tamper resistant cable of short distance. This
guarantees non-interceptable key transfer from the QKD platform to the document
owner/shareholder located outside the trusted nodes. Furthermore, the trusted
nodes are protected by one-way firewalls to prevent attackers from sending malicious
commands from the application layer to the QKD platform. Once supplied with the
keys, the document owner and the shareholders are in charge of key management.
Thus the boundary of responsibility (point-of-interface) is set between the QKD
platform and the application layer. For further details we refer to [SFI+11].
Secret sharing. Our implementation of secret sharing is based on the secret shar-
ing scheme proposed by Shamir [Sha79]. The scheme provides information-theoretic
confidentiality as required by assumption C3. We use a (3,4)-threshold secret shar-
ing, which suits the network structure of the Tokyo QKD Network. This means
that the document owner distributes shares to 4 shareholders and 3 shareholders
are needed for the reconstruction of the data. To allow for sharing data of arbitrary
size, these data are decomposed into parts of appropriate size. Our implementation
supports a simple resharing protocol where the data owner reconstructs the data
and creates new shares. As required by assumption C4 we assume that resharing
happens before the adversary corrupts more than 2 shareholders. In the future we
plan to implement proactive secret sharing as suggested in [HJKY95]. It allows for
taking the document owner out of the loop when resharing happens. Furthermore,
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Security SHA-2 RSA Pedersen
year instance log2(n) log2(p), log2(q)
2040 SHA-224 2048 2048, 224
2065 SHA-224 3072 3072, 224
2085 SHA-256 4096 4096, 256
2103 SHA-384 5120 5120, 384
2116 SHA-384 6144 6144, 384
Table 7.2.: Parameter selection according to Lenstra [Len04].
it is desirable to have a system that does not involve the document owner in the
commitment renewal process. However, this requires more research.
7.4. Experimental evaluation
In the following, we present a performance analysis of LINCOS. We estimate the
storage space required by the system and investigate data transmission limits im-
posed by QKD. We also measure the time required for integrity verification. To
do so, we run the following experiment. A document is stored and protected using
LINCOS over a period of 100 years, starting in 2016 and ending in 2116. Share and
timestamp renewal happen every two years. The share renewal period is to be cho-
sen such that mobile adversaries are unable to recover more shares than permissible.
Also, the typical storage hardware maintenance service interval is two years. The
timestamp renewal period is chosen in accordance with typical certificate renewal
periods. Such certificates are required to verify the timestamps. Finally, commit-
ment renewal happens every ten years. This is in accordance with the heuristic
security assumptions for the commitment scheme parameters.
Parameter choice for the complexity-based cryptographic components is done ac-
cording to the heuristics in [Len04]. The corresponding expected protection periods
are presented in Table 7.2.
7.4.1. Storage space
We analyze the storage space required by the various parties of LINCOS. It is
analyzed as a function of the bitlength sized of the protected document d.
Shareholders. Each shareholder stores one share s per document. Its size is sizes =
sized + sizeR. Here R is the list of decommitment values accumulated over time. Its
size is independent of the document size. The size of a single decommitment value
equals the size of the parameter q of the commitment scheme. At present, a secure
80
7.4. Experimental evaluation
2,020 2,040 2,060 2,080 2,100 2,120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Year
k
B
Figure 7.5.: Accumulated size of decommitment values.
2,020 2,040 2,060 2,080 2,100 2,120
0
200
400
Year
k
B
Figure 7.6.: Size of evidence record.
instantiation of the Pedersen commitment scheme requires a decommitment value
size of 224 bit. The growth of sizeR over 100 years is shown in Figure 7.5. The
experiments show that it is at most 1 kB.
Evidence service. The evidence service stores one evidence record E per docu-
ment. The size of the evidence record sizeE is independent of the document size.
It depends on the size and number of timestamps and commitments contained in
the evidence record. It grows over time because a new timestamp and a new com-
mitment are added with each renewal. The growth of sizeE over time is shown in
Figure 7.6. Our experiments show that the size of the evidence record accumulates
over 100 years to sizeE ≈ 500 kB.
7.4.2. Data transmission
Our system uses authenticated and private channels. Authenticated channels easily
allow for data rate of 1 Gb/s, while they are used for sending only a few hundred
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Figure 7.7.: Key generation rates of the QKD links, and key supply throughputs to
the private channels after appropriate key relays in the key management
layer.
kB of evidence data. So the cost for data transmission via authenticated channels
is negligible.
Private channels are realized using OTP and QKD. The transmission rate of these
channels is limited by the key generation rate of QKD. Therefore, in our analysis
we focus on the QKD part.
Data rate of private channels. The QKD performance in the Tokyo QKD Net-
work differs from link to link because fiber channel lengths as well as specifications
of QKD devices are different from each other. Furthermore, some nodes are directly
connected by a QKD link, others have to use key relay. The achieved secret key
rates of the QKD links are summarized in Table 7.1. They range from 10 kb/s to
300 kb/s depending on the specification of the respective QKD link. To prevent
being limited by the slowest QKD links (10 kb/s), keys are relayed between ap-
propriate KMAs such that OTP keys can be supplied at a reasonable key supply
throughput, which is denoted as keyRateQKD. Such key relaying balances the key
material across the network. The resulting throughput lies between the slowest and
fastest key generation rates of the QKD links. In our current configuration of the
QKD platform, this key relay allows to raise the minimum throughput of key supply
for each pair of four shareholders to keyRateQKD = 40 kb/s, as shown in Figure 7.7.
Storage and retrieval. When the document owner stores data in the confiden-
tiality system, he sends one share to each shareholder. Likewise, when retrieving
the data, the document owner receives one share per shareholder. Since sizes =
sized + sizeR, the time required for generating the necessary OTP key material per
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sizes Sharing Resharing
1 kB 0.2 s 0.4 s
1 MB 3 min 20 s 6 min 40 s
1 GB 2.3 days 4.6 days
Table 7.3.: Key exchange time for sharing and resharing with keyRateQKD = 40 kb/s.
share transfer in a private channel is ts = sizes/keyRateQKD seconds. Table 7.3 shows
timings for shares of different sizes with keyRateQKD = 40 kb/s.
Share renewal. For share renewal, the document owner retrieves the current set
of shares and distributes new shares to the shareholders. So the time for communi-
cating the key material required for resharing is 2 ∗ ts. Table 7.3 also lists timings
for shares of different sizes.
The data that can be protected when resharing happens every two years as in our
experiment has maximum size sizes = 2 years ∗ keyRateQKD/2 = 1 year∗ keyRateQKD.
For the current key supply throughput of 40 kb/s we obtain sizes = 158 GB. This
data size approximately corresponds to human genomic data of 195 persons. In the
near future (4 to 5 years), QKD technology with key rates of 1 Mb/s over 50 km
is expected to be available. Then, data of size up to 3942 GB can be protected,
which is roughly 4 TB or the size of the genomes of 4926 persons. If the key supply
throughput can be increased to 1 Gb/s, data of size 4 PB can be handled, which
corresponds to human genomic data of 4.9 million persons. Such a QKD performance
can be expected to be realizable using dense wavelength division multiplexing of 1000
quantum channels as well as fast key distillation processing. This is a challenge, but
will be feasible by employing integrated photonic technologies and dedicated key
distillation engines on semiconductor chips.
7.4.3. Evidence verification
Figure 7.8 shows timings for verification of an integrity proof. The timings were
measured on a machine with an 2.9GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 8GB RAM running
our Java implementation of the verification algorithm. As the evidence record and
the list of decommitment values grow over time, the verification time increases.
Verification of evidence accumulated over 100 years takes approximately 10 seconds.
It can be expected that, because computers are getting faster, in a hundred years
from now integrity proof verification will only take a fraction of this time.
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Figure 7.8.: Performance of evidence verification.
7.4.4. Summary
Our experimental evaluation shows the following situation. The long-term integrity
system based on COPRIS has very good performance, in particular in view of the
expected growth of computing power. So the time and space cost for time-stamping
commitments instead of hash values and for renewing these commitments is neg-
ligible. As expected, information-theoretic confidentiality protection is expensive.
One limiting factor is the additional space required by secret sharing. However, it
does not exceed the additional storage space required by cloud storage solutions that
use secret sharing for robustness reasons. The second limiting factor is QKD. It is
technically complex and transmission rates are not yet fully satisfactory. But, as we
have explained above, the development in this area is promising so that practical
solutions can be expected in the future.
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Storage with Access Pattern
Hiding
Usually, when a user accesses a database, the database service learns which data
items are accessed at which times. In many scenarios, however, these access patterns
are sensitive information and it is desirable to hide them from the database service.
ORAM schemes [Gol87] allow for doing that, but existing ORAM-based storage
systems do not support long-term protection of data integrity and confidentiality.
Contribution. In this chapter we present the storage architecture PROPYLA which
is the first to provide long-term protection of data integrity, data confidentiality, and
access pattern hiding security. To achieve this, we combine the cryptographic com-
ponents of LINCOS (cf. chapter 7) with an information-theoretically secure ORAM.
We prove our construction secure and show that compared to a multi-data-item
version of LINCOS (which does not provide access pattern hiding security) there is
only a small constant storage overhead and a poly-logarithmic (in the number of
data items) computation and communication overhead.
Publications. This chapter is based on publication [G5].
8.1. Description of PROPYLA
In this section, we describe our new long-term secure storage architecture PROPYLA,
which is the first storage architecture that provides long-term integrity, long-term
confidentiality, and long-term access pattern hiding.
8.1.1. Overview
PROPYLA comprises the following components: a client, an integrity system, which
consists of an evidence service and timestamp service, and a confidentiality system,
which consists of a set of shareholders (Figure 8.1).
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Figure 8.1.: Overview of the storage architecture PROPYLA.
We assume that the client stores a database D that consists of N data blocks that
have equal length:
D = [dat1, dat2, . . . , datN ] .
The data is stored at the shareholders using secret sharing, where each block is
shared separately. Integrity protection of the data blocks is achieved by maintaining
for each data block i an evidence block Ei. An evidence block Ei has the form
Ei = [(opi,1, ci,1, di,1, tsi,1), (opi,2, ci,2, di,2, tsi,2), . . .]
and describes a history of operations that have been performed on the block. For
an element (opi,j, ci,j, di,j, tsi,j) of such an evidence block Ei, the first element opi,j ∈
{‘Write’, ‘Read’, ‘ReCom’, ‘ReTs’} describes the operation type that has been per-
formed, and the elements ci,j, di,j, and tsi,j refer to the commitment, decommitment,
and timestamp, which have been generated during that operation. Here, the com-
mitments and timestamps form a chain, where later commitments and timestamps
guarantee the validity of earlier commitments and timestamps. The evidence is par-
tially stored at the evidence service and partially stored at the shareholders. The
newest part of the evidence is stored at the evidence service so that the timestamps
can be renewed by the evidence service without the help of the data owner.
To achieve access pattern hiding, the client makes accesses to the evidence service
and the storage servers using an information theoretically secure ORAM. Therefore,
the evidence service and the shareholders store a database consisting of M > N
blocks, where M is determined by the choice of the ORAM. The additional M −N
blocks provide the client with the necessary storage space so that it can reshuﬄe and
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access the data such that a uniform distribution of accesses over the server blocks
is achieved. In order to preserve the access pattern hiding property, there must also
be no correlation between the transmitted data of any two blocks. Typically, this
is achived by re-encrypting the data on every access. In our solution, however, this
technique cannot be applied because the evidence service must receive the commit-
ments in plaintext so that it can timestamp them in order to renew the integrity
protection. Instead, we use a recommitment technique to refresh the commitments:
we let the client commit to the previous commitment and timestamp. Thereby, a
new commitment is obtained that is indistinguishable from other fresh commitments
while the connection to the originally timestamped commitment is maintained.
8.1.2. Protocols
In the following we describe the protocols used in PROPYLA for initializing the
system, accessing and protecting the data, renewing the protection, and integrity
verification.
Throughout the description of the protocols we use the following notation. For
i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} and commitment c, we write ES.Write(i, c) to denote that the client
instructs the evidence service to store commitment c at block i. Furthermore, we
write EES ← ES.Read(i) to denote that the client retrieves evidence EES of block
i from the evidence service. Likewise, we denote by SH.Write(i, (dat, E)) that the
client stores data dat and evidence E to block i at the shareholders using proto-
col SHARE.Share and we write (dat, E) ← SH.Read(i) to denote that the client re-
trieves dat and E of block i from the shareholders using protocol SHARE.Reconstruct,
where SHARE is the secret sharing scheme chosen by the client in the initializa-
tion phase. For a data object dat, we write ts ← T S.Stamp(dat) to denote that a
timestamp ts for dat is obtained from timestamp service T S. Likewise, we write
(c, d)← CS.Commit(dat) to denote that a commitment and decommitment are gen-
erated for dat using commitment scheme instance CS. Throughout our description,
we assume that the timestamp services are initialized appropriately using algorithm
Setup of the corresponding timestamp scheme. Similarly, we assume that commit-
ment scheme instances are initialized by a trusted third party using algorithm Setup
of the corresponding commitment scheme.
Initialization
At initialization, the client chooses a secret sharing scheme SHARE, an ORAM
scheme ORAM, and a database size N . It then initializes the ORAM via (s,M) ←
ORAM.Setup(N) and allocates a database with M blocks at the evidence service. For
each i ∈ {1, . . . ,M}, the evidence service initializes block i with an empty evidence
lists, EES,i = []. Afterwards, the client picks a set of secret share holders and a
reconstruction threshold, and then initializes the secret sharing database with M
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blocks using protocol SHARE.Setup. The shareholders initialize their databases such
that for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,M} an empty data object dati = ⊥ and an empty evidence
list Ei = [] is stored at block i. We remark that while we use a stash-free ORAM
model for the benefit of a more comprehensible description, the construction can be
adopted to work with stashed ORAMs in which case the client locally manages the
stashed items as usual.
Read and write
The client reads and writes data blocks using algorithm Access (see Listing 8.1).
This algorithm gets as input an operation type op ∈ {‘Write’, ‘Read’}, a block
identifier id ∈ {1, . . . , N}, optionally data to be written dat′, the ORAM state s, a
commitment scheme instance CS, and a reference to a timestamp service T S. It then
generates an access pattern, (P, s) ← ORAM.GenAP(s, id), and for each (ik, jk) ∈ P
does the following: first, it retrieves the new evidence EES for block ik from the
evidence service and it retrieves the stored data dat and the old evidence E from
the shareholders. Then the new evidence EES is added to the shareholder evidence
E. If this is a write operation (op = ‘Write’) and ORAM.GetId(s, ik) = id, then the
block data dat is replaced with dat′ and a commitment (c, d) to the new data is
generated. Since this block is newly written, the existing evidence is discarded and
the corresponding evidence is set to E = [(‘Write’, c, d,⊥)], where ⊥ is a placeholder
for the timestamp that will later be retrieved by the evidence service. If this is a
read operation (op = ‘Read’) and ORAM.GetId(s, ik) = id, then the data dat is cached
and returned when the access algorithm finishes. Finally, the algorithm refreshes
the commitment by creating a new commitment to the block data and the previous
commitment. This is necessary so that the evidence service cannot trace how the
client rearranges the blocks. The refreshed commitment is stored at the evidence
service at the new location jk. The evidence service then timestamps the new
commitment and stores the timestamp together with the commitment (Listing 8.2).
Also, the client generates new secret shares of the data dat and the shareholder
evidence E and stores them at the shareholders at the new location jk. As the
secret shares are newly generated, they do not correlate with the old shares and
their relocation cannot be traced either.
Timestamp renewal
If the security of the currently used timestamp scheme is threatened, the evidence
service renews the evidence as follows (Listing 8.3). It picks a new timestamp service
T S that uses a more secure timestamp scheme and then for every i ∈ [1, . . . ,M ], it
first creates a commitment (c′, d′) to the last commitment and timestamp stored in
EES,i, then requests a timestamp ts for c′, and finally adds (‘ReTs’, c′, d′, ts) to EES,i.
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Listing 8.1: Access(op, id, dat′, s,CS, T S), run by the client.
([(i1, j1), . . . , (in, jn)], s′)← ORAM.GenAP(id);
for k = 1, . . . , n do
// process k-th entry in access pattern
EES ← ES.Read(ik); (dat, E)← SH.Read(ik); // read data from
location ik
E[−1].ts← EES [1].ts; E += EES [2 :]; // move evidence from ES to
SH
if op = ‘Write’ and T (ik) = id then
dat← dat′; (c, d)← CS.Commit(dat′); E = [(‘Write’, c, d,⊥)];
// write and commit new data, discard old evidence
else if op = ‘Read’ and T (ik) = id then
dat′′ ← dat; E ′′ ← E; // save for output later
end
if op 6= ‘Write’ or T (ik) 6= id then
// refresh commitments
if E[−1].op = ‘Read’ then
E ← E[: −2];
end
(c, d)← CS.Commit([E[−1].c, E[−1].ts]);
E += [(‘Read’, c, d,⊥)];
end
ES.Write(jk, E[−1].c, T S); SH.Write(jk, (dat, E)); // write data to
location jk
end
return (s′, dat′′, E ′′);
Listing 8.2: ES.Write(i, c, T S), run by the evidence service.
ts← T S.Stamp(c);
EES,i ← [(⊥, c,⊥, ts)];
Listing 8.3: RenewTs(CS, T S), run by the evidence service.
for i = 1 to M do
(ci, di)← CS.Commit([EES,i[−1].c, EES,i[−1].ts]);
tsi ← T S.Stamp(ci);
EES,i += [(‘ReTs’, ci, di, tsi)];
end
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Commitment renewal
If the security of the currently used commitment scheme is threatened, the client
renews the evidence using Listing 8.4. It starts by selecting a new commitment
scheme instance CS. Then, for each block i ∈ [1, . . . ,M ], it does the following. It
first retrieves the new evidence EES,i from the evidence service and data block dati
and old evidence block Ei from the shareholders. It then adds the new evidence
EES,i to the shareholder evidence Ei. Afterwards, it creates a new commitment
(ci, di) to the secret data dati and the evidence Ei. It then adds (‘ReCom’, ci, di,⊥)
to Ei. Finally, it sends ci to the evidence service and distributes dati and Ei to the
shareholders.
Listing 8.4: RenewCom(CS, T S), run by the client.
for i = 1, . . . ,M do
EES ← ES.Read(i); (dat, E)← SH.Read(i); // retrieve data from
location i
E[−1].ts← EES [1].ts; E += EES [2 :]; // move evidence from ES to
SH
(c, d)← CS.Commit([dat, E]); // recommit to data and evidence
E += [(‘ReCom’, c, d,⊥)]; // add new evidence
ES.Write(i, E[−1].c, T S);
SH.Write(i, (dat, E)) ; // store evidence and data at location i
end
Share renewal
In regular time intervals the shareholders renew the stored shares to protect against
a mobile adversary by running protocol SHARE.Reshare.
Verification
The verification algorithm (Listing 8.5) uses a trust anchor TA that certifies the valid-
ity of public keys for timestamps and commitments. Here, VerTsTA(dat, ts; tver) = 1
denotes that timestamp ts is valid for dat at reference time tver, and we denote by
VerComTA(dat, c, d; tver) = 1 that d is a valid decommitment from c to dat at time
tver. On input a data object dat, a time t, an evidence block E, and the verification
time tver, the verification algorithm of PROPYLA checks whether E is currently valid
evidence for the existence of dat at time t, given that the current time is tver. In
particular, the algorithm checks that the evidence is constructed correctly for dat,
that the timestamps and commitments have been valid at their renewal time, and
that the first timestamp refers to time t.
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Listing 8.5: VerIntTA(dat, t, E; tver), run by any verifier.
/* verifies that dat existed at time t */
Let E = [(op1, c1, d1, ts1), . . . , (opn, cn, dn, tsn)];
Set tn+1 := tver;
For i ∈ [n], set Ei := [(op1, c1, d1, ts1), . . . , (opi, ci, di, tsi)];
For i ∈ [n], set ti := tsi.t;
For i ∈ [n], set tNRC(i) := min({tj | actj = ‘ReCom’ ∧ j > i} ∪ {tn+1});
for i = n to 1 do
Assert VerTsTA(ci, tsi; ti+1) = 1;
if opi = ‘Write’ and i = 1 then
Assert VerComTA(dat, c1, d1; tNRC(1)) = 1;
else if opi = ‘Read’ or opi = ‘ReTs’ then
Assert VerComTA([ci−1, tsi−1], ci, di; tNRC(i)) = 1;
else if opi = ‘ReCom’ then
Assert VerComTA([dat, Ei−1], ci, di; tNRC(i)) = 1;
else
Fail;
end
end
Assert ts1.t = t;
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8.2. Security analysis
In this section we analyze the security of PROPYLA. Our security analysis requires a
model of real time which is used for expressing the scheduling of protection renewal
events in our security experiments and for expressing computational bounds on
the adversary with respect to real time. We first describe our model of real time.
Then, we show that PROPYLA provides long-term access pattern hiding, long-term
confidentiality, and long-term integrity.
8.2.1. Computational model
For modeling the security of PROPYLA, we want to be able to express that certain
events (e.g., renewal of timestamps) are performed according to a timed schedule.
Concretely, in the security analysis of PROPYLA, we consider a renewal schedule S
that describes at which times, and using which schemes the timestamp and com-
mitment renewals are performed. Additionally, our computational model allows to
capture that an adversary becomes computationally more powerful over time (e.g.,
it gets access to a quantum computer). See chapter 3 for a more detailed description
of our computational model.
8.2.2. Long-term access pattern hiding
In the following we prove that PROPYLA achieves information theoretically secure
access pattern hiding against the evidence service and the shareholders if the used
ORAM, secret sharing scheme, and commitment schemes are information theoreti-
cally secure.
Formally, Access-Pattern-Hiding (APH) Security of PROPYLA is defined via game
ExpAPHPROPYLA (Listing 8.6), where an adversary, A, instructs the client of PROPYLA to
read and write database blocks at logical addresses chosen by the adversary. During
these data accesses, A observes the data that is transferred between the client and
the evidence service and a subset of less than the threshold number of shareholders.
At some point in time, A gives two different access instructions to the client. The
client picks one of them at random and executes it. The goal of the adversary A
is to infer from the observed data stream which of the access instructions has been
executed by the client.
For PROPYLA to be information theoretically secure access pattern hiding, it must
hold that for any timestamp and commitment renewal schedule S, a computationally
unbounded adversary is not able to infer with probability other than 12 which access
instruction was made.
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Definition 8.1 (APH-security of PROPYLA). PROPYLA is information theoreti-
cally APH-secure if for any renewal schedule S and any adversary A:
Pr
[
ExpAPHPROPYLA(S,A) = 1
]
= 12 .
Listing 8.6: The access pattern hiding experiment for PROPYLA,
ExpAPHPROPYLA(S,A).
((op1, id1, dat1), (op2, id2, dat2))← AClock,Client();
b
$← {1, 2};
VIEW← Client(opb, idb, datb);
b′ ← AClock,Client(VIEW);
if b = b′ then
return 1;
else
return 0;
end
oracle Clock(t):
if t > time then
Perform all renewals scheduled
in S between time and t;
time← t;
end
oracle Client(op, id, dat):
PROPYLA.Access(op, id, dat);
Let VIEW denote the data received
by the evidence service and a subset
of less than the threshold number of
shareholders during the execution
of PROPYLA.Access;
return VIEW;
Theorem 8.1. If PROPYLA is instantiated using an information theoretically secure
ORAM, information theoretically hiding commitment schemes, and information the-
oretically secure secret sharing, then it provides information theoretic APH-security.
Proof. We observe that the queries made by the client and observed by the adversary
are either of the form (i, c), when the client instructs the evidence service to store
commitment c at database location i, or of the form (i, s), when the client instructs a
shareholder to store share s at location i. Furthermore, we observe that when using
an information theoretically secure ORAM, there is no statistical correlation between
the instructions (op, id, dat) chosen by the adversary and the database locations i
sent by the client. There is also no statistical correlation between the data and
the commitments c or the secret shares s, as long as the adversary observes less
than the threshold number of shareholders. This is (1) because we use information
93
8. PROPYLA: Long-Term Secure Storage with Access Pattern Hiding
theoretically hiding commitments and information theoretically secure secret sharing
and (2) the shares and the commitments are renewed on every access.
As there is no statistical correlation between the accesses made by the client and
the transmitted data, even a computationally unbounded adversary cannot infer
which of the challenge instructions (op1, id1, dat1) and (op2, id2, dat2) was executed.
8.2.3. Long-term confidentiality
Informally, long-term confidentiality of PROPYLA means that even an unbounded
evidence service and a subset of colluding unbounded shareholders cannot learn
anything about the content of the stored data. More formally, we require that there
is no significant statistical correlation between the data stored by the client and
the data observed by the evidence service and a subset of shareholders. We observe
that this property immediately follows from the information-theoretic access pattern
hiding security of PROPYLA.
8.2.4. Long-term integrity
Next, we provide an intuitive argument that PROPYLA provides long-term integrity
protection based on the results of Part I. Here we consider an adversary that may be
running for a very long time but who can only perform a limited amount of work per
unit of time (see the adversary model description in subsection 8.2.1). Furthermore,
we use the notation and statements introduced in subsection 7.1.2.
Argument 8.1. PROPYLA provides long-term integrity protection, that is, it is
infeasible for an adversary to produce evidence E valid for data dat and time t
without having known dat at time t given that the used timestamp and commitment
schemes are secure within their usage period.
Proof sketch. Assume an adversary outputs (dat, t, E) at some point in time tn+1
and that TA is the trust anchor provided by the PKI at that time. We show that
if E is valid evidence for data dat and time t (i.e., VerIntTA(dat, t, E) = 1), then dat
was known at time t (with high probability).
Let E = [(op1, c1, d1, ts1), . . . , (opn, cn, dn, tsn)] without loss of generality. Then,
for i ∈ [1, . . . , n], define Ei = [(op1, c1, d1, ts1), . . . , (opi, ci, di, tsi)], ti = tsi.t, and
tNRC(i) as the time of the next commitment renewal after commitment ci. Addi-
tionally, we define tNRC(n) = tn+1. In the following, we show recursively that for
i ∈ [n, . . . , 1], statement
St(i) : (ci, tsi) ∈ K[ti+1] ∧ (dat, Ei) ∈ K[tNRC(i)]
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holds, that is, commitment value ci and timestamp tsi are known at the next time-
stamp time ti+1 and the data dat and partial evidence Ei are known at the next
commitment renewal time tNRC(i).
Statement St(n) obviously holds because (dat, E) is output by the adversary at
time tn+1 and includes cn, tsn, dat, and En. Next, we show for i ∈ {n, . . . , 2}, that
VerIntTA(dat, t, E) = 1 and St(i) implies St(i− 1). By the definition of VerInt (List-
ing 8.5) we observe that VerIntTA(dat, t, E) = 1 implies VerTsTA(ci, tsi; ti+1) = 1,
that is, tsi is valid for commitment ci at time ti+1. Furthermore, we observe
that St(i) implies (ci, tsi) ∈ K[ti+1], which means that ci and tsi were known
at time ti+1. We can now apply Argument 7.1 to obtain that commitment ci
was known at time ti (i.e., ci ∈ K[ti]). Next, we distinguish between the case
opi ∈ {‘Read’, ‘ReTs’} and the case opi ∈ {‘ReCom’}. We observe that if opi ∈
{‘Read’, ‘ReTs’}, then VerComTA(ci−1‖tsi−1, ci, di; tNRC(i)) = 1 and by Argument 7.2
it follows that (ci−1, tsi−1) ∈ K[ti] (i.e., ci−1 and tsi−1 were known at time ti). If
opi ∈ {‘ReCom’}, then VerComTA(dat‖Ei−1, ci, di; tNRC(i)) = 1 and it follows that
(dat, Ei−1) ∈ K[tNRC(i−1)]. Together, we obtain that if VerIntTA(dat, t, E) = 1 and
St(i), then St(i− 1) holds. By induction over i it follows that St(1) holds.
Finally, we observe that St(1) by Argument 7.1 and Argument 7.2 implies dat ∈
K[t1]. Also, VerIntTA(dat, t, E) = 1 implies t1 = t, and thus we obtain dat ∈ K[t]. We
conclude that if an adversary presents (dat, t, E) such that VerIntTA(dat, t, E) = 1,
then dat must have been known at time t (with high probability).
8.3. Performance evaluation
In this section, we describe an instantiation of PROPYLA and analyze its perfor-
mance.
8.3.1. Scheme instantiation
We instantiate PROPYLA using Path-ORAM [SvDS+13], Shamir Secret Sharing
[Sha79], Halevi-Micali Commitments [HM96], RSA Signatures [RSA78], and XMSS
Signatures [BDH11]. The implementation has been done in Java and we use the
following parameters. For Path-ORAM we use a bucket size of 5. Our implemen-
tation of Halevi-Micali Commitments uses the hash functions SHA-224, SHA-256,
and SHA-384 of the SHA-2 hash function family [Nat02]. For RSA, we use the stan-
dard JDK implementation and use SHA-224 with RSA-2048. For XMSS, we use the
implementation from the Bouncy Castle Library [The18], which supports the hash
functions SHA-256 and SHA-512, and we use a tree height of 10.
This instantiation has the required security properties. Path ORAM instanti-
ated with an information theoretically secure random number generator (e.g., a
quantum-based random number generator [SGG+00]) provides information theo-
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Table 8.1.: Overview of the used commitment and signature scheme instances and
their usage period.
Years Signatures Commitments
2018-2030 RSA-2048 HM-224
2031-2066 XMSS-256 HM-224
2067-2091 XMSS-256 HM-256
2091-2118 XMSS-512 HM-384
retic security [SvDS+13]. Shamir Secret Sharing and Halevi-Micali Commitments
are information theoretic hiding. Therefore, by Theorem 8.1, the described instanti-
ation of PROPYLA is information theoretic access pattern hiding. Information the-
oretic confidentiality also follows from Theorem 8.1 (see subsection 8.2.3). Finally,
by Argument 8.1, long-term integrity is achieved as long as the used commitment
and signature scheme instances are secure within their usage period. In Table 8.1
we list the commitment and signature scheme instances that we use together with
their usage periods, which are based on the predictions by Lenstra and Verheul
[LV01, Len04, Gir18]. Also, we assume that quantum computers will become a con-
siderable threat by 2040 and therefore transition from RSA Signatures (which are
known vulnerable to quantum computers) to XMSS Signatures (which are expected
secure against quantum computer attacks) after 2030.
8.3.2. Evaluation
Scenario
We examine a use case where a client stores N data objects of size L for a time
period of 100 years. To maintain long-term integrity protection, timestamps and
commitments are renewed regularly. We renew timestamps every 2 years, which
corresponds to the typical lifetime of a public key certificate for digital signature
schemes, and we renew commitments every 10 years, which reflects their stronger
security compared to signatures as they do not require any secret parameters (which
may be compromised at some point in time). The schemes are instantiated as
described in subsection 8.3.1 and shown in Table 8.1. The runtime measurements
have been computed using our Java implementation running on a computer with a
2.9 GHz Intel Core i5 CPU and 8 GB RAM.
Results
In the following we present the results of our performance evaluation. Here, we focus
on the overhead costs for computation, storage, and traffic induced by our long-term
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Figure 8.2.: Additional storage space required for commitments and timestamps per
server block (independent of block size).
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Figure 8.3.: Time required for renewing timestamps and commitments when storing
N = 100, 1000, 10000 data objects of size L = 1 MB.
protection scheme for generating and transmitting timestamps and commitments in
comparison to standard Path-ORAM and Secret Sharing.
In Figure 8.2, we show the storage space consumption of the commitments and
timestamps generated by our protection scheme, per shareholder and for the ev-
idence service. For the shareholders, we observe that the storage space overhead
increases over time with each commitment renewal. Obviously, it also depends on
the chosen commitment and signatures schemes and their parameters. For the ev-
idence service, the storage space overhead increases with each timestamp renewal
and then is reset at commitment renewal, where the evidence is moved to the share-
holders. As the commitment and signature sizes are independent of the size of the
stored data objects, the same holds for the storage space overhead.
In Figure 8.3, we show the time required for renewing timestamps and commit-
ments when storing N = 100, 1000, 10000 data objects of size L = 1 MB. We
observe that the renewal time scales linearly with the number of data objects and
also depends on the chosen schemes and parameters.
In Figure 8.4, we show the computation time overhead for generating commit-
ments and timestamps during one database access when storingN = 100, 1000, 10000
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Figure 8.4.: Time overhead due to commitment and timestamp generation during
one database access when storing N = 100, 1000, 10000 data objects of
size L = 1 MB.
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Figure 8.5.: Traffic overhead due to sending timestamps and commitments during
one database access when storing N = 100, 1000, 10000 data objects
(independent of data object size).
data objects of L = 1 MB. As the number of blocks touched per database access
using Path-ORAM is logarithmic in the number of data objects stored, we observe
that the computation overhead also scales logarithmically with the number of data
objects. Again, the computation time also depends on the chosen schemes and
instances.
In Figure 8.5 we show the network traffic overhead due to sending timestamps and
commitments during one database access when storing N = 100, 1000, 10000 data
objects. We observe that, similar to the computation time overhead per database
access, also the traffic overhead scales logarithmically with the number of data ob-
jects. As for the storage space overhead, also the traffic overhead is independent of
the data object size.
Overall, our performance measurements show that the additional cost for adding
long-term protection to a Path-ORAM database appears manageable. The storage
overhead per block is independent of the block size. The computation time over-
head and the traffic overhead are logarithmic in the database size and the traffic
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overhead is independent of the data object size. The timestamp and commitment
renewal time scales linearly with the database size. We remark that using Secret
Sharing introduces a linear communication overhead in the number of share holders.
However, this overhead seems inevitable when long-term confidentiality protection
is required, as secret sharing is the only solution for information-theoretic confiden-
tiality protection of data at rest.
We observe that for our instantiation, the most time consuming operation is the
timestamp signature generation and the most storage consuming evidence data are
the timestamp signatures. We expect that the performance of our solution could
further be improved by using Merkle Hash Trees (MHT) [Mer90], as follows. During
timestamp and commitment renewal, instead of time-stamping each data block sep-
arately, we would first create a MHT for the entire database, and then timestamp
only the root of that tree. While asymptotically, this introduces an overhead of
O(N · log(N)) (compared to just O(N) for our solution), for our instantiation we
expect better performance as hash function evaluation is much faster than signature
generation.
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9. ELSA: Efficient Long-Term
Protection of Large Datasets
Often, real world databases are complex and consist of a large number of relatively
small data items that must be retrievable individually (e.g., medical databases).
LINCOS (see chapter 7) can be used to protect such databases, but the amount of
work to be performed scales linearly with the number of stored data items and this
causes performance issues.
Contribution. In this chapter we present the long-term secure storage architecture
ELSA which efficiently stores and protects databases that consist of a large num-
ber of data items. The protection guarantees provided are long-term integrity and
long-term confidentiality. Storing a set of data items or renewing protection with
ELSA only requires a single timestamp, while this required with LINCOS a number
of timestamps equal to the number of data items. The improvements are achieved
by constructing and using an extractable-binding vector commitment scheme that
is also information theoretically hiding under selective decommitment. We imple-
mented ELSA and show performance figures for a scenario where a database consist-
ing of 12 000 data items is aggregated, stored, protected, and verified over a time
span of 100 years. Our results show that ELSA can be an order of magnitude faster
than LINCOS when large databases consisting of many small data items are stored
and protected.
Publications. This chapter is based on publication [G6].
9.1. Statistically hiding and extractable binding
vector commitments
In this section, we define statistically hiding and extractable binding vector commit-
ments, describe a construction, and prove the construction secure. This construction
is the basis for our performance improvements that we achieve with our new storage
architecture presented in section 9.2.
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9.1.1. Definition
A vector commitment scheme allows to commit to a vector of messages [m1, . . . ,mn].
It is extractable-binding, if the message vector can be extracted from the commit-
ment and the state of the committer and it is hiding under partial opening if an
adversary cannot infer any valuable information about unopened messages, even if
some of the committed messages have been opened. Our vector commitments are
reminiscent of the vector commitments introduced by Catalano and Fiore [CF13].
However, neither do they require their commitments to be extractable binding nor
do they consider their hiding property.
Definition 9.1 (Vector commitment scheme). A vector commitment scheme is a
tuple (L,M, Setup,Commit,Extract,Verify), where L ∈ N is the maximum vector
length, M is the message space, and Setup, Commit, Extract, and Verify are algo-
rithms with the following properties.
Setup()→ k: This algorithm generates a public key k.
Commit(k, [m1, . . . ,mn])→ (c,D): On input public key k and message vector [m1,
. . . ,mn] ∈ Mn, where n ∈ [L], this algorithm generates a commitment c and
a vector decommitment D.
Extract(k,D, i)→ d: On input key k, vector decommitment D, and index i, this
algorithm outputs a decommitment d for the i-th message corresponding to D.
Verify(k,m, c, d, i)→ b: On input key k, message m, commitment c, decommitment
d, and an index i, this algorithm outputs b = 1, if d is a valid decommitment
from position i of c to m, and otherwise outputs b = 0.
A vector commitment scheme is correct, if a decommitment produced by Commit
and Extract will always verify for the corresponding commitment and message.
Definition 9.2 (Correctness). A vector commitment scheme (L,M, Setup,Commit,
Extract,Verify) is correct if for all n ∈ [L], M ∈Mn, k ∈ Setup, i ∈ [n],
Pr
Commit(k,M)→ (c,D),Extract(k,D, i)→ d,
Verify(k,Mi, c, d) = 1
 = 1 .
A vector commitment scheme is statistically hiding under selective opening, if
the distribution of commitments and openings does not depend on the unopened
messages.
Definition 9.3 (Statistically hiding (under selective opening)). Let S = (L,M,
Setup,Commit,Extract,Verify) be a vector commitment scheme. For n ∈ [L], I ⊆ [n],
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M ∈ Mn, k ∈ Setup, denote by CDk(M, I) the random variable (c, D¯I), where
(c,D) ← Commit(k,M) and D¯ ← (Extract(D, i))i∈[n]. Let  ∈ R[0,1]. We say S is
-statistically-hiding, if for all n ∈ N, I ⊆ [n], M1,M2 ∈ Mn with (M1)I = (M2)I ,
k ∈ Setup,
∆(CDk(M1, I),CDk(M2, I)) ≤  .
A vector commitment scheme is extractable binding, if for every efficient com-
mitter, there exists an efficient extractor, such that for any efficient decommitter,
if the committer gives a commitment that can be opened by a decommitter, then
the extractor can already extract the corresponding messages from the committer
at the time of the commitment.
Definition 9.4 (Extractable binding). Let  : N3 → R[0,1]. We say a vector commit-
ment scheme (L,M, Setup,Commit,Extract,Verify) is -extractable-binding, if for all
t1-bounded algorithms A1, tE-bounded algorithms E, and t2-bounded algorithms A2,
Pr
 Setup()→ k,A1(k)→r c,E(k, r)→ [m1,m2, . . .],A2(k, r)→ (m, c, d, i) :
Verify(p,m, c, d, i) = 1 ∧mi 6= m
 ≤ (t1, tE , t2) .
9.1.2. Construction: Extractable binding
In the following, we show that the Merkle hash tree construction [Mer90] can be
casted into a vector commitment scheme and that this construction is extractable
binding if the used hash function is extractable binding.
Construction 9.1. Let (K,H) denote a keyed hash function and let L ∈ N. The
following is a description of the hash tree construction proposed by Merkle cast into
the definition of vector commitments.
Setup()→ k: Run K → k and output k.
Commit(k, [m1, . . . ,mn])→ (c,D): Set l← min{i ∈ N : n ≤ 2i}. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n−
1}, compute H(k,mi) → hi,l, and for i ∈ {n, . . . , 2l − 1}, set hi,l ← ⊥.
For i ∈ {l − 1, . . . , 0}, j ∈ {0, . . . , 2i − 1}, compute H(k, [hi−1,2j, hi−1,2j+1]).
Compute H(k, [l, h0,0]) → c. Set D ← [hi,j]i∈{0,...,l},j∈{0,...,2i−1}, and output
(c,D).
Extract(k,D, i∗)→ d: Let D → [hi,j]i∈{0,...,l},j∈{0,...,2i−1}. Set al ← i∗. For j ∈
{l, . . . , 1}, set bj ← aj + 2(aj mod 2) − 1, gj ← hj,bj , and aj−1 ← baj/2c.
Set d = [g1, . . . , gl] and output d.
Verify(k,m, c, d, i∗)→ b∗: Let d = [g1, . . . , gl]. Set al ← i∗ and compute H(k,m) →
hl. For i ∈ {l, . . . , 1}, if ai mod 2 = 0, set bi ← [hi, gi], and if ai mod 2 = 1,
set bi ← [gi, hi], and then compute H(k, bi) → hi−1 and set ai−1 ← bai/2c.
Compute H(k, [l, h0])→ c′. Set b∗ ← (c = c′). Output b∗.
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Theorem 9.1. The vector commitment scheme described in Construction 9.1 is
correct.
Proof. Let (L,M, Setup,Commit,Extract,Verify) be the scheme described in Con-
struction 9.1. Furthermore, let n ∈ [L], M ∈ Mn, k ∈ Setup, i ∈ [n], (c,D) ∈
Commit(k,M), d ∈ Extract(k,D, i), and b ∈ Verify(k,Mi, c, d). By the definition
of algorithms Commit and Extract, we observe that d = [g1, . . . , gl] are the siblings
of the nodes in the hash tree D = [hi,j]i∈{0,...,l},j∈{0,...,2i−1} on the path from leaf
H(k,Mi) to the root h0,0. We observe that algorithm Verify recomputes this path
starting with H(k,Mi). Thus, h0 = h0,0 = c. It follows that b = 1.
Theorem 9.2. Let (K,H) be an -extractable-binding hash function. The vector
commitment scheme described in Construction 9.1 instantiated with (K,H) is ′-
extractable-binding with ′(t1, tE , t2) = 2L ∗ (t1 + tE/L, tE/L, t2).
Proof. Let (K,H) be an -extractable-binding keyed hash function and let (L,M,
Setup,Commit,Extract,Verify) be the vector commitment scheme described in Con-
struction 9.1 instantiated with (K,H). To prove the theorem, we use the extractable-
binding property of (K,H) to construct an extractor for the vector commitment
scheme.
Fix t1, tE , t2 ∈ N and t1-bounded algorithm A1. We observe that, because (K,H)
is -extractable-binding, for any t-bounded algorithm A, there exists a tE -bounded
algorithm EHA such that for any t2-bounded algorithm A2, for experiment A(k)→r
h, A2(k, r) → m, and EHA (k, r) → m′, we have H(k,m) = h and m 6= m′ with
probability at most (t, tE , t2).
Define A0,0 as an algorithm that on input k, samples r, computes EHA1(k, r) →
[l, h0,0], and outputs h0,0. Recursively, define Ai,j as an algorithm that on input k,
samples r, computes EHAi−1,bj/2c(k, r)→ [h0, h1], and outputs hj mod 2.
Now define the vector extraction algorithm E as follows. On input (k, r), first
compute EHA1(k, r)→r′ [l, h0,0]. Then, for i ∈ {0, . . . , 2l− 1}, sample ri and compute
EHAl,i(k, [r, r′, ri])→ mi+1. Output [m1, . . . ,m2l ].
We observe that for any t2-bounded algorithm A2, for experiment A1(k) →r c,
A2(k, r)→ (m, d, i), and E(k, r)→M , the probability of having Verify(k,m, c, d, i) =
1 and Mi 6= m is upper-bounded by the probability that at least one of the node
extraction algorithms relied on by E fails. As there are at most 2L nodes in the tree,
this probability is upper-bounded by 2L ∗ (max{t1, tE}, tE , t2).
It follows that Construction 9.1 is ′-extractable-binding with ′(t1, tE , t2) = 2L ∗
(t1 + tE/L, tE/L, t2).
9.1.3. Construction: Extractable binding and statistically hiding
We now combine a statistically hiding and extractable binding commitment scheme
with the vector commitment scheme from Construction 9.1 to obtain a statistically
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hiding (under selective opening) and extractable binding vector commitment scheme.
The idea is to first commit with the statistically hiding scheme to each message
separately and then produce a vector commitment to these individually generated
commitments.
Construction 9.2. Let COM be a commitment scheme and VC be a vector commit-
ment scheme.
Setup()→ k: Run COM.Setup() → k1, VC.Setup() → k2, set k ← (k1, k2), and
output k.
Commit(k, [m1, . . . ,mn])→ (c,D): Let k → (k1, k2). For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, compute
COM.Commit(k1,mi)→ (ci, di). Next, compute VC.Commit(k2, [c1, . . . , cn])→
(c,D′). Set D ← ([(c1, d1), . . . , (cn, dn)], D′). Output (c,D).
Extract(k,D, i)→ d: Let k → (k1, k2) and D → ([(c1, d1), . . . , (cn, dn)], D′). Com-
pute VC.Extract(k2, D′, i)→ d′. Set d← (ci, di, d′) and output d.
Verify(k,m, c, d, i)→ b: Let k → (k1, k2) and d → (c′, d′, d′′). Verify m and c by
computing COM.Verify(k1,m, c′, d′) → b1 and VC.Verify(k2, c′, c, d′′, i) → b2.
Set b← (b1 ∧ b2) and output b.
Theorem 9.3. The vector commitment scheme described in Construction 9.2 is
correct.
Proof. Let (L,M, Setup,Commit,Extract,Verify) be the scheme described in Con-
struction 9.2. Let n ∈ [L], M ∈ Mn, k ∈ Setup, i ∈ [n], Commit(k,M) → (c,D),
Extract(k,D, i) → d, and Verify(k,Mi, c, d) → b. We observe that we can write
D = ((ci, di)i∈[n], D′) and that d ∈ VC.Extract(k2, D′, i). By the correctness of COM,
it follows that COM.Verify(k1,Mi, ci, di) = 1, and by the correctness of VC, it follows
that HT.VC(k2, ci, c, d, i) = 1. Thus, Verify(k,Mi, c, d, i) = 1.
Theorem 9.4. The vector commitment scheme described in Construction 9.2 is
L-statistically-hiding (under selective opening) if the commitment scheme COM is
-statistically-hiding.
Proof. Let (L,M, Setup,Commit,Extract,Verify) be the scheme described in Con-
struction 9.2. For any n ∈ [L], I ⊆ [n], M ∈ Mn, k ∈ Setup, and event
A ⊆ Ω(CDk(M, I)), denote by PrM(A) the probability that A is observed when
sampling from CDk(M, I).
Let n ∈ [L], I ⊆ [n], M1,M2 ∈ Mn with (M1)I = (M2)I , k ∈ Setup. By the
definition of the statistical distance, we have
∆(CDk(M1, I),CDk(M2, I)) =
∑
c,D¯I
∣∣∣∣Pr
M1
(c, D¯I)− Pr
M2
(c, D¯I)
∣∣∣∣ .
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We observe that for any M = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Mn, algorithm Commit(k,M) →
(c,D) first computes Com(k1,mi) → (ci, di), for each i ∈ [n], and then computes
HT.Tree(k2, [c1, . . . , cn])→ T . Denote C˜ = (ci)i∈[n] and D˜ = (di)i∈[n]. By the law of
total probability we have
Pr
M
(c, D¯I) =
∑
C˜,D˜I :
c,D¯I
Pr
M
(c, D¯I |C˜, D˜I) ∗ Pr
M
(C˜, D˜I) .
Furthermore, we observe that c and T are determined by (k, C˜). We also observe
that on input k, D = (T, (ci, di)i∈[n]), and i ∈ [n], algorithm Extract computes
HT.Path(k2, T, i)→ P and outputs d = (ci, di, P ). Hence, the output d is determined
by (k, T, i, ci, di). Hence, PrM(c, D¯I |C˜, D˜I) > 0 implies PrM(c, D¯I |C˜, D˜I) = 1. It
follows that ∑
C˜,D˜I :
c,D¯I
Pr
M
(c, D¯I |C˜, D˜I) ∗ Pr
M
(C˜, D˜I) =
∑
C˜,D˜I :
c,D¯I
Pr
M
(C˜, D˜I) .
Next, we observe from the description of algorithm Commit that each call Com(Mi)→
(ci, di) is independent of the other calls Com(Mj)→ (cj, dj), j 6= i. Thus,
Pr
M
(C˜, D˜I) = Pr
M
(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M
(ci) .
By the description of algorithms Commit and Extract, we have that (C˜I , D˜I) is
determined by MI . We observe that (M1)I = (M2)I . Thus,
Pr
M1
(C˜I , D˜I) = Pr
M2
(C˜I , D˜I) .
It follows that∣∣∣∣∣∣PrM1(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
 ∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M1
(ci)
− Pr
M2
(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
 ∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M2
(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= Pr
M1
(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M1
(ci)
−
 ∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M2
(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ Pr
M1
(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
∑
i∈[n]\I
∣∣∣∣Pr
M1
(ci)− Pr
M2
(ci)
∣∣∣∣ .
We observe that |PrM1(ci)− PrM2(ci)| ≤  because Com is -statistically-hiding. It
follows that ∑
i∈[n]\I
∣∣∣∣Pr
M1
(ci)− Pr
M2
(ci)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ L .
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In summary, we obtain
∆(CDk(M1, I),CDk(M2, I)) ≤ L .
Theorem 9.5. If COM and VC of Construction 9.2 are -extractable-binding, Con-
struction 9.2 is an ′-extractable-binding vector commitment scheme with ′(t1, tE , t2) =
L ∗ (t1 + tE/L, tE/L, t2).
Proof. Let t1, tE , t2 ∈ N and fix any t1-bounded algorithmA1 that on input k outputs
a commitment c.
We observe that because VC is -extractable-binding that there exists a tE -bounded
extraction algorithm E0 such that for any t2-bounded algorithm A2, for experi-
ment Setup → k, A1(k) →r c, A2(k, r) → (ci, d, i), and E0(k, r) → C, we have
VC.Verify(k2, ci, c, d, i) = 1 and Ci 6= ci with probability at most (t1, tE , t2).
Define Ai as an algorithm that on input k, samples r, computes E0(k, r) → C,
and outputs Ci.
For i > 0, define Ei as a tE -bounded extraction algorithm such that for any
t2-bounded algorithm A2, for experiment K → k, Ai(k) →r ci, Ei(k, r) → m′i,
A2(k, r) → (mi, di), we have COM.Verify(k1,mi, ci, di) = 1 and mi 6= m′i with prob-
ability at most (tE , tE , t2).
Now we define a message vector extraction algorithm E as follows. On input
(k, r), first compute E1(k, r)→r′ C. Then, for i ∈ [|C|], compute Ei(k, [r, r′])→ mi.
Output [m1, . . . ,m|C|].
We observe that for any t2-bounded algorithm A2, for experiment A1(k) →r c,
A2(k, r)→ (m, d, i), and E(k, r)→M , we have Verify(k,m, c, d, i) = 1 and Mi 6= m
with probability at most L ∗ (t1 + tE , tE , t2).
It follows that the vector commitment scheme described in Construction 9.2 is
′-extractable-binding with ′(t1, tE , t2) = L ∗ (t1 + tE/L, tE/L, t2).
9.2. ELSA: Efficient long-term secure storage
architecture
Now we present ELSA, a long-term secure storage architecture that efficiently pro-
tects large datasets. It provides long-term integrity and long-term confidentiality
protection of the stored data.
ELSA uses statistically-hiding and extractable-binding vector commitments (as
described in section 9.1) in combination with timestamps to achieve renewable and
privacy preserving integrity protection. The confidential data is stored using proac-
tive secret sharing to guarantee confidentiality protection secure against computa-
tional attacks. The data owner communicates with two subsystems (Figure 9.1),
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Data owner ShareholdersEvidence
Service
Timestamp
Service
Secret Shares
Commitments,
Timestamps
Figure 9.1.: Overview of the components of ELSA.
where one is responsible for data storage with confidentiality protection and the
other one is responsible for integrity protection. The evidence service is responsi-
ble for integrity protection updates and the secret share holders are responsible for
storing the data and maintaining confidentiality protection. The evidence service
also communicates with a timestamp service that is used in the process of evidence
generation.
9.2.1. Construction
We now describe the storage architecture ELSA in terms of the algorithms Init,
Store, RenewTs, RenewCom, RenewShares, and Verify. Algorithm Init initializes the
architecture, Store allows to store new files, RenewTs renews the protection if the
timestamp scheme security is weakened, RenewCom renews the protection if the
commitment scheme security is weakened, RenewShares renews the shares to protect
against a mobile adversary who collects multiple shares over time, and Verify verifies
the integrity of a retrieved file.
Initialization
The data owner uses algorithm ELSA.Init (Listing 9.1) to initialize the storage sys-
tem. The algorithm gets as input a proactive secret sharing scheme SHARE, a set of
shareholder addresses (shURLi)i∈[N ], a sharing threshold T , and an evidence service
address esURL. It then initializes the storage module SH by means of the proto-
col SHARE.Setup and the evidence service module ES. During the initialization of
the evidence service, the evidence list ES.evidence and the evidence renewal cache
ES.renewLists are initialized as empty lists.
The interface to the storage system is as follows. We write SH.Store(name, dat) to
denote that the data owner shares the data dat among the shareholders at location
name by means of the protocol SHARE.Share. If the shared data dat is larger then the
size of the message space of the secret sharing scheme, dat is first split into chunks
that fit into the message space and then the chunks are shared individually. Each
shareholder maintains a database that describes which shares belong to which data
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item name. We write SH.Retrieve(name) to denote that the data owner retrieves the
shares associated with the name name from the shareholders and reconstructs the
data by means of the protocol SHARE.Reconstruct.
Listing 9.1: ELSA.Init(SHARE, (shURLi)i∈[N ], T, esURL)
SH.Init(SHARE, (shURLi)i∈[N ], T );
ES.Init(esURL);
Data storage
The client uses algorithm ELSA.Store (Listing 9.2) to store a set of data files [filei]i∈[n].
For this, it chooses a signature instance SIG for signing the data, and a vector
commitment scheme VC and a timestamp scheme TS that protect the data and the
signature against ageing. Here, we assume that SIG is supplied with the secret key
necessary for signature generation and VC is supplied with the public parameters
necessary for commitment generation.
The algorithm first signs each of the data objects individually. It then stores
the file data, the public key certificate of the signature scheme instance, and the
generated signature at the secret sharing storage system. Afterwards, the algorithm
generates a vector commitment (c,D) to the file data vector and the signatures.
For each file, the corresponding decommitment is extracted and stored at the share-
holders. The file names filenames, the commitment scheme instance VC, the com-
mitment c, and the chosen timestamp scheme instance TS are sent to the evidence
service.
When the evidence service receives (filenames,VC, c,TS), it does the following
in algorithm AddCom (Listing 9.3). It first timestamps the commitment (VC, c)
and thereby obtains a timestamp ts. Then, it starts a new evidence list l =
[(VC, c,TS, ts)] and assigns this list with all the file names in filenames. Also,
it adds l to the list renewLists, which contains the lists that are updated on a
timestamp renewal.
Timestamp renewal
Algorithm ES.RenewTs (Listing 9.4) is performed by the evidence service regularly in
order to protect against the weakening of the currently used timestamp scheme and
employ a new timestamp scheme. The algorithm gets as input a vector commitment
scheme instance VC′ and a timestamp scheme instance TS. It first creates a vector
commitment (c′, D′) for the list of renewal items renewLists. Here, we are only
interested in the extractable-binding property of VC′, while the hiding property
is not relevant as all of the data stored at the evidence service is already hidden
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Listing 9.2: ELSA.Store([filei]i∈[n], SIG,VC,TS)
filenames← {};
for i ∈ [n] do
SIG.Sign(filei.dat)→ si;
SH.Store([’data’, filei.name], [filei.dat, SIG.Cert, si]);
filenames += filei.name;
end
VC.Commit([filei.dat, SIG.Cert, si]i∈[n])→ (c,D);
for i ∈ [n] do
VC.Extract(D, i)→ d;
SH.Store([’decom’, filei.name, i], d);
end
ES.AddCom(filenames,VC, c,TS);
Listing 9.3: ES.AddCom(filenames,VC, c,TS)
TS.Stamp((VC, c))→ ts;
l← [(VC, c,TS, ts)];
for name ∈ filenames do
evidence[name]← l;
renewLists += l;
end
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by the data owner. The freshly generated timestamp, commitment, and extracted
decommitments are added to the corresponding evidence lists.
Listing 9.4: ES.RenewTs(VC′,TS)
VC′.Commit(renewLists)→ (c′, D′);
TS.Stamp((VC′, c′))→ ts;
for i ∈ [|renewLists|] do
VC′.Extract(D′, i)→ d′;
renewLists[i] += (VC′, c′, d′,TS, ts);
end
Commitment renewal
The data owner runs algorithm ELSA.RenewCom (Listing 9.5) to protect against
a weakening of the security of the used commitment scheme. It chooses a new
commitment scheme instance VC and a new timestamp scheme instance TS and
proceeds as follows. First the current evidence lists ES.evidence are retrieved from
the evidence service and complemented with the decommitment values stored at
the shareholders. Next, a list with the data items, the signatures, and the current
evidence for each data item is constructed. This list is then committed to using
the vector commitment scheme VC. The decommitments are extracted and stored
at the shareholders, and the commitment is added to the evidence at the evidence
service using algorithm ES.AddComRenew.
Share renewal
There are two types of share renewal supported by ELSA. The first type (Listing 9.7)
triggers the share renewal protocol of the secret sharing system (i.e., the protocol
SHARE.Reshare). This interactive protocol refreshes the shares at the shareholders
so that old shares, which may have leaked already, cannot be combined with the
new shares, which are obtained after the protocol has finished, to reconstruct the
stored data. The second type (Listing 9.8) replaces the sharing scheme entirely. This
may be necessary if the configuration of the sharing scheme needs to be changed or
it has additional security properties like verifiability (see proactive verifiable secret
sharing [HJKY95]), which may require an update in order to remain secure. For
the second type, the data is retrieved, stored at the new shareholders, and the old
sharing system is shutdown.
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Listing 9.5: ELSA.RenewCom(VC,TS)
comIndices← {}; comCount← {}; L← [];
for name ∈ ES.evidence do
SH.Retrieve([’data’, name])→ (dat, SIG, s);
ES.evidence[name]→ e;
for i ∈ |e| do
if ei.VC 6= ⊥ then
SH.Retrieve([’decom’, name, i])→ ei.d;
end
end
L += (dat, SIG, s, e);
comIndices[name]← |L|;
comCount[name]← |e|;
end
VC.Commit(L)→ (c,D);
for name ∈ ES.evidence do
VC.Extract(D, comIndices[name])→ d;
SH.Store([’decom’, name, comCount[name]], d);
end
ES.AddComRenew(VC, c,TS);
Listing 9.6: ES.AddComRenew(VC, c,TS)
TS.Stamp((VC, c))→ ts;
l← [(VC, c,TS, ts)];
renewLists← [l];
for name ∈ evidence do
evidence[name] += l;
end
Listing 9.7: ELSA.RenewShares()
SH.Reshare();
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Listing 9.8: ELSA.RenewSharing(SHARE, (shURLi)i∈[N ], T )
SH′.Init(SHARE, (shURLi)i∈[N ], T );
I ← ES.itemInfos;
for name ∈ I do
SH.Retrieve(’data/’ + name)→ dat;
SH′.Store(’data/’ + name, dat);
end
SH.Shutdown();
SH← SH′;
Data Retrieval
The algorithm ELSA.Retrieve (Listing 9.9) describes the data retrieval procedure of
ELSA. It gets as input the name of the data file that is to be retrieved. It then
collects the evidence from the evidence service and the data from the shareholders.
Next, the evidence is complemented with the decommitments and then the algorithm
outputs the data with the corresponding evidence.
Listing 9.9: ELSA.Retrieve(name)
e← ES.evidence[name];
for i ∈ [|e|] do
if ei.VC 6= ⊥ then
SH.Retrieve([’decom’, name, i])→ ei.d;
end
end
SH.Retrieve([’data’, name])→ (dat, SIG, s);
E ← (SIG, s, e);
return (dat, E);
Verification
Algorithm ELSA.Verify (Listing 9.10) describes how a verifier can check the integrity
of a data item retrieved from ELSA. This algorithm gets as input a reference to the
PKI (e.g., a trust anchor), the current verification time tverify, the data to be checked
dat, the storage time tstore, and the corresponding evidence E. The algorithm returns
true, if dat is authentic and has been stored at time tstore.
In more detail, the verification algorithm proceeds as follows. It first checks
whether the signature s contained in E is valid for the data object dat under signa-
ture scheme instance SIG. It also checks whether E contains a valid decommitment
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from the first commitment to the data and the signature (dat, SIG, s) and the decom-
mitment has existed when the commitment was still valid. Here, NTT(i, E ′, tverify)
denotes the time of the next timestamp after position i in E ′ and NCT(i, E ′, tverify)
denotes the time of the timestamp corresponding to the next commitment after
position i and we set NTT(i, E ′, tverify) = tverify if i is the last timestamp and
NCT(i, E ′, tverify) = tverify if i is the last commitment in E ′.
Next, the algorithm iterates over the remaining |E ′| − 1 entries of E ′. For each
entry it checks whether it contains a recommitment. In this case, both, the com-
mitment c and the timestamp ts, are checked. If a timestamp renewal has been
performed, the commitment c′ and the timestamp ts are checked. If all checks
succeed, the algorithm returns 1, otherwise it returns 0.
Listing 9.10: ELSA.Verify(PKI, tverify : dat, tstore, E)→ b
(SIG, s, e)← E;
((VC, c, d), (VC′, c′, d′), (TS, ts))← ei;
tnt ← NTT(1, e, tverify); tnc ← NCT(1, e, tverify);
b← SIG.Verify(PKI, ts.t : dat, s);
b ∧= VC.Verify(PKI, tnc : (dat, SIG, s), c, d);
b ∧= TS.Verify(PKI, tnt : c, ts, tstore);
L← (VC, c,TS, ts);
for i ∈ [2, . . . , |e|] do
((VC, c, d), (VC′, c′, d′), (TS, ts))← ei;
tnt ← NTT(i, e, tverify); tnc ← NCT(i, e, tverify);
if VC = ⊥ then
b ∧= VC′.Verify(PKI, tnt : L, c′, d′);
b ∧= TS.Verify(PKI, tnt : c′, ts, ts.t);
L += (VC′, c′, d′,TS, ts);
else
dat′ ← (dat, Cert, s, e[1, i− 1]);
b ∧= VC.Verify(PKI, tnc : dat′, c, d);
b ∧= TS.Verify(PKI, tnt : c, ts, ts.t);
L← (VC, c,TS, ts);
end
end
return b;
9.2.2. Security
We now analyze the security of ELSA.
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Computational Model
In a long-running system we have to consider adversaries that increase their compu-
tational power over time. For example, they may increase their computation speed
or acquire new computational devices, such as quantum computers. We capture this
by using the computational model described in chapter 3.
Integrity
First, we analyze integrity protection, by which we mean that it should be infea-
sible for an adversary to forge a valid evidence list for a data object, but the data
object has not been authentically signed at the claimed time. This is captured in
the following definition, where we define security with respect to a set of schemes S
(e.g., commitment schemes, signature schemes, timestamp schemes) that are avail-
able within the context of the adversary. Also, we assume that each scheme instance
Si is associated with a breakage time tbi after which it is considered insecure. The
experiment (Listing 9.11) has a setup phase, where all the scheme instances are
initialized by means of parameter generation. We write Si.Setup() → (sk, pk) to
denote that a scheme potentially generates a secret parameter sk (e.g., a private
signing key) and a public parameter pk (e.g., a public verification key or the pa-
rameters of a commitment scheme instance). We allow the adversary to access the
secret parameters of an instance once it is considered insecure (via oracle Break).
Definition 9.5 (Integrity). We say ELSA is (M, )-unforgeable for schemes S, if
for any p-bounded machine A ∈M,
Pr
[
ExpForgeS (A) = 1
]
≤ (p) .
The experiment ExpForge is described in Listing 9.11.
Next, we prove that the unforgeability security of ELSA can be reduced to the
extractable binding security of the used commitment schemes and the unforgeability
of the used signature schemes within their validity period.
Theorem 9.6. Let M = (Mt)t specify which computational technology is available
at which point in time and let S be a set of cryptographic schemes, where each scheme
Si ∈ S is associated with a breakage time tbi and is i-secure against adversaries using
computational technology Mtbi . In particular, we require unforgeability-security for
signature schemes and extractable-binding-security for commitment schemes. Let
pE be any computational bound and L be an upper bound on the maximum vector
length of the commitment schemes in S. Then, ELSA is (M, )-unforgeable for S
with (p) = (∑i∈SIG i(p(tbi)pE(tbi)L2)) + (∑i∈COM i(p(tbi), pE(tbi), p(tbi))).
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Listing 9.11: ExpForgeS (A)
SetupExperiment();
AClock,PKI,SIG,TS,Break → (dat, tstore, E);
tverify ← time;
b← Verify(PKI, tverify; dat, tstore, E) ∧ dat 6∈ Qtstore ;
return b;
SetupExperiment():
time← 0;
for i ∈ [|S|] do
Si.Setup→ (sp, pp);
SP [i]← sp; PP [i]← pp;
end
Clock(t):
if t > time then
time← t;
end
PKI(i):
return PP [i];
Break(i):
if time ≥ Si.tb then
return SP [i];
end
SIG(i,m):
Assert Si.type = sig;
Q[time] += m;
Si.Sign(SP [i];m)→ s;
return s;
TS(i,m):
Assert Si.type = ts;
Sign(i; [time,m])→ s;
return (time, s);
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Proof. Suppose any p-bounded machine A that interacts with interfaces Clock, PKI,
SIG, and TS, and outputs (dat, tstore, E). For each signature scheme i ∈ SIG, con-
struct a machine Bi with the goal to break the unforgeability of scheme i until time tbi .
Bi in the signature unforgeability experiment gets as input a public key pk and access
to a signing oracle Sign. Its goal is to output (m, s) such that Si.Verify(pk,m, s) = 1
and the oracle Sign was not queried with m. Bi, on input pk, does the follow-
ing. It runs A until time tbi and simulates the environment of A with the following
difference. Bi sets the public key of signature scheme i to pk and whenever the
simulation of the experiment for A requires the generation of a signature for scheme
i, Bi requests the signature from the oracle Sign. While A is running, Bi searches
the outputs of A for a valid message-signature-pair, where the message has not been
queried to the signing oracle thus far. Bi also uses the extractable-binding property
of the commitment schemes, as follows. Whenever, A queries the timestamp service
TS with a commitment, then Bi uses a pE-bounded commitment message extrac-
tor to extract the corresponding messages out of A. Let L be an upper bound on
the maximum length supported by all the used vector commitment schemes COM.
Then, Bi runs in at most pBi = p(tbi) ∗ pE(tbi) ∗ L2 operations and adheres to the
computational model Mtbi .
We observe that an evidence object E is a sequence (SIG, s, CDT1, . . . , CDTn),
where CDTi = (VCi, ci, di,VC′i, c′i, d′i,TSi, tsi). Define CTi = (VC′i, c′i, d′i,TSi, tsi).
The verification algorithm of ELSA ensures that tsi is a valid timestamp for (VCj, cj,
CTj, . . . , CTi−1), where j is the largest index such that VCj 6= ⊥ and j ≤ i. If
VCj 6= ⊥, then it also ensures that di is a valid opening of ci to (dat, SIG, s, CDT1,
. . . , CDTi−1). It follows that in every run in which A outputs (dat, tstore, E) with
Verify(PKI, tverify; dat, tstore, E) = 1 and dat 6∈ Qtstore , there is at least one Bi that
wins its unforgeability experiment before time tbi or at least one of the extractors
used by Bi fails. Hence, the probability that A breaks ELSA is upper bounded
by (∑i∈SIG i(pBi)) + (∑i∈COM i(p(tbi), pE(tbi), p(tbi))), where COM denotes the set of
commitment schemes and SIG denotes the set of signature schemes of S.
Confidentiality
Next, we analyze confidentiality protection of ELSA. Intuitively, we require that
an adversary with unbounded computational power who observes the data that is
received by the evidence service and a subset of the shareholders does not learn
any substantial information about the stored data. In particular, it should be guar-
anteed that an adversary does not learn anything about unopened files even if it
retrieves some of the other files and the corresponding signatures, commitments,
and timestamps.
We model this intuition by requiring that any (unbounded) adversary A should
not be able to distinguish whether it interacts with a system that stores a file vector
F1 or a system that stores another file vector F2, if A only opens a subset I of
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files and F1 and F2 are identical on I. This is modeled in experiment ExpDIST
(Algorithm 9.12), where we use the following notation. For a secret sharing scheme
SHARE we denote by SHARE.AS the set of authorized shareholder subsets that can
reconstruct the secret. For a protocol P, we write 〈P〉View to denote an execution of
P where View contains all the data sent and received by the involved parties. For an
involved party P , we write View(P) to denote the data sent and received by party
P .
Definition 9.6 (Confidentiality). We say ELSA is -statistically-hiding for S, if for
all machines A, subsets I, sets of files F1, F2 with (F1)I = (F2)I , for all L ∈ N,∣∣∣Pr [ExpDistS,L(A, F1, I) = 1]− Pr [ExpDistS,L(A, F2, I) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ (L) .
The experiment ExpDIST is described in Algorithm 9.12.
Next, we show that ELSA indeed provides confidentiality protection as defined
above if statistically hiding secret sharing and commitment schemes are used.
Theorem 9.7. Let S be a set of schemes, where S.SHARE is an -statistically-hiding
secret sharing scheme and every commitment scheme in S is -statistically-hiding.
Then, ELSA is ′-statistically-hiding for S with ′(L) = 2L.
Proof. We observe that the statistical distance between the view of the evidence
service and the receiver for F1 and the view for F2 is at most  per call to ELSA′ be-
cause the vector commitment schemes in S are -statistically-hiding. The statistical
distance between the view of an unauthorized subset of shareholders for F1 and the
view of the same subset of shareholders for F2 is also at most  because the secret
sharing scheme is -statistically-hiding. It follows that the statistical distance for
each query of the adversary diverges by at most 2. Hence, overall the statistical
distance is bounded by 2L.
With regards to protecting the network communication between the data owner
and the shareholders we ideally require that information theoretically channels are
used (e.g., based on Quantum Key Distribution and One-Time-Pad Encryption
[GRTZ02]), so that a network provider, who could potentially intercept all of the
secret share packages, cannot learn any information about the communicated data.
If information theoretically secure channels are not available, we recommend to use
very strong symmetric encryption (e.g., AES-256 [Nat01]).
9.3. Performance evaluation
We compare the performance of our new architecture ELSA with the performance of
the storage architecture LINCOS (cf. chapter 7), which is the fastest existing storage
architecture that provides long-term integrity and long-term confidentiality.
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Listing 9.12: ExpDistS,L(A, F iles, I)
SetupExperiment();
AClock,ELSA′ → b;
return b;
SetupExperiment():
time← 0; N ← 0;
Generate parameters for S;
ELSA.Init(S.SHARE, SH,ES);
Clock(t):
if t > time then
time← t;
end
ELSA′(op, param):
if N < L then
N += 1; T ← T ′;
if op = Store ∧ param 6∈ S.SHARE.AS then
〈ELSA.Store(Files, param)〉View;
T ← param;
else if op = Retrieve ∧ param ∈ I then
〈ELSA.Retrieve(param)〉View;
else if op = ReTs then
〈ELSA.RenewTs(param)〉View;
else if op = ReCom then
〈ELSA.RenewCom(param)〉View;
else if op = ReShare ∧ param 6∈ S.SHARE.AS then
〈ELSA.RenewShares()〉View;
T ′ ← param;
end
return View(ES, SHT , Receiver);
end
9.3.1. Protection Scenario
For our evaluation we consider a scenario inspired by the task of securely storing
electronic health records in a medium sized doctor’s office. The storage time frame
is 100 years. Every month, 10 new data items of size 10 kB (e.g., prescription data
of patients) are added. Every year, one document from each of the previous years
is retrieved and verified (e.g., historic prescription data is read from the archives).
We assume the following renewal schedule for protecting the evidence against the
weakening of cryptographic primitives. The signatures are renewed every 2 years,
as this is a typical lifetime of a public key certificate, which is needed to verify
the signatures. While signature scheme instances can only be secure as long as the
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Table 9.1.: Overview of the used commitment and signature scheme instances and
their usage period.
Years Signatures Commitments
2018-2030 RSA-2048 HM-256
2031-2066 XMSS-256 HM-256
2067-2091 XMSS-256 HM-256
2091-2118 XMSS-512 HM-512
corresponding private signing key is not leaked to an adversary, commitment scheme
instances do not involve the usage of any secret parameters. Therefore, their security
is not threatened by key leakage and we assume that they only need to be renewed
every 10 years in order to adjust the cryptographic parameter sizes or to choose a
new and more secure scheme.
In our architecture we instantiate signature and commitment schemes as follows.
As signature scheme, we first use the RSA Signature Scheme [RSA78] and then
switch to the post-quantum secure XMSS signature scheme [BDH11] by 2030, as
we anticipate the development of large-scale quantum computers. Both of these
schemes satisfy unforgeability security as required by Theorem 9.6. As the vector
commitment scheme we use Construction 9.2 with the statistically hiding commit-
ment scheme by Halevi and Micali [HM96] whose security is based on the security of
the used hash function which we instantiate with members of the SHA-2 hash func-
tion family [Nat02]. If we model hash functions as random oracles, the extractable-
binding property required by Theorem 9.6 is provided. This vector commitment
scheme construction also provides statistical hiding security as required by Theo-
rem 9.7. We adjust the signature and commitment scheme parameters over time as
proposed by Lenstra and Verheul [LV01, Len04]. The resulting parameter sets are
shown in Table 9.1.
For the storage system, we use the secret sharing scheme by Shamir [Sha79]. We
run this scheme with 4 shareholders and a threshold of 3 shareholders are required
for reconstruction. Secret shares are renewed every 5 years, where the resharing is
carried out centrally by the data owner.
9.3.2. Results
We now present the results of our performance analysis. Figure 9.2 compares the
computation time of the two systems, ELSA and LINCOS, and Figure 9.3 and Fig-
ure 9.4 compare the storage costs. The implementation was done using the pro-
gramming language Java. The experiments were performed on a computer with a
quad-core AMD Opteron CPU running at 2.3 GHz and the Java virtual machine
was assigned 32 GB of RAM.
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Figure 9.2.: Running time of the experiment.
Figure 9.2 shows that ELSA is much more computationally efficient compared
to LINCOS. Completing the experiment using LINCOS took approximately 6.81 h,
while it took only 24 min using ELSA. The biggest difference in the timings is ob-
served when renewing timestamps. Timestamp renewal with LINCOS for year 2116
takes 21.89 min, while it takes only 0.34 s with ELSA. Data storage performance is
also considerably faster with ELSA than with LINCOS. The same holds for the com-
mitment renewal procedure. Data retrieval and verification performance is similar
for the two systems.
Next, we observe by Figure 9.3 that ELSA is also more efficient compared to
LINCOS when it comes to the consumed storage space at the evidence service. This
is, again, because ELSA requires fewer timestamps to be generated and stored than
LINCOS. After running for 100 years, the evidence service of ELSA consumes only
17.27 MB while the evidence service of LINCOS consumes 1.75 GB of storage space.
We observe by Figure 9.4 that ELSA consumes slightly more storage space at the
shareholders than LINCOS. This is because additional decommitment information
for the vector commitments must be stored. After running for 100 years, a share-
holder of ELSA consumes about 748 MB while a shareholder of LINCOS consumes
about 559 MB of storage space.
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Figure 9.3.: Storage space consumed by the evidence service.
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Figure 9.4.: Storage space consumed by a shareholder.
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10. Conclusions
Summary of contributions. The contributions of this thesis are two-fold. Part I
improves our understanding of the computational security of cryptographic schemes
that are intended to provide protection over long periods of time (i.e., decades or
centuries). Part II solves the problem of combining renewable integrity protection
with information-theoretic confidentiality protection.
In Part I we first developed a new computational model that captures long-lived
computationally-bounded entities whose computational power per unit of time in-
creases over time. Based on this model, we then provided security proofs for long-
term integrity protection schemes based on signature-based timestamps and hash-
based timestamps. We also proposed a new cryptographic primitive called long-term
commitment which is a cryptographic commitment that is information-theoretically
hiding and long-term binding.
In Part II, we then gave the first construction of a long-term secure storage sys-
tem that provides renewable integrity and authenticity protection and information-
theoretically secure confidentiality protection. We also proposed a variation of this
construction which additionally provides long-term access pattern hiding security
and a variation which achieves improved performance for databases that contain a
large number of small data items.
Directions for future work. We see several directions for future work. One im-
portant open problem is to prove the security of efficient and privacy-preserving
long-term integrity schemes based on standard cryptographic assumptions. So far,
our analysis of hash-based long-term time-stamping and long-term commitments ei-
ther requires an idealized setting (e.g., the ideal primitive model), or non-standard
assumptions (e.g., the existence of extractable collision resistant hash functions).
With respect to our long-term secure storage architecture, it would be worthwhile
to extend it to support multiple data owners that store their data collectively and can
selectively share parts of it with each other. Foreseeably, this requires the integration
of access control mechanisms into the existing architecture and the development
of new ORAM schemes that support multiple data owners. Another important
research challenge is to enable secure computation on the stored and protected
data. This could be achieved, for example, by using secure multiparty computation
protocols. Such protocols could also be used for performing commitment renewals,
which are currently performed by the data owner. Then, long-term integrity and
confidentiality protection without the help of the data owner would be possible.
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With respect to the components of our storage architecture, it would be desir-
able to improve the efficiency of proactive secret sharing for storing large amounts
of data. The existing schemes are designed for small datasizes on the order of
a few kilobytes, but storage architectures must often handle data of size several
megabytes up to several gigabytes. Furthermore, a wide class of proactive secret
sharing schemes relies on computationally binding and statistically hiding homo-
morphic commitment schemes, but the currently used schemes are insecure against
quantum computers. Thus, post-quantum secure commitment scheme candidates
for proactive secret sharing must be explored. Besides proactive secret sharing,
our architecture ideally requires information-theoretically secure channels to pro-
vide long-term confidentiality protection of data in transit. The most promising
technology for this currently is Quantum Key Distribution, but its performance
and availability is still limited. Current QKD technology only allows for channel
transmission rates of a few hundred kilobits per second over a distance of at most
a few hundred kilometers. The performance of QKD technology must be improved
and the practicality of quantum repeaters, which are required for establishing end-
to-end secure connections over longer distances, must be demonstrated. Moreover,
new connection establishment and channel protocols with support for Quantum Key
Distribution and information-theoretically encryption must be developed and their
security must be analyzed.
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